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"Again we must call on the Legislature to sort out the parental rights
and responsibilities of those involved in artificial reproduction. No
matter what one thinks of artificial insemination, traditional and
gestational surrogacy (in all its permutations), and-as now appears in
the no-too-distant future, cloning and even gene splicing-courts are
still going to be faced with the problem of determining lawful parentage.
A child cannot be ignored. Even if all means of artificial reproduction
were outlawed with draconian criminal penalties visited on the doctors
and parties involved, courts would still be called upon to decide who the
lawful parents are and who-other than the taxpayers-is obligated to
provide maintenance and support for the child. These cases will not go
away.
I. INTRODUCTION
California's present approach to determining the identity of a child's parents in
the eyes of the law has its roots in an age when it was scientifically impossible to
determine identity of the genetic parent, when the only way to create a child was
by sexual intercourse between a man and a woman with the woman giving birth,
and when society had a much narrower view of who should be allowed to have a
parental relationship with a child. Even when scientifically reliable evidence of
genetic2 paternity and maternity became readily available, pre-scientific notions
still controlled the system of determining parentage.3 An outmoded and confusing
1. In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 293 (Ct. App. 1998).
2. Because this article is about parentage and sorting out the various criteria or standards to be used to
determine a child's parent, I have found it necessary to almost always use an adjective before the words "father,"
"mother," or "parent." The great variety of these terms confirms the complexity of this subject; however, most of
the terms are used in their everyday meanings. "Fathers," "mothers," and "parents" can all be "genetic," "genetic-
biological," or "adoptive." In addition, they can also be "psychological" (meaning an adult parental figure who has
a psychological or emotional relationship with the child to such a degree that we refer to it as parental), "intended"
(meaning a person defined as the "intended parent" in the case of Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993)), or
"contractual" (referring to a parent designated as such in a contract of assisted conception). Fathers can also be
"presumed" fathers of which there are two varieties, "conclusively presumed" and "rebuttably presumed." These
terms have their origin in the two types of statutory presumptions of paternity, the conclusive presumption of
California Family Code section 7540, and the rebuttable presumptions of California Family Code section 7611.
CAL. FAM. CODE § 7540 (West 1994 & Supp. 2003); id. § 7611. Mothers are most often "birth mothers,"
"surrogate mothers," or "gestational mothers." The term "birth mother" is used to identify the woman who is
designated the child's mother by virtue of the fact that she gave birth to the child. "Surrogate mother" and
"gestational mother" also give birth to a child but these terms designate a woman who has contracted to gestate and
deliver a child to other parents. "Gestational mother" is the term used by the Uniform Parentage Act (2000) (UPA
(2000)) to replace "surrogate mother," so the terms are really synonymous. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 102(1 1)
(enacted 2002), 9B U.L.A. 303 (2001). One adjective that I have rarely used is the term "natural" to modify either
"father," "mother," or "parent." "Natural parent" is used numerous times in the California Family Code to
designate the person who will have the parent and child relationship with the child. See, e.g., CAL FAM. CODE
§ 7611 (West 1994 & Supp. 2003). In a sense, this article is about determining who is the child's natural parent.
3. Perhaps the best example of this phenomenon is Justice Scalia's plurality opinion in Michael H. v.
Gerald D., in which Justice Scalia found substantive due process protection for the family but not for the genetic
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system of presumptions plays a central role in the California statutory scheme.4 In
such determinations, California still has a conclusive presumption of paternity,5
although it has been modified in a manner which makes it rebuttable to some
extent.6 In addition to the conclusive presumption, there is a series of rebuttable
presumptions, adopted from the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) which also deals
with paternity.' In adopting these rebuttable presumptions from the UPA, the
California Legislature ignored the fact that the conclusive presumption of paternity
was conspicuously absent from the UPA. Although both the conclusive and the
rebuttable presumptions were originally established as methods of determining
legitimacy and paternity, these presumptions have been imbued with the patina of
protecting the intact family.8 But in the end, this system of presumptions does not
protect the intact family,9 it does not protect the child's relationship with a
psychological parent,'0 and it does not protect the best interest of the child."
parent. 491 U.S. 110, 124 (1989). Applying the traditional test to determine fundamental rights, Justice Scalia could
not conclude that a genetic father had a fundamental right to a relationship with his child simply because
traditionally it was impossible to determine a child's genetic father. Id. Similarly, in Johnson v. Calvert, the
California Supreme Court resolved a parentage issue between a gestational surrogate mother and the genetic mother
by resorting to an intent test, under which the mother was determined to be the woman who had intended to create
life, rather than simply saying the mother was the genetic mother, because the statutory scheme in existence at that
time gave no special weight to the genetic parent. 851 P.2d at 782 & n. 10.
4. In California these presumptions are found at California Family Code sections 7540 and 7600-7730.,
(West 1994 & Supp. 2003), which California adopted from the Uniform Parentage Act. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACt
(1973), 9B U.L.A. 377 (2001).
5. CAL FAM. CODE § 7540 (West 199 & Supp. 2003). For the sake of easy reference, throughout this article
I have referred to the presumption in this code section as the conclusive presumption. At one time this presumption
was not rebuttable in the sense that, once the foundational requirements of the presumption had been established,
evidence could not be admitted to rebut the presumption. I have used the term "conclusive" to easily distinguish
this presumption from those "rebuttable" presumptions of Family Code section 7611. Id. § 7611. The fact that the
presumptions in both sections 7540 and 7611 are rebuttable, supports the argument that section 7540 should be
abolished.
6. The presumption is rebuttable by the presumed father himself, by the child's birth mother, and by another
man who is a presumed father under section 7611. Id. § 754 1(b)-(c). The presumption, even with the present
modification, cannot be rebutted by a mere genetic father unless that genetic father is also a presumed father. See id
(omitting genetic father from the list).
7. Id. § 7611 (adopted, with changes, from UNIF. PARENrAGEACr (1973), 9B U.L.A. 377 (2001)). There is
also a statutory test for determining maternity which is not stated as a presumption. ("Between a child and the
natural mother, [the parent-child relationship] may be established by proof of her having given birth to the
child .... CAL FAM. CODE § 7610(a) (West 1994)) but which has been treated very much like a presumption by
the California Supreme Court. See Johnson, 851 P.2d 776.
8. See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 124; Dawn D. v. Superior Court, 952 P.2d 1139, 1144-45 (Cal. 1998)
(referring to the concept that the interests of the family are stronger than those of the biological parent).
9. See discussion infra Part m.A.2.
10. Of all the presumptions, only one even hints at the possibility of a psychological relationship: California
Family Code section 7611 (d) states that a man will be presumed to be a child's father if he "receives the child into
his home and openly holds out the child as his natural child." CAL FAM. CODE § 761 l(d) (West 1994 & Supp.
2003). Still, it is obvious that a man could fulfill this requirement without having a psychological relationship with
the child. The other presumptions merely refer to the presumed father's relationship to the mother. The Uniforn
Parentage Act allows a man to be a presumed father if "he acknowledges his paternity of the child in a writing filed
with the [appropriate court or Vital Statistics Bureau] ... " a provision which at least shows a desire of the putative
father to have some relationship, including a psychological one, with the child. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4(a)(5)
(1973), 9B U.L.A. 394 (2001).
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The California Legislature has done very little to modernize the statutory
scheme governing parentage; regarding assisted conception, it has buried its head
in the sand. While the California statutory scheme has gradually expanded the role
of genetic testing, the legislative process has stopped short of making the genetic-
biological relationship the baseline test for parentage. As a result, the California
statutory scheme still greatly favors certain putative parents over others.'2 As to
new developments of assisted reproduction, the California parenthood scheme has
also failed to change in another way: the scheme is almost entirely silent on
determining parentage when assisted reproduction is involved. In terms of
parentage, there is only one reference to assisted reproduction in the California
statutes. Family Code section 7613 establishes that a husband who consents to his
wife's artificial insemination is the father of the child 3 and that the donor, if he
provided the sperm to a licensed physician, is not the father. 4 There is no
equivalent provision governing ovum extraction, ovum donation, or in vitro
fertilization. Most importantly, the statute is silent about surrogacy.
The California Legislature" has simply failed to recognize that there are new
factors, both scientific and sociological, which the California statutory scheme
11. Indeed, presumptions fail to safeguard the best interests of the child. In a contested parentage case, a
hearing would be required to resolve the fact-intensive question of what is in the best interest of the child.
Presumptions prevent hearings, or at least hearings in which all of the interested parties are present. The
interested party most likely to be absent is the unwed father. Keeping the unwed father out of the picture may
have been one of the rationales for presumptions: this person was presumed to be unfit. See Stanley v. Illinois,
405 U.S. 645 (1972) (considering whether a legal presumption that an unwed father is an unfit parent and
removing his children from his custody based only on that presumption and with no hearing violated the Equal
Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment).
12. The man who is married to the mother is the most favored. He is favored over both the biological
father and even the birth mother. He can disavow his paternity easily through genetic evidence, CAL. FAM.
CODE § 7541(b) (West 1994 & Supp. 2003), and, when either the conclusive presumption or a rebuttable
presumption is involved, he can prevent the genetic father from asserting his paternity. Id. §§ 7540, 7611. When
the conclusive presumption is involved, the mother can challenge her husband's paternity only if she has an
affidavit from the biological father that he will support the child. Id. § 7541(c). There is also a bias favoring
birth mothers over genetic fathers who are not married to the mother. The birth mother can simply cut off any
rights of a genetic father by engaging in conduct which establishes another man as the presumed father, id.
§ 7611, or she can limit the ability of the genetic father to establish his paternity by relinquishing the child for
adoption. Id. § 7662. However, unless there is a conclusively presumed father, she can establish the paternity of
the genetic father merely through genetic testing. Id. § 7541(c). The fathers who are not presumed fathers have
the least rights of any party to establish their paternity. If there is a presumed father who has not disavowed
paternity, the non-presumed father has no right whatsoever to assert his paternity. Id. § 7541. If the mother has
chosen to relinquish the child for adoption, the genetic father, if he is not a presumed father must, in order to
establish his paternity, prove not only his genetic relationship with the child but also that it is in the best interest
of the child that his parental rights not be terminated. Id. § 7664.
13. Id. § 7613(a) (West 1994).
14. Id. § 7613(b).
15. While both the United States Supreme Court and the California Supreme Court, out of respect for
tradition, have upheld portions of the California scheme, they have done little to make this scheme more
consistent with modern views regarding the nature of determining parenthood. The United States Supreme
Court has never had great respect for the purely genetic parent, requiring the genetic parent to have participated
in the child's upbringing in order for a fundamental right to attach. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983);
Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978); Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645 (1972). In Michael H., Justice Scalia, having perhaps the narrowest view of tradition among the
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has not taken into account. It is now possible to establish without doubt the
genetic parents of a child.' 6 Sperm donation and artificial insemination can be
done by amateurs. 7 Ovum donation is a routine procedure, but not a simple one.
In vitro fertilization is a daily occurrence. Cloning of humans is such a scientific
likelihood that it has been banned. Tentative steps are already being taken in the
creation of an artificial womb, and there is no reason to believe that it will not be
perfected someday. 9 New technology means that new avenues exist for childless
couples to have children, and that children whose parentage cannot be
determined under the present system will be brought into this world.
Supreme Court Justices, in a plurality decision rejected the view that Lehr, Caban, Quilloin, and Stanley
established "that a liberty interest is created by biological fatherhood plus an established parental relationship-
factors that exist in the present case as well" and stated that "[wie think that distorts the rationale of those cases.
As we view them, they rest not upon such isolated factors but upon the historic respect-indeed, sanctity would
not be too strong a term-traditionally accorded to the relationships that develop within the unitary family."
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123 (1989). Although the California Supreme Court has slavishly
adopted the techno-phobic views of Justice Scalia and followed Michael H. in holding that there is no
constitutional protection for the parental relationship outside of the family, Dawn D. v. Superior Court, 952
P.2d 1139, 1140 (Cal. 1998), the only real gap that the court has filled in the incomplete California scheme was
in Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993). In Johnson, the court adopted a somewhat novel approach to
determining parenthood in a surrogacy case between the gestational mother and the genetic mother. id. The
court applied the intent of the parties to determine parentage, but has failed to deal with the inadequacies of this
test as pointed out in a devastating dissent by Justice Kennard. Id. at 781-82, 791-93.
16. See discussion infra Part III.A.4.
17. See generally Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 224 Cal. Rptr. 530 (Ct. App. 1986); In re Marriage of
Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893 (Ct. App. 1994).
18. California Health and Safety Code section 24185 states as follows:
(a) No person shall clone a human being or engage in human reproductive cloning.
(b) No person shall purchase or sell an ovum, zygote, embryo, or fetus for the purpose of
cloning a human being.
(c) For purposes of this chapter, the following definitions apply:
(1) "Clone" means the practice of creating or attempting to create a human being by
transferring the nucleus from a human cell from whatever source into a human or
non human egg cell from which the nucleus has been removed for the purpose of, or
to implant, the resulting product to initiate a pregnancy that could result in the birth
of a human being.
(2) "Department" means the State Department of Health Services.
(3) "Human reproductive cloning" means the creation of a human fetus that is
substantially genetically identical to a previously born human being. The
department may adopt, interpret, and update regulations, as necessary, for purposes
of more precisely defining the procedures that constitute human reproductive
cloning.
California Health and Safety Code § 24185 (West Supp. 2003). See generally Janet L. Dolgin, Foreword:
Cloning Debate, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 473 (1999) (discussing the moral, ethical, and legal implications of
cloning); Nanette Elster, Who Is the Parent in Cloning?, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 533 (1999) (exploring how
existing laws relating to parentage, surrogacy, egg donation, and artificial insemination may apply in the
cloning context to clarify the parent-child relationship established through cloning); Clarke D. Forsythe, Human
Cloning and the Constitution, 32 VAL. U. L. REV. 469 (1998) (discussing whether cloning is a constitutional
liberty encompassed within the liberty created by Roe v. Wade and whether legislation regulating cloning may
pass constitutional muster).
19. Robin McKie, Men Redundant? Now We Don't Need Women Either: Scientists Have Developed an
Artificial Womb that Allows Embryos to Grow Outside the Body, THE OBSERVER, Feb. 10, 2002, at 7. In a world
which utilizes the artificial womb, the relationship of every human being, male or female, to his or her offspring is
that of a father.
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The nature of the family and marriage is also changing. Indeed, most articles
written today regarding the determination of parentage deal with what might be
called new family relationships. 0 It is clear that many children are being raised in
families that are different from what might be called the "traditional family." A
large percentage of children are raised in single-parent homes."' A remarkable
number of couples who have children choose not to get married, at least at the
outset of their child-rearing years.22 We know that fathers can adequately rear
children, even babies, alone, and that far more of them are doing so than in the
past.23 Many states allow single people, and same-sex couples barred from
marriage, to adopt. Nevertheless, the law now governing who is a parent was
framed long before any of these changes took place.
The purpose of this article is to propose a system of determining parentage that
takes advantage of modem genetic testing but is not a slave to it, that takes into
account new technology and indeed could be expanded to meet the technology of
the future, and that also allows for changes in society's collective opinion about
who should raise children and which adults should have a right to have a
relationship with a child. It is possible, in a very simple manner, for legislation to
modify the California scheme governing parenthood in a way that will create a
degree of certainty which has not been present in California parentage law, remove
the need for judicial gap-filling, and adequately meet the demands of new
reproductive technology and the needs of contemporary families which appear in
many and varied manifestations. This proposed model uses the genetic relationship
as the starting point,24 relegates the traditional presumptions to the minor role of
determining parentage in situations where parentage itself is not being litigated,
and creates pragmatic, easily implemented criteria to determine when someone
other than the genetic parent is to be designated as a child's parent.
20. See infra Part II.
21. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, SERIES
P23-194, POPULATION PROFILE OF THE UNITED STATES: 1997, 27 (1998).
22. Id. at 26-27.
23. Id. at 27.
24. Indeed, the impetus for me in investigating the subject of parentage and pursuing this article was the
injustice that I felt in the treatment of genetic fathers, especially those who had not had the opportunity to
develop a participatory relationship with their children. The case of Lehr v. Robertson represented not only a
cramped and grudging view of due process but a rank injustice as well. 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983). On an
intuitive and emotional level, the other United States Supreme Court cases dealing with parental rights, Caban
v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979), Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978), and Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645 (1972), all seemed wrong to me, not because of the results but because of the rationales. To me it seemed
that fatherhood, even on the constitutional level, did not commence once the father had participated in a child's
life, but, rather, fatherhood existed as a result of the genetic relationship, and could be lost through neglect. In
other words, the genetic relationship stood for something both in the real world and in the realm of human
rights. The proper model for me was Adoption of Kelsey S., which recognized the right of the genetic father who
attempted to form a relationship with his child. 823 P.2d 1216 (Cal. 1992). In this light and on the intuitive
level, the plurality opinion of the United States Supreme Court in Michael H. v. Gerald D. seemed to lead to the
absurd conclusion that the genetic relationship counted for nothing and that the family included just about every
relationship but that of the genetic father and his child. 491 U.S. 110, 123 n.3, 124 (1989).
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The model presented in this article for a legislative parentage scheme in
California has three parts. The first, which I refer to as the baseline, makes the
genetic parent the parent for all purposes unless another person has been
designated as the child's parent by operation of law. Present California law can
be easily modified to achieve this result simply by abolishing the conclusive
presumption and by making the rebuttable presumptions truly rebuttable: that is,
all genetic fathers, not just genetic fathers who are also presumed fathers, could
rebut the presumptions. The second part, the bright-line, requires that, except for
cases of artificial insemination,2 in all instances of assisted conception in which
someone other than the genetic parent is the intended parent of the child, there be
21a judicially pre-validated contract. Implementation of this part would require
legislation that not only states that assisted conception requires a pre-validated
contract, but also sets forth specific requirements for that judicial validation.
Finally, the third part, which would also necessitate legislation, requires that, in
all instances of assisted conception where there is either no contract or an
unenforceable contract due to lack of judicial pre-validation, the best interest of
the child standard be used to determine parentage.
II. THE CALIFORNIA STATUTORY SCHEME
A. Paternity
1. The Conclusive Presumption
California Family Code section 7540,27 commonly called "the conclusive
presumption," is not a conclusive presumption at all-at least for two years from
the birth of the child whose paternity is in question; 8 in a sense, it is actually a
rebuttable presumption that at one time was absolutely conclusive. The language
of the presumption is straightforward: "the child of a wife cohabiting with her
husband, who is not impotent or sterile, is conclusively presumed to be a child of
the marriage."29 However, at the present time, section 7541(a) of the Family
25. CAL. FAM. CODE§ 7613 (West 1994); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5 (1973), 9B U.L.A. 407 (2001).
26. Pre-validation simply means that the assisted conception contract must be judicially approved before
the conception is allowed to take place. While this concept has been borrowed from the UPA (2000), the UPA
(2000) does not actually use the terms "pre-validation" or "pre-validated"; however, the first line of the
comment to the pertinent section makes it clear that validation must take place before conception: "This pre-
conception authorization process for a gestational agreement is roughly analogous to adoption procedures in
place in most jurisdictions as of December 2000." UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 803 cmt (2000), 9B U.L.A, 362
(2001).
27. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7540 (West 1994 & Supp. 2003).
28. Id. § 7541.
29. Id. § 7540 (West 1994). There is an ambiguity in this language which is only partially apparent on
the face of the statute: at what point does the wife have to be cohabiting with the husband? Cases have made it
clear that the presumption will arise when the wife and the husband are cohabiting at the time of conception.
See, e.g., In re Marriage of Freeman, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 439 (Ct. App. 1996). Accord Dawn D. v. Superior Court,
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Code ° states that the presumption of paternity can be rebutted by blood tests
under sections 7550 through 75573! which show that the husband is not the father
of the child if the action is brought within two years of the child's birth.32 The
presumption can be rebutted by the husband" of the woman who gave birth, by a
man who is a presumed father under the rebuttable presumptions of paternity,'
4
by the birth mother herself if she has an affidavit acknowledging paternity from
the biological father,35 or by the guardian ad litem of the child.36 Conspicuously
absent from the group of people who can rebut the presumption is the child's
genetic father who has no status as a presumed father; for example, an unwed
father who has never had the opportunity to receive the child into his home and
hold the child out as his own would not have the right to rebut the presumption.
7
952 P.2d 1139, 1140 (Cal. 1998); In re Estate of McNamara, 183 P. 552, 555-56 (Cal. 1919); Brian C. v. Ginger
K., 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 294, 298 (Ct. App. 2000); San Francisco v. Strahlendorf, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 817, 818 (Ct. App.
1992); Fuss v. Superior Court, 279 Cal. Rptr. 46, 49 n.3 (Ct. App. 1991). The fact that conception serves as the
key time is additional evidence that the statute was actually designed for the purpose of determining who the
father was, not protecting the unitary family. Cf Susan H. v. Jack S., 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 120, 123 (Ct. App. 1994)
(stating that even though the conclusive presumption does "not comport with biological reality, [the
presumption] does not purport to determine factually the biological paternity of [the] child.").
30. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7541(a) (West 1994 & Supp. 2003).
31. Id. §§ 7550-7557. See Rodney F. v. Karen M., 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 399, 403 (Ct. App. 1998) (stating that
only blood tests authorized by the paternity statute, section 7541, "can overcome the conclusive presumption of
paternity").
32. CAL. FAM. CODE § 754 1(b) (West 1994 & Supp. 2003). The legislative intent behind the two-year
statute of limitations on paternity actions was that "biology will control determination of paternal responsibility
for a limited period early in a child's life and thereafter the predominant consideration must be the nature of the
presumed father's social relationship with the child." In re Marriage of Freeman, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 445-46
(citing William P. Hoffman, Jr., California's Tangled Web: Blood Tests and the Conclusive Presumption of
Legitimacy, 20 STAN. L. REV. 754, 761-62 (1968)).
33. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7541(b) (West 1994 & Supp. 2003).
34. Id. By "rebuttable presumptions of paternity," I am referring to the presumptions under the Uniform
Parentage Act, id. § 7611.
35. Id. § 7541(c). There are three situations in which the presumed father may not challenge the
presumption of his paternity: (I) where there is a judgment of paternity signed before Sept. 30, 1980, id.; (2)
where the child is conceived by artificial insemination; and (3) where the child is conceived by a surgical
procedure. Id. § 7541(e)(l)-(3).
36. Id. § 7541(b).
37. The exclusion of the non-presumed genetic father from the list of those who may rebut the
conclusive presumption has been upheld by the United States Supreme Court in Michael H. v. Gerald D. 491
U.S. 110 (1989). Justice Scalia announced the judgment of the Court and wrote an opinion which is most
notable for its substantive due process analysis and comments regarding the constitutional rights of unwed
parents who seek to establish parental relationships with their children. The legal effect of the case is debatable
because it is a very fragmented plurality decision and because subsequent legislation has modified the
California statute to remove the specific limitation that was upheld. (The genetic father who challenged the
conclusive presumption was also a presumed father under the "receiving and holding out" provision of section
7611(d), but at the time of his action there was no statutory provision for presumed fathers to rebut the
conclusive presumption. After Michael H., the California Legislature modified section 7541(b) to allow
presumed fathers to rebut the presumption.). CAL. FAM. CODE § 7541(b) (West 1994 & Supp. 2003). Despite
this legislative repudiation of Michael H., the California Supreme Court in Dawn D. v. Superior Court, did
adopt the reasoning of the plurality opinion of Justice Scalia. 952 P.2d 1139, 1140 (Cal. 1998). In his analysis of
the constitutional right of the genetic father to rebut the conclusive presumption, Justice Scalia acknowledged
that the term liberty in the Due Process Clause protects more than freedom from physical restraint, that there are
fundamental rights, that in determining these rights the Court "comes nearest to illegitimacy," Michael H., 491
U.S. at 122 (quoting the dissenting opinion of Justice White in Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 544
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It is evident from both the language and history of the conclusive presumption
that its primary purpose was to serve as a substitute for real evidence of who
fathered the child. In a sense, the presumption has always been a rule of• 38
expediency. As the court stated in In re Marriage of B.,
[e]arly California cases were able to justify the conclusive presumption
in question on the ground that no competent evidence could be adduced
to indicate who among those who had had intercourse with the wife
during the period of possible conception was the biological father of the
child born to her.39
While it might be argued that the presumption mainly operated relating to
matters concerning the legal concept of legitimacy and the integrity of the family,
regardless of paternity, 4° this view is belied by the fact that, before modern blood
testing, presumptions of paternity had never been applied where there was
physical evidence available to prove the father of the child was not the mother's
husband-where he was impotent or unavailable, for example.
When California legislatively adopted the conclusive presumption, it adopted
the common impotency exception and the requirement of cohabitation as well.
4
'
The common law allegiance to physical evidence of paternity has been continued
by subsequent acts of both the courts and the legislature evidenced by the
following: the willingness of the courts to allow racial characteristics to rebut the
(1977)), and that these rights must be "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked
as fundamental." Michael H., 491 U.S. at 122 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
However, Justice Scalia rejected the assertion of the genetic father (based upon Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248
(1983), Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979), Quilloin v. Woolcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978), and Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972)) that "biological fatherhood plus an established parental relationship--factors that
exist in the present case" create such a liberty interest. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 123. Justice Scalia instead
presented an alternate reading of these cases: "As we view them, they rest not upon such isolated factors but
upon the historic respect-indeed, sanctity would not be too strong a term-traditionally accorded to the
relationships that develop within the unitary family." Id. The end result was that the genetic father's challenge
failed because the conclusive presumption did not violate his substantive due process rights: "It is a question of
legislative policy and not constitutional law whether California will allow the presumed parenthood of a couple
desiring to retain a child conceived within and born into their marriage to be rebutted." Id. at 129-30. See
generally Gregory C. Cook, Footnote 6: Justice Scalia 's Attempt to Impose a Rule of Law on Substantive Due
Process, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 853 (1991) (arguing that the footnote 6 methodology proposed by Justice
Scalia is legally sound).
38. In re Lisa R., 532 P.2d 123, 132 (Cal. 1975) (stating that "a possible legitimate interest which the
state might assert in support of the conclusiveness of the presumption is speed and efficiency of judicial inquiry
in circumstances where such inquiry might seldom be productive."). See also Mindy S. Halpern, Comment,
Father Knows Best-But Which Father? California's Presumption of Legitimacy Loses Its Conclusiveness:
Michael H. v. Gerald D. and Its Aftermath, 24 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 275, 277 (1991).
39. 177 Cal. Rptr. 429, 431 (Ct. App. 1981).
40. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 124 (citing H. NICHOLAS, ADULTURINE BASTARDY 9-10 (1836), citing
BRACTON, DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS ANGIAE, bk. i, ch. 9, p. 6; bk. ii, ch. 29, p. 63; ch. 32, p. 70
(1569)). See also Banbury Peerage Case, 57 Eng. Rep 62 (H.L. 1811), cited in D. Le Marchant's Barony of
Gardner, app. note. E, 389 (1828). The case itself is much earlier than this report. Lord Banbury died in 1632.
41. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1962(5) (1963) (repealed 1965). "[T]he issue of a wife cohabiting with her
husband, who is not impotent, is indisputably presumed to be legitimate." Id. (emphasis added).
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presumptions; 42 the judicial and legislative addition of the sterility exception; 43
and the legislative creation of the right of the mother,44 mother's husband, 4' a
presumed father under Family Code section 7611, and the child to challenge the
presumption based upon blood tests.46
This allegiance to physical evidence of paternity is important because it
shows an unspoken preference in the California paternity scheme for the genetic
father as the person who should raise and support the child. The presumption as it
stands now allows a man who has not fathered a child to avoid serving as the
psychological and financial father of the child. This legislative policy probably
corresponds to the sensibilities of most people-it is unfair to require a man who
is not the father of a child to raise and support the child against his will. This
view is based upon the belief that the man who is not the biological father is not
sufficiently connected to the child to have such a responsibility. The requirement
that the mother have an affidavit from the biological father also indicates the
importance of the biological connection.4 ' The mother is not simply entitled to
find any man who will support the child (such as her new husband). She must
establish the biological connection to the father before she can challenge the
paternity of the conclusively presumed father.48
This preference for establishing the paternity of the biological father does
not, of course, preclude other rationales for the conclusive presumption. There
can be no doubt that there has always been a state interest in the financial
protection of children, in addition to merely protecting lineage and inheritance
rights. Moreover, the state has a general "desire to have an individual rather than
the state assume the financial burden of supporting the child., 49 Although this
interest is still apparent in the requirement that the birth mother have an affidavit
from the biological father in order to rebut the presumption, in recent times-
with the expansion of the right to rebut the conclusive presumption-the
protection of this interest has become subordinate to the interest in protecting the
presumed father who is not the biological father from having to pay support for a
child who is not his. The easiest way to implement this general interest in having
some man available to support the child would be simply to make the
presumption truly conclusive.
42. In re McNamara's Estate, 183 P. 552, 557-58 (Cal. 1919) (stating that the conclusive presumption
does not apply when indeterminability is absent because, for example, a "husband and wife are of the same race
... and it appears that the wife has had intercourse with a man of another race ... and the child is of mixed
blood.").
43. Hughes v. Hughes, 271 P.2d 172, 175 (Ct. App. 1954); 1975 Cal. Stat. 1244 § 13.
44. 1980Cal. Stat. 1310 § 1.
45. 1981 Cal. Stat. 1180 § 1.
46. 1990 Cal. Stat. 543 § 2.
47. CAL. FAM. CODE § 754 1(c) (West 1994 & Supp. 2003).
48. Id.
49. In re Marriage of B., 177 Cal. Rptr. 429, 432 (Ct. App. 198 1).
50. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7541(c) (West 1994 & Supp. 2003).
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Another rationale for the conclusive presumption is that it protects the
family. This is the rationale that captured the imagination of Justice Scalia in
Michael H. v. Gerald D. and served as the basis of his opinion upholding the
constitutionality of the presumption." There are a variety of ways to express this
rationale: protection of family integrity, protection of family privacy, or
protection of the unitary family." However, no matter how one phrases it, there is
really very little left in the modem presumptions that protects the family, at least
within the first two years after the child's birth. Within the family, the husband,
the wife, and the child (through a guardian) can all rebut the presumption and
destroy whatever integrity or unity still exists. 3 From outside the family, the
presumption and the family unit can be attacked by a man who is a presumptive
father under the UPA. During the two year period, the only protection for the
family, although some may consider this significant, is that the mother and her
husband may join forces-in that they do not attack the presumption
themselves-to fend off an attempt to rebut the presumptions by the biological
father who has not reached the status of presumed parent. Although, where a
non-presumptive genetic father is involved, there has already been a breach of
family unity.
If the rationale of protecting the family is examined historically, two
important points must be made. First, the family integrity rationale as we know it
today was first applied to the rebuttable presumption of paternity, not to the
conclusive presumption. In In re McNamara's Estate, the California Supreme
Court confronted the dilemma of whether to apply the conclusive presumption or
the rebuttable presumption of Civil Code section 194 to a child born 304 days
after the mother left the husband.-4 The court concluded that the rebuttable
presumption should apply.5 For the conclusive presumption to apply, the mother
had to be cohabiting with her husband at the time of conception, and 304 days,
though shown scientifically to be a possible period of time for human gestation,
would be quite exceptional and unlikely, and the court refused to consider this
possibility to trigger the conclusive presumption." Since the conclusive
51. 491 U.S. 110, 120 (1989).
52. Justice Scalia used all three terms. At one point he said, "Of course the conclusive presumption not
only expresses the State's substantive policy but also furthers it, excluding inquiries into the child's paternity
that would be destructive of family integrity and privacy." Id. Later in the opinion he referred to unitary family:
"As we view them, they rest not upon such isolated factors but upon the historic respect-indeed, sanctity
would not be too strong a term-traditionally accorded to the relationships that develop within the unitary
family." Id. at 123. See also Rodney F. v. Karen M., 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 399, 403 (Ct. App. 1998) (recognizing that
the policy of the conclusive presumption is to "reflect[] the sanctity traditionally accorded to ... relationships
that develop within the unitary family").
53. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7541(b) (West Supp. 2003).
54. 183 P. 552 (Cal. 1919). This rebuttable presumption was a precursor to the present-day rebuttable
presumptions of the California Family Code section 7611, both of which were derived from the Uniform
Parentage Act. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611 (West 1994 & Supp. 2003).
55. In re McNamara Estate, 183 P. at 558.
56. Id. at 555.
2003 /Baseline, Bright-line, Best Interests
presumption did not apply, external evidence of paternity was admissible. 7 In
reaching this conclusion, the court made the following statement regarding the
policy differences between the conclusive presumption and the rebuttable
presumption:
Nor is there any reason of public policy which requires such extending of
the conclusive presumption. The prima facie presumption of legitimacy,
which requires clear and satisfactory proof for its overcoming, is founded
on the policy of protecting the integrity of the family, of preventing the
bastardizing of issue born in wedlock except upon clear and certain
evidence. The reason for going beyond this primafacie presumption, and
applying a conclusive presumption wherever the husband has had
intercourse with the wife during the time when the child must normally
have been conceived, although others as well may have had intercourse
with her during the same period, is the impossibility of determining under
such circumstances who is the father. As was said in Commonwealth v.
McCarty, 2 Clark (Pa.), 356, the process of conception is a hidden one, and
the organs perform their appropriate functions without the volition of the
female and without her being conscious that the process is going on.
Where she has had intercourse with more than one man at about the same
time, and a child has resulted, neither she nor anyone else can say with
reasonable certainty which is the father. Any weighing of probabilities
under such circumstances is but guessing, and, where the husband is one
of the possible fathers, he must bear the burden of his relation to the
woman and be taken to be the father of her child. 8
Ironically, under the present presumption, the husband has an absolute right to
prove that he is not the father of the child.
Secondly, the protection of the family rationale began to be applied to the
conclusive presumption only when scientific evidence from blood tests became
viable evidence regarding paternity. Although the conclusive presumption
originally existed as a substitute for evidence regarding paternity, the courts
began to justify the presumption as a means of protecting the integrity of the
unitary family. As one appellate court stated,
Early California cases were able to justify the conclusive presumption in
question on the ground that no competent evidence could be adduced to
indicate who among those who had had intercourse with the wife during
the period of possible conception was the biological father of the child
born to her. However, as blood tests became scientifically reliable so that
they could exclude a husband as the biological father, the courts sustained
57. Id.
58. Id. at 557.
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 34
the legislative mandate by unabashedly calling it a substantive rule of
law.5 9
While the protection of the family rationale is accepted today, getting a
strong boost from Justice Scalia, it must be admitted that all family members do
not benefit equally from this protection. In fact, the present structure of the
conclusive presumption creates a hierarchy of benefits. The patriarch gets the
greatest benefit of the statute in several ways. First, within the two year period
after the child's birth, he is free to disavow his paternity or maintain it. Second,
there are limitations placed upon all those who would challenge his paternity.6'
His wife can challenge his paternity only if there is another man, the genetic
father, who is willing to accept responsibility for the child. 62 Next, the child can
challenge his paternity only if it is for the purpose of proving another man's
paternity; furthermore, a child would face significant practical difficulties in
obtaining a guardian ad litem. Finally, the child's genetic father can challenge the
patriarch's paternity only when he is a presumed father under the UPA, 63 a status
which is almost completely controlled by the child's mother.
4
2. The Rebuttable Presumptions
What I have referred to as the rebuttable presumptions are, of course, the
presumptions established in California's version of the UPA, Family Code
sections 7600-7730. 6' The California statutes define the "parent and child
59. In re Marriage of B., 177 Cal. Rptr. 429, 431 (Ct. App. 1981) (footnote omitted), accord Michelle
W. v. Ronald W., 703 P.2d 88, 92-93 (Cal. 1985); Estate of Cornelious, 674 P.2d 245, 247 (Cal. 1984); In re
Lisa R., 532 P.2d 123, 132 (Cal. 1975); Kusior v. Silver, 354 P.2d 657, 667-68 (Cal. 1960); In re Estate of
Lund, 159 P.2d 643, 648 (Cal. 1945).
60. CAL. FAM. CODE § 754 1(b) (West 1994 & Supp. 2003).
61. Id. § 7611(d) (West Supp. 2003).
62. Id.
63. Id. § 7541(b) (West 199 & Supp. 2003).
64. The birth mother controls the genetic father because she has absolute control over whether she
marries or attempts to marry the genetic father, and she has practical control over whether the genetic father
"receives the child into his home and openly holds out the child as his natural child." Id. § 7611 (d). She also
controls the ability of the genetic father to file for a voluntary declaration because she must sign the declaration
as well. Id. § 7574(b)(1).
65. Id. §§ 7600-7730. The California Family Code refers to these statutory provisions as the Uniform
Parentage Act although California did not adopt all of the provisions of the actual Uniform Parentage Act. See
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (1973), 9B U.L.A. 377 (2001). There were forms of a rebuttable presumption enacted in
1872 along with the conclusive presumption. Code of Civil Procedure section 1963 created a disputable
presumption "[t]hat a child born in lawful wedlock, there being no divorce from bed and board, is legitimate."
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1963 (1963) (repealed 1965). Civil Code section 193 created a corresponding
presumption: "All children born in wedlock are presumed to be legitimate," CAL. CIV. CODE § 193 (1937)
(repealed 1965), and Civil Code section 194 added an additional factor, foreshadowing the Uniform Parentage
Act: "[a]ll children of a woman who has been married, born within ten months after the dissolution of marriage,
are presumed to be legitimate children of that marriage." Id. § 194. All three provisions were repealed, without
replacement, in 1965. 1965 Cal. Stat. 299 §§ 8, 10.
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relationship" and then establish a series of presumptions that are used to determine
when the parent and child relationship applies, at least as it applies to fathers.
"Parent and child relationship" means a relationship between the child and the
child's natural or adoptive parents upon which law "imposes rights, privileges,
duties, and obligations." '6 Section 7610(a) provides two methods of establishing
the maternal parent and child relationship: (1) proof of giving birth; and (2)
"under this part," 67 which was interpreted in Johnson v. Calvert08 to mean genetic
testing under Family Code sections 7550 through 7558.69 As to fathers, the
statutes provide that the parent and child relationship can be established
"between a child and the natural father.., under this part."7° The phrase "under
this part" refers to the conclusive presumption of section 7540,"' to voluntary
declarations authorized under section 7571,72 and most importantly, refers to the
rebuttable presumptions in section 7611.71
The rebuttable presumptions of paternity are at the heart of the California
version of the UPA. The statute states that a man is presumed to be the natural
father74 if any of the following four conditions are found: 75 (1) under section
761 1(a), the man and the natural mother are or were married and the child was
born during marriage or within 300 days after marriage terminated;76 (2) under
section 7611(b), the man has attempted an invalid marriage with the mother
before the birth of the child; 77 (3) under section 7611 (c), the man has married or
66. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7601 (West 1994). Family Code section 7602 also establishes that a parent and
child relationship applies equally to every child and every parent regardless of marital status of the parents. Id.
§ 7602. Cf Nancy S. v. Michele G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212, 215 (Ct. App. 1991) (holding that a lesbian partner was
not a parent within the meaning of the UPA where the lesbian partner was not the natural mother, had not
adopted the children, and she and the natural mother did not have a "legally recognized marriage when the
children were born").
67. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7610 (a) (West 1994).
68. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 7550-7558 (West 1994 & Supp. 2003).
69. 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
70. Id. § 7610(b) (West 1994). The statute also provides for the establishment of the parent and child
relationship between child and adoptive parents "by proof of adoption." Id. § 7610(c).
71. Id. § 7540.
72. Id. § 7571 (West 1994 & Supp. 2003).
73. Id. § 7611.
74. Also, the presumptions do not apply where the child was conceived by an act of rape (a violation of
California Penal Code section 261) or statutory rape (a violation of California Penal Code section 261.5) where
the father is convicted and the mother was under the age of 15 and the father was 21 years of age or older. Id.
§ 7611.5(a)-(b) (West 1994).
75. Id. § 7611. It is the father's burden to prove he is a presumed father by a preponderance of the
evidence. Glen C. v. Superior Court, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 103, 115 (Ct. App. 2000).
76. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611 (a) (West 1994 & Supp. 2003). The provision for the child to be born within
300 days of the end of the marriage indicates that marriage at the time of conception is the threshold
requirement of this presumption.
77. Id. § 761 l(b) (stating that a man is the presumed father if "[b]efore the child's birth, he and the
child's natural mother have attempted to marry each other by a marriage solemnized in apparent compliance
with law, although the attempted marriage is or could be declared invalid..."). This provision applies to invalid
marriages which are voidable or void. If the marriage is merely voidable, meaning it "could be declared invalid
only by a court," the child must be born during the marriage "or within 300 days after its termination by death,
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attempted to marry the child's mother after the child's birth,78 and any of the
following is true: "[w]ith his consent, he is named as the child's father on the
child's birth certificate"; 9 he is obligated by "written voluntary promise or by
court order" to pay child support for the child;8° or (4) the man "receives the child
into his home and openly holds out the child as his natural child."'"
The primary method of rebutting the presumptions is the genetic test," but if
pre-UPA cases are applied to the present law, it seems clear that the
presumptions could be rebutted by evidence that the man was absent or did not
have intercourse with the mother.83 The statute also has provisions for rebuttal by
a judgment establishing paternity of another man" or where the man has
consented in writing to the artificial insemination of his wife.8" There is also a
cryptic statement in section 7612 which declares that if two or more conflicting
presumptions arise, the one that is "founded on the weightier considerations of
policy and logic controls." 6 The standard of proof is clear and convincing
evidence. 7
annulment, declaration of invalidity, or divorce." Id. If the attempted marriage is void, the child must be bom
"within 300 days after the termination of cohabitation." Id. Family Code section 2210 describes the grounds,
such as unsound mind, fraud, coercion, or physical incapacity, for a marriage to be voidable, id. § 2210 (West
1994), and sections 2200 and 2201 designate incestuous, bigamous and polygamous marriages as void ab initio.
Id. §§ 2200-01.
78. Id. § 7611 (c).
79. Id. §7611(c)(1).
80. Id. § 7611(c)(2).
81. Id. § 7611(d). This last presumption was removed from the Uniform Parentage Act (2000) on the
grounds that this relic of the past has become outmoded due to the precision of modern genetic testing. UNIF.
PARENTAGE ACT § 204 cmt (2000), 9B U.L.A. 348 (2001). See Adoption of Michael H., 898 P.2d 891, 895
(Cal. 1995); Glen C. v. Superior Court, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 103, 114 (Ct. App. 2000) (stating that there must be
actual receipt into the home; constructive receipt is insufficient). Cf Adoption of Kelsey S., 823 P.2d 1216,
1220-23 (Cal. 1992) (finding no actual receipt even though the father's attempts to bring the child into his home
were thwarted by legal action of the mother); In re Estate of Baird, 188 P. 43, 47-48 (Cal. 1920) (finding no
actual receipt where, under an assumed name, the father maintained illegitimate child clandestinely in another
home with its mother, with whom he lives in illicit relations part of his time and also maintains relations with
his legitimate family); In re Tanis H., 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 380, 387-88 (Ct. App. 1997) (holding that living with the
mother while she was pregnant did not amount to actual receipt). The burden is on the proponent of the
rebuttable presumption to show actual receipt and public acknowledgment by a preponderance of the evidence.
In re Spencer W., 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 524, 527 (Ct. App. 1996).
There was a fifth provision which was in effect only until January 1, 1997 which stated "[a] man [was]
presumed to be the natural father of a child ... [i]f the child was born and reside[d] in a nation with which the
United States engage[d] in an Orderly Departure Program, and [the man] acknowledge[d] that he [was] the
child's father in a declaration under penalty of perjury." CAL. FAM. CODE § 761 l(e) (West 1994 & Supp. 2003).
82. See In re Olivia H., 241 Cal. Rptr. 792, 795 (Ct. App. 1987) (stating that paternity may be conclusively
refuted with blood tests).
83. See Cinders v. Lewis, 208 P.2d 687, 688 (Cal. Ct. App. 1949); In re Walker's Estate, 168 P. 689,
691 (Cal. 1917). Both of these cases would seem to be valid under to the modern provisions under the UPA.
84. CAL FAM. CODE § 7612(c) (West 1994 & Supp. 2003); see also Barkaloff v. Woodward, 55 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 167, 170-71 (Ct. App. 1996), review denied.
85. CAL FAM. CODE § 7613 (West 1994). This provision also states that the husband and wife will be
treated as the parents of the child conceived by artificial insemination. Id.
86. Id. § 7612(b) (West 1994 & Supp. 2003). See Brian C. v. Ginger K., 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 294, 313 (Ct.
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While it is clear that the presumptions are rebuttable, the question of who can
rebut them is more complicated." There are four categories of possible petitioners
under the statutes who can attempt to rebut the rebuttable presumptions of
paternity. Three of the categories appear in Family Code section 7630.89 The first
is described explicitly in section 7630(a): an action to determine the parent and
child relationship may be brought by the "child, the child's natural mother, or a
man presumed to be the child's father under section 7611.""' However, one type
of presumed father, the man who "receives the child into his home and openly
holds out the child as his natural child,"9' is excluded from the list of presumed
fathers who can bring such an action.92 All other presumed fathers-men who
have been married to the mother before the birth of the child,93 men who
attempted marriage to the mother before the birth of the child, 94 and men who
married or attempted to marry the mother after the birth of the child95-have the
same rights to bring an action as the child and the natural mother. Together with
the child and natural mother, these presumed fathers constitute the first category
of people who can bring an action to establish paternity. 96
The second category of persons who can assert paternity is by far the
broadest. Section 7630(b) states that "[a]ny interested party may bring an action
at any time for the purpose of determining the existence or nonexistence of the
father and child relationship presumed under subdivision (d) of Section 7611,"
which involves a man who has taken the child into his home and held the child
out to be his own.97 In a sense, this broad group of those who can rebut the
"taking in and holding out" presumption makes this the weakest of the
presumptions; even non-presumed genetic fathers can bring an action to rebut it.98
App. 2000) (describing section 7612 as a weighing process to determine which man meeting the requirements
will be the presumed father).
87. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612(a) (West 1994 & Supp. 2003).
88. There is precedent from another state that the presumption of paternity in California law can be
rebutted in any forum by any person who has an interest in doing so. See Taylor v. Richardson, 354 F. Supp. 13,
16 (D. La. 1973).
89. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7630 (West 1994 & Supp. 2003).
90. Id. § 7630(a) (West 1994).
91. Id. § 7611 (d). See also sources cited supra note 81.
92. CAL. FAM. CODE. §§ 7611 (d), 7630(a) (West 1994).
93. Id. § 7611 (a).
94. Id. § 7611(b).
95. Id. § 7611(c).
96. Id. § 7630(a). As to this first category of possible petitioners, the statute draws a distinction between
actions brought for the purpose of declaring the existence of the paternal relationship and those declaring the
nonexistence of the paternal relationship. Actions to declare the existence of the relationship may be brought at
any time. Id. § 7630(a)(I). Those that are brought to declare the nonexistence of the relationship must be
brought "within a reasonable time after obtaining knowledge of relevant facts." Id. § 7630(a)(2).
97. Id. § 7630(b).
98. Brian C. v. Ginger K., 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 294, 313 (Ct. App. 2000).
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The third category, established by section 7630(c), includes a long list of
parties who can bring an action for paternity when there is no presumed father or
when the presumed father is dead. The action may be brought by
the child or personal representative of the child, the Department of Child
Support, the mother or the personal representative or a parent of the
mother if the mother has died or is a minor, a man alleged or alleging
himself to be the father, or the personal representative, or a parent of the
alleged father if the alleged father has died or is a minor.99
The fourth category, which falls under Family Code section 7631, includes
putative fathers who are not presumed fathers. Simply paraphrased, section 7631
states that, except for cases under the conclusive presumption, a man who is not
the presumed father may bring an action to have himself declared the natural
father of a child who has a presumed father if the birth mother consents to
adoption of the child.'00 Except for section 7630(b), the second category
mentioned above, this is the only provision that expressly allows a non-presumed
genetic-biological father to rebut a presumption of paternity in order to establish
a parent-child relationship. °' However, severe limitations are placed upon the
biological father's right to do so. This action must be brought quickly, within
thirty days after the man is served with notice of his potential patemity,' ° or after
99. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7630(c) (West 1994 & Supp. 2003). This action may also be joined with an
action under section 7662 to terminate the parent's rights. Id.
100. Id. § 7631 (West 1994).
101. In Dawn D. v. Superior Court, the California Supreme Court was asked to decide the
constitutionality of California's rebuttable presumption of paternity and the corresponding limitations on
standing to rebut the presumption. 952 P.2d 1139 (Cal. 1998). At issue before the California Supreme Court
was whether sections 7611 and 7630 unconstitutionally deprived the genetic father of the chance to prove his
paternity. Id. at 1139-40. The genetic father argued that he had "a liberty interest, protected as a matter of
substantive due process, in being permitted to develop a parental relationship with his offspring." Id. at 1142.
The court, however, relying on Michael H., rejected the notion that the genetic father had a protected liberty
interest in establishing his paternity and upheld that statutory scheme preventing him from doing so. Id. at 1146.
The majority viewed Michael H. as controlling and quickly concluded that Jerry, the genetic father, had no
protected liberty interest in establishing a relationship with his son. Id. The court apparently found Michael H.
persuasive because seven Justices in Michael H. agreed that a biological link alone does not create a protected
interest. Id. at 1144-45. Ignoring the fact that Jerry made great efforts to establish a relationship with his son and
was only prevented from doing so by Dawn, the mother, the court concluded that, because Jerry had no existing
relationship with the child, he also had no protected liberty interest in establishing one. Id.
Justice Chin, in dissent, began her analysis with the proposition that Jerry's interest in establishing a
relationship with his child was a constitutionally protected liberty interest. Id. at 1150. She first pointed out that
Michael H. is not authoritative because only four Justices agreed that there was no liberty interest for a
biological father in Michael H. or Jerry's position. Id. at 1150-51. In Michael H., Justice Stevens, who provided
the fifth vote for the plurality, found that the California scheme provided sufficient due process protection but
rejected the plurality's reasoning that a biological father of a child born to a woman married to another man
could never have a protected interest in establishing a relationship with his child. See id. (discussing Michael H.
v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 132-36 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
102. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 7660-7670 (West 1994 & Supp. 2003). The notice provision referred to in the
statute is required as part of the process of terminating a parent's rights prior to adoption under sections 7660
through 7670. The notice provision in section 7666 specifically requires that "notice be given to every person
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the child's birth, "whichever is later."' 3 It is worthwhile to note that these
provisions allow for the automatic termination of parental rights of a non-
presumed father who does not respond to the notice.' °' If the non-presumed
genetic father does respond to the notice and claims parental rights, then the best
interest test applies. The court will make a preliminary decision on whether it is
in the best interest of the child for the adoption to proceed considering all
"relevant evidence, including efforts made by the father to obtain custody, the
age and prior placement of the child, and the effects of the change of placement
on the child."'' 5 If it is in the best interest of the child, the father will be allowed
to retain parental rights and the adoption will be barred unless the father consents
to it.'O If it is in the best interest of the child for the adoption to proceed, or if the
man is found not to be the genetic father, the court may order that the man's
consent is not required. Such an order terminates all possible parental rights.1°7
This application of the best interest standard does not apply to the presumed
father if the mother attempts to place the child up for adoption. The presumed
father's rights must be terminated.' 8
3. Voluntary Declaration
The California Family Code also provides for the establishment of paternity
by voluntary declaration in sections 7570-7577.' °9 These provisions provide an
administrative framework to obtain voluntary declarations and to encourage the
establishment of paternity through the utilization of voluntary declarations."0 The
voluntary declaration must be signed by both the putative father"' and the
identified as the natural father or a possible natural father." Id. § 7666. This provision indicates that the
California Rules of Civil Procedure will be followed although publication or posting of notice is not required,
presumably because of concerns for privacy. Id. Additionally, where the whereabouts of the father are
unknown, the court may dispense with the notice requirement. Id.; see also id. § 7663 (identifying special
provisions included to identify and locate possible fathers).
103. Id. § 7662.
104. Id. § 7664(a) (West 1994). Section 7665 terminates parental rights when the court cannot find the
natural father. Id. § 7665. See generally Louise A. Leduc, No-Fault Termination of Parental Rights in
Connecticut: A Substantive Due Process Analysis, 28 CONN. L. REV. 1195 (1996) (providing general
background on termination of parental rights and the application of Connecticut law to the proceedings).
105. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7664(b) (West 1994).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. § 7664(c).
109. Id. §§ 7570-7577 (West 1994 & Supp. 2003).
110. See id. §§ 7571-7572, 7574. These provisions include: requirements to notify unmarried mothers and
putative fathers of the procedures for a voluntary declaration, id. § 7571(a); the development and publication of
written informational materials, id. § 7572(a); warnings regarding the effect of a voluntary declaration to be
attached to materials, id. § 7572(b); authorization for the State Department of Social Services to promulgate
regulations, id. § 7572(e); and requirements for the creation of a form for the declaration. Id. § 7574.
111. Id. § 7574(b)(2).
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mother,"' and must be filed with the Department of Child Support Services."3 At
one time the effect of a voluntary declaration was expressed in terms of a
presumption and, indeed, this presumption still applies to voluntary declarations
signed prior to December 31, 1996." 4 The present statute simply states that the
voluntary declaration signed after December 31, 1996 "shall establish the
paternity of a child and shall have the same force and effect as a judgment for
paternity issued by a court of competent jurisdiction."" 5 Nevertheless, one
California court of appeal case" 6 has determined that the voluntary declaration
still creates a presumption because of the language of Family Code section
7611."'
Regardless of whether the declaration creates a presumption, the declaration
can be rescinded by either parent within sixty days. " ' The court may also set
aside the declaration if all experts conclude based upon genetic tests that the man
who signed the declaration was not the child's father.' 9 A notice of motion for
such a declaration may be filed by "a local child support agency, the mother, [or]
the man who signed the voluntary declaration" within two years of the child's
birth.' 2 The notice of motion can also be filed in an action brought under section
7630 "to determine the existence or nonexistence of the father and child
relationship."' 2'
4. Genetic Tests
While the California statutory scheme relies heavily on presumptions, it does
provide for the use of genetic tests to determine paternity and, indeed, creates a
presumption in favor of the result of paternity tests. The term "genetic test" is
defined by the statute as "any genetic test that is generally acknowledged as
reliable by accreditation bodies,"'2 and the statute adds that the test must be
performed by an accredited laboratory." In any proceeding the court may order
112. Id. § 7574(b)(1).
113. Id. §7571(a).
114. Id. § 7576.
115. Id. § 7573.
116. In re Liam L., 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d 13 (Ct. App. 2000).
117. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611 (West Supp. 2003). "A man is presumed to be the natural father of a child
if he meets the conditions provided in Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 7540) or Chapter 3 (commencing
with Section 7570) of Part 2 ......
118. Id. § 7575(a).
119. id. § 7575(b)(1). A stipulation to paternity is also voidable when a parent was not represented by
counsel, was not advised of his right to trial, and would not have executed the agreement had he been properly
advised. County of Los Angeles v. Soto, 674 P.2d 750, 752 (Cal. 1984).
120. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7575(b)(2)(a) (West Supp. 2003).
121. Id. Also, the notice of motion may be filed "in any action.., for child custody, visitation, or child
support based upon the voluntary declaration of paternity." Id.
122. Id. § 7551 (West 1994 & Supp. 2003).
123. Id. § 7552. The accreditation body must be approved by the United States Secretary of Health and
Human Services. Id.
2003 /Baseline, Bright-line, Best Interests
the "mother, child, and alleged father" to have a genetic test' 24 and it has the
power to resolve an issue against a party who refuses to submit to the test.'21 If
the testing process meets specific procedural requirements, 26 it will be admitted
without foundation for authenticity unless there is a written objection. 127
However, if there is a written objection, which may be filed as late as five days
before the hearing,12 experts appointed by the court must be called to establish
authenticity and veracity.129
As to the evidentiary effect of the genetic test, the California Family Code
has two provisions. The first provision under section 7554 instructs courts to
resolve the question of paternity according to the testimony of the experts.'o If
the experts agree "that the alleged father is not the father," the court must
conclude that he is not the father."' If the experts disagree about the results of the
test or conclude that there is only a probability of paternity, then the court may
take the question under submission subject to California Evidence Code section
352, which allows a court to exclude evidence "if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate
undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of
confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury."'32 The second provision regarding
the evidentiary effect of genetic tests under section 7555 creates a rebuttable
presumption of paternity "if the court finds that the paternity index, as calculated
by experts qualified as examiners of genetic markers, is 100 or greater." '33
124. Id. § 7551. The only limitation would appear to be the relevancy of the information that the test will
reveal. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. Among these requirements are: the requirements for service of copies, id. § 7552.5(a) (West
Supp. 2003); a declaration of custodian of records, id. § 7552.5(a)(1); a statement establishing chain of custody,
id. § 7552.5(a)(2); a statement establishing that procedures are "in the laboratory's ordinary course of business
to ensure accuracy... " id. § 7552.5(a)(3); and a statement that test results were prepared by qualified person.
Id. § 7552.5(a)(4).
127. Id. § 7552.5(b).
128. Id.
129. Id. § 7552.5(c).
130. Id. § 7554 (West 1994).
131. Id. § 7554(a). This same instruction to the court exists in section 7541(a). Id. § 7541(a) (West 1994
& Supp. 2003).
132. Id. § 7554(b) (West 1994); CAL. EVID. CODE § 352 (West 1995).
133. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7555(a) (West 1994 & Supp. 2003). Subsection (b) defines the relevant terms
as follows: ."[glenetic markers' mean separate genes or complexes of genes identified as a result of genetic
tests," id. § 7555(b)(1), and "'[p]aternity index' means the commonly accepted indicator used for denoting the
existence of paternity," id. § 7555(b)(2). The authors of the section add this information regarding the "paternity
index":
It expresses the relative strength of the test results for and against paternity. The paternity index,
computed using results of various paternity tests following accepted statistical principles, shall
be in accordance with the method of expression accepted at the International Conference on
Parentage Testing at Airlie House, Virginia, May 1982, sponsored by the American Association
of Blood Banks.
Id. § 7555(b)(2); see also County of El Dorado v. Misura, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 908, 916-17 (Ct. App. 1995)
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The impact of the genetic testing provisions on paternity is really determined
by those code sections which govern the use of genetic testing. The workhorse
provision is Family Code section 7630(c) which allows a wide variety of people
to bring an action to determine the father and child relationship through the use
of genetic testing where there is no presumed father. 34 The child, the Department
of Child Support Services, or the mother can bring an action to establish through
genetic testing that a particular man is the child's natural father,1 35 and an alleged
father can also bring an action to establish his own relationship with the child.'36
If there is a presumed father, then the ability to use genetic testing to
determine the existence of a father and child relationship becomes restricted,
especially for a non-presumed genetic father. If there is a conclusive presumption
of paternity, then genetic testing can only be used to rebut the presumption by the
conclusively presumed father himself, by a man who is a presumed father under
the rebuttable presumptions,'37 by the child, or by the mother of the child if she
has an affidavit from the genetic father acknowledging his paternity."' The
genetic father, if he does not have the status of a presumed father, may not
challenge the conclusive presumption. 9 The approach is similar under the
rebuttable presumptions: they can be challenged under section 7630(a) by the
child, the mother, 40 or "a man presumed to be the child's father."''141 With two
exceptions, the genetic father who does not have presumed status may not
challenge the rebuttable presumptions. The first exception applies when the
action is for the purpose of rebutting the presumption created by section 7611 (d),
where a man "receives the child into his home and openly holds the child out as
his natural child,"'142 which under section 7630(b) can be rebutted by "[a]ny
interested party ... at any time.""' The second exception, under section 7631,
allows a genetic father to bring an action to establish his paternity where there is
a presumed father under the rebuttable presumptions "if the mother relinquishes
(holding that evidence that the father had intercourse with the mother during the period of conception and had a
paternity index of 970 based on genetic testing was sufficient to trigger the statutory presumption of paternity).
134. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7630(c) (West 1994 & Supp. 2003).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. § 7611. Only presumed fathers under California Family Code section 7611 qualify as presumed
fathers to rebut the conclusive presumption. Id. The presumption of paternity created by a genetic test with a
paternity index of 100 or greater under California Family Code section 7555(a) does create presumed-father
status for purposes of rebutting the conclusive presumption or the rebuttable presumptions. Id. § 7555(a).
138. Id. § 7641 (West 1994).
139. See supra note 15 (discussing Michael H. v. Gerald D.. 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (upholding the
limitation placed upon the right of the genetic father to challenge the conclusive presumption)).
140. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7630(a) (West 1994 & Supp. 2003). The mother does not have to have an
affidavit from the natural father to rebut these presumptions.
141. Id. (excluding presumed fathers under section 7611(d) from using genetic tests to rebut a
presumption of paternity).
142. Id. § 7611(d).
143. Id. § 7630(b) (West 1994).
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for, consents to, or proposes to relinquish for or consent to, the adoption of the
child. ' 44 There are significant limitations on this right to bring an action. The
genetic father must bring the action within thirty days of being notified that he
might be the father or the date of the child's birth, whichever is later. 45 More
significantly, if the genetic father seeks to assert his rights, the court must
determine not only that he is the genetic father but also that it is in the best
interest of the child for the genetic father to retain his parental rights.' 46 The
existence of these restrictions on the application of genetic testing to paternity
determinations establishes a very important point. Presently in California, genetic
testing does not serve as the baseline in establishing paternity.
B. Maternity
Issues regarding the establishment of maternity have been rare simply
because the primary criterion for determining maternity, the "giving birth test,"
has always served so well. Moreover, the birth mother was always the genetic
mother. Traditionally, problems only arose when there was a mix-up regarding
the birth mother.'47 Solomon would not have had to resort to his "sword test" if he
had solid evidence regarding the birth mother.'4' If two babies were switched in
the hospital, they were returned to their "real" mothers, the mothers who had
given birth to them.'49 If many years had passed and the children had formed
strong psychological bonds with their custodial parents,'o the result might have
been different; but until those bonds were fully formed, the consensus was that
the children should be returned to their birth mothers.'5' However, in recent times,
with the advent of modern reproductive technology, things have become much
more complicated. The "giving birth test" is no longer adequate because it is now
possible for different women to be a child's genetic mother, birth mother,
144. Id. § 7631.
145. Id.
146. Id. § 7664(b).
147. The result can be humorous or tragic. See, e.g., HENRY FIELDING, TOM JONES (Wordsworth
Classics 1999) (1749) and SOPHOCLES, OEDIPUS REX (R.D. Droger David Dawe ed., Cambridge Univ. Press
1983) (n.d.).
148. See I Kings 3:16-27. It is interesting that Solomon assumed that the psychological mother was the
same as the genetic and birth mother; otherwise, the story means that Solomon was actually determining who
had bonded with the child.
149. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Foote, Comment, What's Best for Babies Switched at Birth? The Role of the
Court, Rights of Non-Biological Parents, and Mandatory Mediation of the Custodial Agreements, 21 WHITrER
L. REV. 315, 332-33 (1999) (acknowledging that many courts have some preference for natural parents); Janet
Leach Richards, Redefining Parenthood: Parental Rights Versus Child Rights, 40 WAYNE L. REV. 1227, 1254-
55 (1994) (stating that most jurisdictions have a natural parent preference); see also Perry-Rogers v. Fasano,
715 N.Y.S.2d 19, 25 n.2 (2000) (noting that hospital mix-ups discovered immediately should be corrected at
once).
150. Cf Twigg v. Mays, 1993 WL 330624 at *6 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1993) (rejecting the claim of the natural
parents because the switch was not discovered for ten years and because of the detrimental effect to the child
that would otherwise result).
151. See I Kings 3:16-27.
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intended mother, and even psychological mother."' If an artificial womb were
ever developed, the "giving birth test" would be in danger of becoming
meaningless, and some women would stand in the same relationship to their
children as fathers do now.
The California version of the UPA'53 contains the "giving birth test." Family
Code section 7610(a) provides that "[b]etween a child and the natural mother,
[the parent-child relationship] may be established by proof of her having given
birth to the child . . .. " In addition, the California Supreme Court in Johnson v.
Calvert,'55 has construed the genetic testing provisions of Family Code sections
7550 through 7558 to apply also to the mother and child relationship."' This
construction was based upon two other Family Code provisions: section 7650
which states, "[i]nsofar as practicable, the provisions of this part [which include
the genetic testing provisions] applicable to the father and child relationship
apply" also to the establishment of the mother and child relationship;" and
section 7551 which authorizes blood testing of "mother, child, and alleged
father" in any "proceeding in which paternity is a relevant fact."' 58 Therefore, the
Johnson court concluded that, "[w]hen maternity is disputed, genetic evidence
derived from blood testing is likewise admissible.... By parity of reasoning,
blood testing may also be dispositive of the question of maternity."'59
Johnson v. Calvert was the first California Supreme Court case truly to
struggle with the issue of establishing maternity. The court ultimately concluded
that where the two tests to determine maternity under California law-the genetic
test and the "giving birth test""o-conflict and yield disparate results, the courts
must use a wholly new approach to maternity, the intent test:
[A]lthough the Act recognizes both genetic consanguinity and giving
birth as means of establishing a mother and child relationship, when the
two means do not coincide in one woman, she who intended to procreate
the child-that is, she who intended to bring about the birth of a child
that she intended to raise as her own-is the natural mother under
California law.'6
152. In addition, a child may have a genetic father, a presumed father, an intended father, a contractual
father, and a psychological father. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 285 (Ct. App.
1998) (discussing different ways in which paternity may be established under California law).
153. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 7600-7700 (West 1994 & Supp. 2003).
154. Id. § 7610(a).
155. 851 P.2d 776, 779 (Cal. 1993).
156. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 7550-7558 (West 1994 & Supp. 2003).
157. Id. § 7650 (West 1994).
158. Id. § 7551.
159. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 781 (citations omitted).
160. Id. at 782.
161. Id.
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The issue of maternity came to the fore in Johnson only because the child
who was the subject of the maternity dispute was created through the use of new
technology. The new technology in Johnson was gestational surrogacy, which is
delicately described by the California Supreme Court as the process whereby
"pursuant to a surrogacy agreement, a zygote formed of the gametes of a husband
and wife is implanted in the uterus of another woman, who carries the resulting
fetus to term and gives birth to a child not genetically related to her . ,, The
genetic donors in Johnson were Mark and Crispina Calvert, a married couple
who, under the provision of the surrogacy contract, were to receive the child. The
surrogate mother was Anna Johnson who, in violation of the agreement, sought
to keep the child."' The supreme court broke the tieu6 between Crispina, the
genetic mother, and Anna, the birth mother, by resorting to the intent test' 65 and
concluded that Crispina was the child's natural mother.'
66
In reaching this conclusion, however, the court offered no direct statement of
why it chose the intent test; rather, its position was expressed through a series of
references to legal commentators.167 From the court's use of these references, it is
possible to understand the court's reasons for choosing the intent test. First, the
intended parents have a special status and claim because they are the prime
movers of the child's birth; the child would not have been born without their
efforts.6  Second, the court was also influenced by the intended parents'
162. id. at 777-78 (footnotes omitted); see also Anne Goodwin, Determination of Legal Parentage in Egg
Donation, Embryo Transplantation and Gestational Surrogacy Arrangements, 26 FAM. L.Q. 275, 276 (1992)
(providing a detailed description of gestational surrogacy).
163. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 778. The only explanation as to why the court did not simply pick the genetic
mother must be inferred from footnote 10, which shows that the court wanted an approach which would also
cover the situation in which the genetic mother was a true donor and the birth mother was the intended mother.
Id. at 782 n.10.
164. California Family Code section 7612 contemplates situations where presumptions conflict and states
that if two or more conflicting presumptions arise, the one which is founded "on the weightier considerations of
policy and logic controls." CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612(b) (West 1994 & Supp. 2003). While technically the "giving
birth test" in the code is not stated as a presumption and the court is not necessarily bound to follow this section,
this section does show the legislature's preference to stay within the bounds of the statute and not create a new test
as a tie-breaker.
165. This approach had been suggested by several law review commentators, including: John Lawrence
Hill, What Does It Mean to Be a "Parent"? The Claims of Biology as the Basis for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 353 (1991); Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood: An
Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 297; Andrea E. Stumpf, Note, Redefining Mother: A Legal
Matrix for New Reproductive Technologies, 96 YALE L.J. 187 (1986).
166. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 778.
167. Id.; see also Hill, supra note 165, at 415; Shultz, supra note 165, at 323; Stumpf, supra note 165, at
197-202.
168. The court stated:
Professor Hill, arguing that the genetic relationship per se should not be accorded priority in the
determination of the parent-child relationship in the surrogacy context, notes that "while all of
the players in the procreative arrangement are necessary in bringing a child into the world, the
child would not have been born but for the efforts of the intended parents.... [T]he intended
parents are the first cause, or the prime movers, of the procreative relationship."
Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782 (quoting Hill, supra note 165, at 415); see also Hill, supra note 165, at 415 (citation
660
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intentions because they were "voluntarily chosen, deliberate, express and
bargained-for.. . ." 9 Third, the court followed what might be called the "mental
concept doctrine"-that is, the parent is that person who was the originator of the
concept of the child. 7° Fourth, the court seemed to be influenced by the desire to
meet the needs of other situations which may arise using new technology.'
7
'
Finally, the court viewed the intended parents as those who will act in the best
interests of the child," a view which is especially interesting because the court,
while applying this "imputed best interest test," rejected the use of the "actual"
best interest standard suggested by Justice Kennard in her dissent.' 73 The court
omitted). The court does not go beyond this quote to explain why the prime mover mother should have
preference over the birth mother. This is an important point because, in regard to intent, Crispina and Anna are
on equal footing. Both intended to create and raise a child. The only difference between the two is that Crispina
developed her full intent first. The court defines the term "intended mother" as "she who intended to procreate
the child-that is, she who intended to bring about the birth of a child that she intended to raise as her own" and
concludes that she "is the natural mother under California law." Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782. Using the definition
of "intent" in the Restatement of Torts, that "the actor desires to cause consequences of his act," it can be said
validly that both Anna and Crispina acted with intent, with a desire to create a child and that they both believed
that the birth of a child would result. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965). The claims of Crispina
and Anna to the status of intended mother diverge only when emphasis is placed on the second half of the
definition that the woman intends not only to procreate but also "to raise [the child] as her own." Johnson, 851
P.2d at 782. Crispina developed her desire to raise the child earlier than Anna. As to the use of intent to
determine maternity, timing appears to be of the essence; the "prime" in "prime mover" is key.
The next question is, why should the prime mover be favored over a birth mother who develops her desire
to raise the child during the period of gestation? The court does not fully explain its answer to this question, but,
if the court had looked to statutory authority regarding birth mothers who change their minds and want to raise
their children, the result might have been different. California law allows birth mothers to revoke their consent
to adoption. While there is a thirty day limit on the right to revoke, that limit does not begin to run until after the
placement agreement or consent has been signed, which cannot take place until the child is born. CAL. FAM.
CODE § 8814.5 (West Supp. 2003). Basically, adoption law allows a birth mother to have a change of heart. A
woman who during gestation consents to the adoption of her child, like Anna, has no intent to raise the child,
but this woman, unlike Anna, has the right to change her mind after the birth of the child. If she develops an
intent to raise the child during gestation or after the child's birth, that intention will be honored, and she will be
considered the natural mother. Why is Anna not afforded a similar right to revoke her agreement? One possible
answer is that she is not the child's genetic mother.
169. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 783 (citing Shultz, supra note 165, at 323). The full statement by the court is as
follows: "'Within the context of artificial reproductive techniques,' Professor Shultz argues, 'intentions that are
voluntarily chosen, deliberate, express and bargained-for ought presumptively to determine legal parenthood."'
Johnson, 851 P.2d at 783 (quoting Shultz, supra note 165, at 323)..
170. Id. (citing Stumpf, supra note 165, at 196). This doctrine comes from a student note in the Yale Law
Journal. The court stated:
Another commentator has cogently suggested, in connection with reproductive technology, that
"[t]he mental concept of the child is a controlling factor of its creation, and the originators of that
concept merit full credit as conceivers. The mental concept must be recognized as independently
valuable; it creates expectations in the initiating parents of a child, and it creates expectations in
society for adequate performance on the part of the initiators as parents of the child."
Id. (quoting Stumpf, supra note 165, at 196).
171. Id.at782&n.10,783.
172. Id. at 783 (quoting Shultz, supra note 165, at 397).
173. Except for these comments about the best interest test, the majority in Johnson did not address any
of the analytical problems raised by Justice Kennard in her dissent. In dealing with the majority's arguments,
Justice Kennard raised four issues. First, she argued that the intent test as it is being used by the majority in
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concluded the best interest test was inappropriate because (1) it is repugnant to the
right of privacy; 74 (2) its use confused issues of parentage and issues of custody; 75
and (3) because the best interest standard is a fact-intensive determination which
promotes litigation and instability. 1
76
The court did not offer a satisfactory explanation as to why it did not simply
enforce the surrogacy contract. If a tie-breaker was needed in this situation, why
not make it the contract rather than the somewhat novel intent test? The law of
contracts is well-established; the law regarding the use of the intent test to
determine maternity, however, is non-existent.7 7 The usual reason for not
enforcing surrogacy contracts is that they violate public policy; however, the
court expressly stated that it did not find that the contract violated public policy:
Johnson is really the "but-for" test, a tort doctrine which has been rejected in California, and replaced by the
substantial factor test. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 795-96 (Kennard, J., dissenting) (citing Mitchell v. Gonzales, 819
P.2d 872, 876, 879-81, (Cal. 1991) (disallowing the "but-for" test in jury instructions for tort cases)). More
importantly, she pointed out, under either the "but-for" test or the substantial factor test, the positions of Anna
and Crispina are equal. But for the conduct of both Anna and Crispina, the child would not have been born; both
Anna and Crispina are a substantial factor in the birth of the child. See id. at 796. (Kennard, J., dissenting)
(stating: "Neither the 'but for' nor the 'substantial factor' test of causation provides any basis for preferring the
genetic mother's intent as the determinative factor in gestational surrogacy cases: Both the genetic and the
gestational mothers are indispensable to the birth of a child in a gestational surrogacy arrangement.").
Second, Justice Kennard pointed out that the "originator of the concept" idea is one that is borrowed from
intellectual property law, an area that is completely unrelated to parentage and that is indeed repugnant to the
parent-child relationship, since, above all, we must not treat children as property. See id. (Kennard, J.,
dissenting).
Third, Justice Kennard dealt with the "voluntarily chosen, deliberate, express and bargained-for"
argument of the majority, by pointing out that this is really a contract enforcement argument and that law does
not recognize specific enforcement of personal service contracts. Id. at 796-97. (Kennard, J., dissenting).
Finally, Justice Kennard pointed out that the majority adopted an imputed best interest standard, that the
interest of the child and those of the person who intended to bring him/her into the world correspond, and
rejected the actual "best interest test," where the best interest of the particular child in question would be
determined and followed. Id. at 798-99. (Kennard, J., dissenting). Kennard stated:
I agree with the majority that the best interests of the child is an important goal; indeed, as I shall
explain, the best interests of the child, rather than the intent of the genetic mother, is the proper
standard to apply in the absence of legislation. The problem with the majority's rule of intent is that
application of this inflexible rule will not serve the child's best interests in every case.
Id. at 798. (Kennard, I., dissenting).
174. There is no explanation as to why privacy concerns are especially great and outweigh the best
interest of the child when matters of assisted conception are involved. It is not difficult to imagine scenarios that
would endanger a child that could easily outweigh whatever privacy right the putative parent might have. The
child suffers no additional loss of privacy by virtue of a best interest analysis.
175. While the best interest standard is commonly associated with custody disputes, there is no reason
why it cannot be used to determine parentage; in fact, such a use is authorized by statute in California Family
Code sections 7631 and 7664 for the determination of parentage when a mother relinquishes a child for
adoption. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 7631, 7664(b) (West 1994).
176. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782 n.10. In a sense, the best interest standard might promote judicial
economy. If there is truly something egregious in the background of the intended parent, the protection afforded
by a best interest hearing is a small price to pay, one that is not uncommon or abnormal, one that has established
rules and procedures in place. Refusal to inquire into the best interest of the child at this point of judicial contact
is a false and dangerous economy.
177. Perhaps the court did not want to enforce the contract because specific performance of a personal
service contract is not an available remedy under contract theory. But, as Justice Kennard pointed out, if the law
forbids the enforcement of a personal service contract, should it not prohibit the specific performance of the
intent of the parties as it is presented in that contract?
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"[i]n deciding the issue of maternity under the Act we have felt free to take into
account the parties' intentions, as expressed in the surrogacy contract, because in
our view the agreement is not, on its face, inconsistent with public policy."'78
Also, the court in Johnson used a contract-like rationale to justify the intent test:
"'Within the context of artificial reproductive techniques,' Professor Shultz
argues, 'intentions that are voluntarily chosen, deliberate, express and bargained-
for ought presumptively to determine legal parenthood."" 79 Moreover, the court
appears to have relied heavily on the contract in this case. The intent of the
parties is revealed in the contract. No inquiry need be made as to who is the
intended mother because the intended mother is also the contractual mother.
Application of the intent test has the same result as enforcement of the contract
unless the court envisions assisted reproduction scenarios in which there is an
intended mother but no contract. 180 While this situation might arise where there is
no written contract, it is difficult to imagine the absence of at least an oral
contract. Or, does the court envision situations in which there is a contractual
mother and an intended mother, for example, where the contractual mother is a
mere front for the intended mother, the prime-mover, or the originator of the
concept? Would the court award the child to the intended mother over the
contract mother? Unless there really are scenarios in which the intent test yields a
different approach than enforcement of the contract, the better approach is simply
to enforce the contract and develop parameters for enforcing contracts.
The California Supreme Court's dismissal of the best interest standard as a
tie-breaker seems premature and ill-considered as a rule of law. It is difficult to
imagine the court would have awarded the baby to Crispina and Mark if the court
actually had thought that it was not in the best interest of the baby to be placed
with them. Would the court have followed the intent test if there had been
something truly egregious in Crispina and Mark's background? No doubt the
court was greatly comforted by its own conclusion as to the best interest: "[t]he
Calverts are the genetic and intending parents of their son and have provided
him, by all accounts, with a stable, intact, and nurturing home."'8 ' The court had
the luxury of ignoring the child's best interest standard because it was convinced
that, in this particular case, it would be in the child's best interest to be placed
with Crispina and Mark.
178. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 783. The view that surrogacy contracts violate public policy has been widely
expressed. The most commonly mentioned policies are: the best interest of the child should determine custody
arrangements; children should remain with their natural parents; the rights of natural parents are equal; the
policy against the sale of children; a mother's consent for adoption is revocable; the policy against the
commodification and degradation of women who serve as surrogates; and the policy that asserts that the
legislature, as the voice of the 2eople, ought to be the branch of government to decide such important issues.
See, e.g., In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227, 1246-50 (N.J. 1988).
179. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 783 (citing Shultz, supra note 165, at 323).
180. The position of this article is that, if there is an invalid contract, or no contract for that matter, then
the best interest standard should be used.
181. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 781 n.8.
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The court's rejection of the best interest test to be applied in assisted
conception cases is even more enigmatic because of its reliance upon what might
be called the imputed best interest standard. The court quoted from a scholarly
source:
Moreover, as Professor Shultz recognizes, the interests of children,
particularly at the outset of their lives, are "[un]likely to run contrary to
those of adults who choose to bring them into being." Thus, "[h]onoring
the plans and expectations of adults who will be responsible for a child's
welfare is likely to correlate significantly with positive outcomes for
parents and children alike."'82
There are, of course, several problems with this imputed best interest standard.
First, this view seems to be based upon the naive assumption that those who would
use new technology to bring a child into the world are good people and would
bring a child into the world only for good reasons. The Court imputed wholly pure
motives and purposes to the persons who intend to procreate through new
reproductive technology. However, one of the objections to new technology,
such as cloning, is that it will be used for bad motives and purposes and will lead
to the commodification of children by those who would procreate solely for
economic benefit or worse. Second, this form of reasoning is purely intuitive. To
many it may seem just as likely that a woman who has given birth to a child
would act in the best interest of the child. Third, an imputed best interest standard
is always suspect. Such a standard might be justified in an emergency situation
where there is a need for an immediate decision regarding parentage. In all other
situations, doing that which is in the best interest of the child demands a
determination of the best interest. It may be that an intended parent is an alcoholic,
drug addict, child abuser, or even a pedophile. Justice Kennard was correct:
accuracy in the application of the best interest standard demands a hearing.'83
Perhaps the question which really remains after Johnson is whether the intent
test is merely a tie-breaker to be used when there is both a birth mother and a
genetic mother vying for the status of natural mother or whether it is a new test
designed to meet the needs of all cases of assisted reproduction. There is no
doubt that the authors cited by the court in Johnson argue that the intent test
should play a much greater role than merely that of tie-breaker.'14 Moreover, the
court in Johnson also may have used the intent test to determine that Mark was
the father of the child even though in his case there was no tie to break."'
182. Id. at 783 (quoting Shultz, supra note 165, at 397).
183. See id. at 799-800 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
184. See Hill, supra note 165, at 413-18; Shultz, supra note 165, at 322-27; Stumpf, supra note 165, at
194-97.
185. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 778. The court in Johnson appeared to have used the intent test to determine
that Mark was the father of the child. See id. at 782. At the very least, this case is somewhat vague as to what
test is being used for paternity. There can be no doubt that the court actually resolved the issue of paternity
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Additional support for the view that the intent test has the potential for wider
applicability can be found in In re Marriage of Buzzanca,6 in which a man
attempted to avoid his parental responsibilities to a child born through the
process of gestational surrogacy. There was no tie to break because the action
was brought by the intended mother against the intended father; the two were
married at the time the gestational surrogacy process"' had been initiated."' 8 The
gestational mother and the donors of both the sperm and the ovum did not assert
parental rights.8 9 The California court of appeal concluded that the intended
parents were the child's parents and that the intended father had to pay child
support. The court declared, "they are still her lawful parents given their
initiating role as the intended parents in her conception and birth."' 9
C. Assisted Conception
1. Artificial Insemination
In California, as in most states, 9' the process of semen donation and artificial
insemination and the issue of parentage as a result of this process is controlled by
statutory provisions. California Family Code section 7613 is straightforward and
direct. Subsection (b) severs the potential parent-child relationship between donor
and child: "The donor of semen provided to a licensed physician and surgeon for
use in artificial insemination of a woman other than the donor's wife is treated in
law as if he were not the natural father of a child thereby conceived.' " 9, Subsection
when it stated: "We conclude that the husband and wife are the child's natural parents... " Id. at 778. Justice
Arabian, in his concurring opinion, referred to Mark, as "the child's natural father." Id. at 787 (Arabian, J.,
concurring). The court did not apply any of the standard presumptions of paternity. The trial court decided the
case based on the genetic evidence linking Mark and Crispina to the child. Id. at 778. However, the California
Supreme Court did not explicitly base the paternity issue on genetics. Moreover, there are several places where
the court mentioned the husband Mark's intent: "The Calverts are the genetic and intending parents of their son
and have provided him, by all accounts, with a stable, intact, and nurturing home." Id. at 781 n.8.
Mark and Crispina are a couple who desired to have a child of their own genes but are physically
unable to do so without the help of reproductive technology. They affirmatively intended the birth of
the child, and took the steps necessary to effect in vitro fertilization. But for their acted-on intention,
the child would not exist.
Id. at 782. "Mark and Crispina never intended to 'donate' genetic material to anyone. Rather, they intended to
procreate a child genetically related to them by the only available means." id. at 787.
186. 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Ct. App. 1998).
187. Id. at 282.
188. Id. at 282-83.
189. Id. at 283.
190. Id. at 293. One other case, decided just after Johnson, declined to use the intent test when there was
no tie to be broken. See In re Marriage of Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893, 896 (Ct. App. 1994).
191. According to Nanette Elster, there are thirty-four states which have statutory provisions dealing
with artificial insemination. Nanette Elster, Who Is the Parent in Cloning?, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 533, 537 n. 14
(1999).
192. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613(b) (West 1994).
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(a) establishes the new parental relationship with the husband of the woman
inseminated:
If, under the supervision of a licensed physician and surgeon and with the
consent of her husband, a wife is inseminated artificially with semen
donated by a man not her husband, the husband is treated in law as if he
were the natural father of a child thereby conceived. The husband's
consent must be in writing and signed by him and his wife.' 93
The statute is silent about the determination of the mother-child relationship,
presumably because in non-surrogacy situations the woman inseminated will be
the birth mother under section 7610(a).' 9 The involvement of a licensed
physician in both severing one paternal relationship and establishing another is
significant. In a sense, the physician represents the operation of law at a non-
judicial level; in other words, the law is implemented not by judicial action or by
the action of a representative of the executive branch such as a state agency, but
rather by a private individual who has been licensed by the state. Moreover, this
licensed individual has not been licensed by the state for the specific purpose of
severing and creating parental relationships, but for the more general purpose of
practicing medicine. Although there are requirements 95 and limitations 9' placed
upon the physician in this situation, the physician's conduct actually operates in a
manner similar to a judicial order severing a natural parent's rights and establishing
an adoptive parent-child relationship.
Perhaps the most interesting case, and one of the few dealing with section
7613(b), is Jhordan C. v. Mary K' which involved an at-home artificial
insemination. The ultimate birth mother Mary K. and her partner Victoria T.
sought to raise a child together."' They selected Jhordan C. to provide sperm so
that Mary could artificially inseminate herself, possibly with the help of Victoria.' 99
The implantation took place at home without physician involvement and pregnancy
193. Id. § 7613(a).
194. Id. § 7610(a).
195. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 2260(a) (West Supp. 2003). The Code states that, "[a] physician and
surgeon who removes sperm or ova from a patient shall, before the sperm or ova are used for a purpose other
than reimplantation in the same patient or implantation in the spouse of the patient, obtain the written consent of
the patient as provided in subdivision(b)." Id. Subsection (b) states specific requirements for the form of
consent. Id. §2260(b).
196. CAL. PENAL CODE § 367g (West 1999). The California Penal Code makes it a crime for anyone "to
knowingly use sperm, ova, or embryos in assisted reproduction technology, for any purpose other than that
indicated by the sperm, ova, or embryo provider's signature on a written consent form." Id. § 367g(a). It is also
a crime "to knowingly implant sperm, ova, or embryos, through the use of assisted reproduction technology,
into a recipient who is not the sperm, ova, or embryo provider, without the signed written consent of the sperm,
ova, or embryo provider and recipient." Id. § 367g(b).
197. 224 Cal. Rptr. 530 (Ct. App. 1986).
198. Id. at 532.
199. Id.
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resulted.2 0 During the pregnancy, Jhordan kept in contact with Mary and when the
baby, Devin, was born, Jhordan visited and showed interest in the child.20 ' When
Mary and Victoria sought to cut off his visitation, he brought an action to establish
paternity and visitation.2 Justice Donald King, a well-respected jurist and author
of an important treatise on family law,2°3 authored the opinion which held that "the
trial court properly declared Jhordan to be Devin's legal father."' ° The rationale
for this decision was straightforward. California Civil Code section 7005, the
identical predecessor of Family Code section 7613, did not apply in this case to
cut off the parent-child relationship between Jhordan and Devin. 2°' The court
reasoned that section 7005 had given women 206 the opportunity to take advantage
of artificial insemination "without fear that the donor may claim paternity." 2°7
The requirement of physician involvement was an essential part of the statute,
and it served two important functions: first, "a physician can obtain a complete
medical history of the donor (which may be of crucial importance to the child
during his or her lifetime) and screen the donor for any hereditary or
communicable diseases,"206 and second,
the presence of a professional third party such as a physician can serve to
create a formal, documented structure for the donor-recipient relationship,
without which, as this case illustrates, misunderstandings between the
parties regarding the nature of their relationship and the donor's relationship
to the child would be more likely to occur.209
Additionally, the court held that the failure to apply section 7005 to this case
withstood the constitutional challenges brought by Mary and Victoria on both
equal protection 20 and privacy grounds.2 "
200. Id.
201. id.
202. Id. at 533.
203. William P. Hogoboom & Donald B. King, CALIFORNIA PRACICE GUIDE: FAMILY LAW (The
Rutter Group 2002).
204. Jhordan C., 224 Cal. Rptr. at 537-38 (holding also that Victoria did not have the status of parent).
205. Id. at 535.
206. The court pointed out that the original version from the Uniform Parentage Act also limited the
application of this provision to married women and California had removed this limitation. Id. at 533-34.
207. Id. at 534.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 535.
210. Id. at 536. The equal protection argument asserted by Mary and Victoria was simply that the law
provides less protection for the unmarried mother than it does for the married mother. If the mother was
married, the donor could not assert paternity because he would be blocked by the statutory provisions now
found in Family Code section 7541(b) and (c) which only allow a mother and her husband to challenge the
presumptions of paternity arising out of the marriage. The court took the position that this disparity is the result
of section 7541(b) and (c) and not of the physician requirement of Family Code section 7613 and that it is well
settled that the law may discriminate in favor of married parents: "[e]qual protection is not violated by
providing that certain benefits or legal rights arise only out of the marital relationship." Id.
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As to Jhordan's paternity, Justice King and the other members of the court
assumed that Jhordan, the genetic father, was the natural father and the father
who was protected by law. Although the court held that Family Code section
7613 (formerly Civil Code section 7005) did not sever his parental relationship, it
cited no statutory provision that established his parental relationship. While it
may not have been necessary to mention any statutory provision because the
case, after all, was based upon a trial court judgment declaring Jhordan to be
Devin's father, there was no provision which could be cited in Jhordan's favor
other than the provision that says that blood tests may be used to establish
paternity. Jhordan was not a presumed father under either the conclusive or
rebuttable presumption. Although he had acknowledged paternity, he had never
taken Devin into his home. The only possible statutory basis was the provision
which says that blood tests can be used to prove paternity which assumes as its
basis that the genetic parent is the parent."'
2. Ovum Donation and In Vitro Fertilization
As to ovum donation and in vitro fertilization (IVF), the Family Code is
silent; there is no provision"' equivalent to Family Code section 7613, severing
the parental ties of the donor 214 and establishing a new maternal relationship. The
main references to these subjects are in Business and Professions Code section
2260, which requires consent to implant an ovum in someone other than the
donor and establishes a fine for failure to obtain consent,2" and Penal Code
section 367g, which makes it a crime to use donated sperm, ova, or an embryo in
any other manner than that specified by the donor when he or she consented to
216the donation. While the consent easily might be construed as severing the
parent and child relationship, there is no appellate case that has made this
construction. The result is that in an IVF situation, there are three possible
mothers: the genetic mother who provides the egg, the surrogate mother who
gives birth, and the intended mother. According to Johnson v. Calvert,2'7 theclaims of both the genetic mother and the birth mother could be based upon
211. The court's conclusion regarding privacy was two-pronged: first, "the court's ruling did not
infringe upon any right of Mary and Victoria to family autonomy, because, under the peculiar facts of this case,
Jhordan was not excluded as a member of Devin's family for purposes of resolving this custody dispute," and
second, "the statute imposes no restriction on the right to bear a child," in other words, on procreative choice.
Id. at 536-37.
212. Interestingly, if the court had applied the intent test, there is a possibility that Victoria would have
been found to be the parent of Devin rather than Jhordan. While this test has not been applied in a factual setting
such as this, there is no conceptual reason why it could not be so applied.
213. There are only five provisions nationwide that deal with egg donation and in vitro fertilization:
"See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.14; N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-18-04; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 555; TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 151.102; VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158." Elster, supra note 18 1, at 181 n. 15.
214. The UPA (2000) has such a provision.
215. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 2260 (West Supp. 2003).
216. CAL. PENAL CODE § 367g (West 1999).
217. 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
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California Family Code section 7610(a)."' The claim of the intended mother
could be supported by Johnson v. Calvert"9 and, more specifically, by In re
Marriage of Buzzanca in which the appellate court upheld the claim of the
intended mother who was neither the biological donor nor the birth mother 20
Additionally, because there is no provision limiting the rights of ovum donors
even if they donate, as they always do, to a licensed physician, it would appear
that ovum donors may assert parental rights in a manner that sperm donors
cannot.221
The relative status of the three possible mothers in IVF situations is difficult
to unravel; in other words, should the courts favor any one of these mothers?
Johnson v. Calvert favored the woman who was both the genetic mother and the
intended mother over the birth mother.22 By the same reasoning, a court might
favor the gestational mother who was also an intended mother, 22 and also favor
the donor mother who is also the gestational mother, as in traditional surrogacy.224
This approach to determining maternity in a surrogacy case might be referred to
as a point system. One point is awarded to the woman who satisfies each one of
the three criteria for motherhood. If any woman receives two points, she is the
mother. However, the point system helps little in a surrogate situation in which
the genetic donor, the gestational mother, and the intended mother are all
225different women.
218. Id. at 779. The genetic mother is included because of the reference to establishing the natural
mother "under this part," which Johnson interpreted as referring to the genetic testing of Family Code sections
7550 through 7557. Id. at 781.
219. Id. at 782.
220. 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 282 (Ct. App. 1998).
221. See id. While it might be argued that In re Marriage of Buzzanca stands for the application of the
intended parent test in all cases of gestational surrogacy regardless of whether there is a tie to break, where the
intended parents are not the donor parents, this conclusion is suspect. In In re Marriage of Buzzanca the donor
parents and the gestational mother did not seek parental rights and were not before the court. As a result, the
court was somewhat anxious, even desperate, to find a solution to the thorny problem presented by the trial
court which had declared that the child had no parents:
Even though neither Luanne nor John are biologically related to Jaycee, they are still her
lawful parents given their initiating role as the intended parents in her conception and birth.
And, while the absence of a biological connection is what makes this case extraordinary, this
court is hardly without statutory basis and legal precedent in so deciding. Indeed, in both the
most famous child custody case of all time [the one decided by Solomon], and in our
Supreme Court's Johnson v. Calvert decision, the court looked to intent to parent as the
ultimate basis of its decision.... That is far more than can be said for a model of the law that
renders a child a legal orphan.
Id. at 293 (Citation and footnotes omitted; emphasis added).
222. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 776.
223. See id. This scenario is not uncommon. An example is a woman who is infertile and uses the IVF
procedure and bears the child herself. Her husband might be the sperm donor as well.
224. This is actually the scenario of traditional surrogacy which usually involves artificial insemination
rather than IVF. See In re Marriage of Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893, 894 (Ct. App. 1994) (stating that, in a
traditional surrogacy arrangement, the mother was the woman who was both the genetic mother and the birth
mother).
225. In re Marriage of Buzzanca favored the intended parent, but neither the donor mother nor the birth
mother sought to assert parental rights. See In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 280.
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The real question that needs to be asked in regard to the genetic donor in IVF
cases is whether there are scenarios in which the genetic mother would be
favored over either the birth mother or the intended mother. There are two
conceivable situations in which the answer would be yes: first, where the embryo
created through IVF is implanted either negligently or intentionally through fraud
or theft in the wrong woman;226 and second, and this is one of the main points of
this article, where it is clearly in the best interest of the child to have a parental
relationship with the genetic parents. If the gestational mother and the intended
mother were unavailable to raise the child or if there was clearly something in the
character of these women which would make them unfit, then the genetic donor
should have the opportunity to raise her child.
3. Surrogacy
Perhaps because of the complexity of the subject of surrogacy or because of
the power of the special interest involved in formulating a statutory scheme to
control surrogacy, the California statutory scheme is silent on the subject of
surrogate motherhood as an alternate means of reproduction." 7 There is no mention
of the words surrogate or surrogacy in the California Family Code.2 The
Legislature has considered numerous proposals229 and passed one which was
vetoed by Governor Pete Wilson.2 Despite public outcry for legislation to govern
226. See Robert B. v. Susan B., 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 785 (Ct. App. 2003); Prato-Morrison v. Doe, 126 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 509 (Ct. App. 2002). In the Historical and Statutory Notes to Penal Code section 367g, which makes it
a crime to improperly use sperm, ova, or embryos, the Legislature included the following findings:
(a) At least 60 California families allege that, in the last decade, medical personnel at fertility
clinics at the University of California at Irvine and the University of California at San
Diego transferred their sperm, ova, or embryos to researchers or implanted their sperm,
ova, or embryos into other women without their signed written consent.
(b) The fertility industry is a multibillion dollar industry with hundreds of fertility clinics
nationwide.
(c) The continued risk of these unethical transfers and implantations without informed
consent warrants stronger legislative protections for California families undergoing in
vitro and other assisted reproduction procedures.
(d) Physicians and other medical personnel must obtain signed written consent from patients
before performing in vitro and other assisted reproduction procedures.
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES TO CAL. PENAL CODE § 367g (West 1999).
227. The term "surrogate" appears many times in the code, but it usually refers to a substitute decision-
maker. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 2290.5(g) (West 1990 & Supp. 2003); CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 51131,
56050 (West 1989 & Supp. 2003); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 7579.5 (West 1995 & Supp. 2003); CAL. PROB. CODE
§§ 4643, 4685 (West Supp. 2003). The term "surrogate" does not appear at all in the Family Code. According to
Nanette Elster, "[wihile twenty states and the District of Columbia have laws addressing surrogacy, only eight
of those address the issue of parentage." Elster, supra note 191, at 537-38.
228. The Westlaw search: pr (family-code) & surrog! yields no results.
229. See John D. Miller, A Political Review of Alternative Surrogacy Proposals, 28 U.S.F. L. REV. 627,
627 n.l (1994).
230. Id. at 627 n.2 (citing S.B. 937, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1991-92) (vetoed by Governor Wilson (1992)).
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surrogacy contracts,"' there is still no specific statutory law on this subject.
According to one insider, however, "[tihe hearings and debate surrounding these
measures produced a remarkably thorough and in-depth review of surrogacy. '232
Nevertheless, because of the Legislature's failure to enact legislation, it has left
the courts to struggle with statutes that were not intended to apply to surrogacy.
Ultimately, the Legislature has surrendered control of surrogacy to the
marketplace without safeguards for the children who are conceived or for the
adults who play a role in their conception.
There are, of course, two forms of surrogate motherhood. First, in what might
be called traditional surrogacy, the surrogate mother is artificially inseminated with
the semen of a man who is not her husband but who has contracted with her to
have her surrender custody of the child to him and to relinquish the child for
adoption by the man's wife, although adoption by the father's wife is not
essential. A single man or a gay couple could also make use of traditional
surrogacy. In traditional surrogacy the genetic material is provided by the man
who is the contractual, as well as the intended, father and the woman who is also
the birth mother but not the contractual or intended mother."' The technology
used in traditional surrogacy is not sophisticated at all, requiring only artificial
insemination, which can be done at home24 even with household utensils.35
Indeed, traditional surrogacy can be accomplished without resort to technology at
all .236
Gestational surrogacy, on the other hand, requires significant use of technology.
While the distinctly low-tech process of semen donation is required, the
sophisticated processes of ovum extraction, in vitro fertilization, and embryo
transplantation are also required. 2 " The use of technology widely expands the
231. See Garry Whiter, Note, Surrogate Contracts: Another Cry from the California Courts for
Legislative Action, 19 J. JUV. L. 437,438 n. 10 (1998).
232. Miller, supra note 229, at 627. Mr. Miller, who was the principal consultant to the State Senate
Committee on Health and Human Services and Chief of Staff for California State Senator Diane E. Watson, has
added the following insight into the legislative process in this area:
In addition to the reasoned legal arguments presented, the political, and often deeply personal,
debates encompassed every aspect of this complex and emotional dispute. The novelty of one
woman voluntarily carrying another woman's genetic child forced the legal community to
advance original concepts in the proposed legislation. Likewise, the subjective nature of the
questions generated by surrogacy stretched accepted political doctrines. So divisive was the
debate over surrogacy, that the vast majority of interested organizations could not agree on
any position regarding the legislation. Even when specific positions could be established, they
followed no consistent pattern. For example, the National Organization of Women strongly
opposed permitting surrogacy, while the Commission on the Status of Women strongly
supported it.
Id. at 627.
233. See In re Matter of Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227, 1234 (N.J. 1988).
234. See Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 224 Cal. Rptr. 530, 535 (Ct. App. 1986).
235. See In re Marriage of Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893, 894 & n.3 (Ct. App. 1994).
236. See Genesis 16:2.
237. See Goodwin, supra note 162, at 276.
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number of people who may claim to have the rights and responsibilities of
parenthood. The possible mothers include the surrogate who is the birth mother,
the egg donor who is the genetic mother, and the intended or contractual mother
who may also be the egg donor and therefore the genetic mother. The list of
potential fathers is just as long. While among the potential fathers there is no
equivalent of the birth mother, the birth mother's husband may have a claim.
While the rebuttable presumptions may not apply in artificial insemination cases,
there is no statutory provision which might prevent the conclusively presumed
father from asserting the presumption. There could also be a genetic father, and a
contractual or intended father who may or may not also be the genetic father.
Both forms of surrogacy involve complicated contractual arrangements, but
the number of combinations of contracts depends, of course, on the type of
surrogacy. The basic contractual arrangement is between the surrogate mother
and the future parents of the child. The surrogate mother agrees to be either
artificially inseminated or to be implanted with a fertilized ovum, and, in return,
the future parents agree to pay money. This was the basic arrangement in
Johnson v. Calvert.23 In addition, the future parents may also enter into a contract
with an intermediary who has provided the service. 39 While the cases do not
usually discuss it, there may be other contracts involving doctors, sperm donors,
and egg donors. Each of the donors may contract with the doctor, and all three
may have contractual relations with an intermediary organization or with the
future parents.
Despite the complexity, as noted above, the issue of surrogacy has been left
to the courts, and the result has been a general endorsement of gestational
surrogacy. Johnson v. Calvert24 is the most important case dealing with surrogacy
in California, and has analytically confused the issue by the court's resort to the
intent test rather than simply enforcing or refusing to enforce the surrogacy
contract. However, it is clear that the court in Johnson endorsed surrogacy
contracts and that the actual contract in Johnson played an important role. The
court stated, "[b]ecause two women each have presented acceptable proof of
maternity, we do not believe this case can be decided without enquiring into the
parties' intentions as manifested in the surrogacy agreement."24' In addition, the
238. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 778 (Cal. 1993), stating:
On January 15, 1990, Mark, Crispina, and Anna signed a contract providing that an embryo
created by the sperm of Mark and the egg of Crispina would be implanted in Anna and the
child born would be taken into Mark and Crispina's home "as their child." Anna agreed she
would relinquish "all parental rights" to the child in favor of Mark and Crispina. In return,
Mark and Crispina would pay Anna $10,000 in a series of installments, the last to be paid six
weeks after the child's birth. Mark and Crispina were also to pay for a $200,000 life
insurance policy on Anna's life.
Id. at 778.
239. See In re Matter of Baby M., 537 A.2d. 1227, 1246-50 (N.J. 1988).
240. 851 P.2d 776.
241. Id. at 782 (emphasis added).
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court concluded that the surrogacy contract did not violate public policy: "In
deciding the issue of maternity under the Act we have felt free to take into
account the parties' intentions, as expressed in the surrogacy contract, because in
our view the agreement is not, on its face, inconsistent with public policy." 2 The
court rejected three public policy arguments against surrogacy contracts. The first
two policy arguments against surrogacy contracts involved the law of adoption,
and the court dealt with these two arguments together. The first is "the public
policy embodied in Penal Code section 273, prohibiting the payment for consent
to adoption of a child," 243 and the second is the group of "policies underlying the
adoption laws of this state [which] are violated by the surrogacy contract because
it in effect constitutes a prebirth waiver of [the mother's] parental rights."'' 4
The court rejected both of these arguments simply because they are adoption-
related, and, since surrogacy is not adoption and since the differences between
adoption and surrogacy are crucial, adoption law and the policies behind
adoption law do not apply.24' More specifically, the court stated,
Gestational surrogacy differs in crucial respects from adoption and so is
not subject to the adoption statutes. The parties voluntarily agreed to
participate in in vitro fertilization and related medical procedures before
the child was conceived; at the time when Anna entered into the contract,
therefore, she was not vulnerable to financial inducements to part with
her own expected offspring. As discussed above, Anna was not the
genetic mother of the child. The payments to Anna under the contract
were meant to compensate her for her services in gestating the fetus and
undergoing labor, rather than for giving up "parental" rights to the child.
Payments were due both during the pregnancy and after the child's birth.
We are, accordingly, unpersuaded that the contract used in this case
violates the public policies embodied in Penal Code section 273 and the
adoption statutes.246
What the court was really saying is that Anna is not the genetic mother, and,
therefore, she is not being paid money to give up her child.24' The court appears
to ignore the status it had just given to Anna because she is the birth mother.
While she did contract to provide services, she also agreed to relinquish a child to
whom she gave birth-facts which in any other circumstance would make her the
child's mother without question. One wonders why, if the court was going to
place such an emphasis on the fact that Anna is not the child's genetic mother,
242. Id. at 783.
243. Id. at 783-84.
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the court did not simply say that Crispina was the natural mother because she was
the child's genetic mother.
The court also dealt with several other social policies in a summary fashion.
Surrogacy does not violate prohibitions on involuntary servitude because the
court saw "no potential for that evil in the contract at issue here, and extrinsic
evidence of coercion or duress is utterly lacking," and because the contract
contained a clause that said that any promise which is contrary to a woman's
"absolute right to abort or not abort any fetus she is carrying ... is
unenforceable. '"m The court rejected claims that surrogacy will "exploit or
dehumanize women, especially women of lower economic status," or that
"surrogacy may encourage society to view children as commodities, subject to
trade at their parents' will," because there was insufficient evidence that these
bad effects would result.2 49 Regarding dehumanization, the court stated, "there
has been no proof that surrogacy contracts exploit poor women to any greater
degree than economic necessity in general exploits them by inducing them to
accept lower-paid or otherwise undesirable employment."'  The court dismissed
the commodification of children argument simply by saying, "no evidence is
offered to support it." 25' The court's response to both of these issues missed the
point and showed that the court either chose to ignore or was unaware of the
essential moral nature of these issues and the potential for even greater problems
when new technology such as cloning becomes widely available. 22
Finally, the court dismissed any constitutional issues. There were no
procedural due process issues 2 3 or equal protection issues.2  According to the
248. Id.
249. Id. at 784-85.
250. Id. at 785. The court also appended what might be considered a pseudo-feminist argument:
The argument that a woman cannot knowingly and intelligently agree to gestate and deliver a
baby for intending parents carries overtones of the reasoning that for centuries prevented
women from attaining equal economic rights and professional status under the law. To
resurrect this view is both to foreclose a personal and economic choice on the part of the
surrogate mother, and to deny intending parents what may be their only means of procreating
a child of their own genes. Certainly in the present case it cannot seriously be argued that
Anna, a licensed vocational nurse who had done well in school and who had previously borne
a child, lacked the intellectual wherewithal or life experience necessary to make an informed
decision to enter into the surrogacy contract.
Id.
251, Id.
252. See Matthew H. Baughman, In Search of Common Ground: One Pragmatist Perspective on the
Debate over Contract Surrogacy, 10 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 263 (2001); April L. Cherry, Nurturing in the
Service of White Culture: Racial Subordination, Gestational Surrogacy, and the Ideology of Motherhood, 10
TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 83 (2001); Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Approaching Surrogate Motherhood: Reconsidering
Difference, 26 VT. L. REV. 407 (2002); Adam Marshall, Choices for a Child: An Ethical and Legal Analysis of
a Failed Surrogate Birth Contract, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 275 (1996).
253. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 785.
254. Id. The court explained:
Furthermore, neither Anna nor amicus curiae ACLU articulates a claim under the equal
protection clause, and we are unable to discern in these facts the necessary predicate to its
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court, Anna's constitutional claim must rest "on theories of substantive due
process, privacy, and procreative freedom.""'
However, the court dismissed these claims almost peremptorily:
Anna's argument depends on a prior determination that she is indeed the
child's mother. Since Crispina is the child's mother under California law
because she, not Anna, provided the ovum for the in vitro fertilization
procedure, intending to raise the child as her own, it follows that any
constitutional interests Anna possesses in this situation are something less
than those of a mother.256
As to the constitutionality of the court's determination that Anna was not the
child's natural mother, the court rejected her contention that she had a liberty
interest in her relationship to the child. 57 The court based its reasoning upon
Michael H. v. Gerald D.,255 which Anna also relied upon, and stated: "Society has
not traditionally protected the right of a woman who gestates and delivers a baby
pursuant to an agreement with a couple who supply the zygote from which the
baby develops and who intend to raise the child as their own." 259 In reaching this
operation. This is because a woman who voluntarily agrees to gestate and deliver for a
married couple a child who is their genetic offspring is situated differently from the wife who
provides the ovum for fertilization, intending to mother the resulting child.
Id.
255. Id. The court cited the following cases as the basis of Anna's argument: Santosky v. Kramer, 455
U.S. 745, 768 (1982); Lassiter v. Dep't. of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981); Smith v. Org. of Foster
Families, 431 U.S. 816, 842 (1977); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972). The court then stated:
Most of the cases Anna cites deal with the rights of unwed fathers in the face of attempts to
terminate their parental relationship to their children. (See, e.g., [Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645, 658-59 (1972); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 247-48 (1978); Caban v. Mohammed,
441 U.S. 380 (1979); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983).] These cases do not support
recognition of parental rights for a gestational surrogate. Although Anna quotes language
stressing the primacy of a developed parent-child relationship in assessing unwed fathers'
rights (see Lehr v. Robertson, [463 U.S. at 260-62], certain language in the cases reinforces
the importance of genetic parents' rights. (Lehr v. Robertson, [463 U.S. at 262] ["The
significance of the biological connection is that it offers the natural father an opportunity that
no other male possesses to develop a relationship with his offspring. If he grasps that
opportunity and accepts some measure of responsibility for the child's future, he may enjoy
the blessings of the parent-child relationship and make uniquely valuable contributions to the
child's development."]; see also Adoption of Kelsey S.,[823 P.2d 1216 (Cal. 1992).] ["The
biological connection between father and child is unique and worthy of constitutional
protection if the father grasps the opportunity to develop that biological connection into a full
and enduring relationship."].)
Johnson, 851 P.2d at 785-86.
256. Id. at 786.
257. Id.
258. 491 U.S. 110, 124-25 (1989) (plurality opinion).
259. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 786.
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conclusion, the court ignored the inherent problems in the traditional test26° and
the special problem when it is applied to issues of new technology. 26'
In re Marriage of Moschetta, a traditional surrogacy case, was the first post-
Johnson surrogacy case.262 Despite the California Supreme Court's generally
favorable attitude toward surrogacy contracts, the court in In re Marriage of
Moschetta declined to enforce the traditional surrogacy contract.26 ' The case
resulted from a surrogacy agreement between a married couple, Robert and
Cynthia, and a surrogate mother, Elvira Jordan. In a provision typical of
traditional surrogacy contracts, Elvira agreed that Robert "could obtain sole
custody and control of any child born" and Elvira would "sign all necessary
papers to terminate her parental rights and 'aid' Cynthia ... in adopting the
child."'2  Elvira became pregnant after being artificially inseminated with semen
from Robert. During the course of the pregnancy, Robert and Cynthia began to
have marital difficulties, which Elvira learned of just before delivery. Elvira had
second thoughts regarding the surrogacy agreement and refused to let Robert see
the child for two days. She retained custody but relented when Robert and
Cynthia "told her they would stay together."' 65 When Robert and Cynthia
separated, Robert and Cynthia asserted their parental rights, and Elvira asserted
her parental rights. In holding that Robert and Elvira, the surrogate mother, were
the natural parents of the child, Marissa, the court declined "to enforce the
agreement, not for the public policy reasons sometimes advanced by those who
oppose surrogacy, but because enforcement of a traditional surrogacy contract by
itself is incompatible with the parentage and adoption statutes already on the
books."' '66 The court also refused to apply the intent test simply because "[t]here
260. See id. First, the concept of tradition is easy to manipulate by simply redefining categories.
Tradition has always protected gestational mothers. But the court rejected that category and placed Anna in a
category of gestational mothers pursuant to a surrogacy agreement. Then the court created a category which fit
the Calverts, stating "[,t]o the extent that tradition has a bearing on the present case, we believe it supports the
claim of the couple who exercise their right to procreate in order to form a family of their own, albeit through
novel medical procedures." Id.
261. See id. Of course, tradition never protected gestational surrogacy mothers. The social process that
created the tradition occurred long before people in society ever conceived of the technology that created
gestational surrogacy. While the court does recognize that surrogate contracts are of recent origin, the court did
not acknowledge the possibility that the traditional test may be inapplicable in this area where new technology
is so important. It simply decided that "such arrangements are of too recent an origin to claim the protection of
tradition." Id.
262. 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893 (Ct. App. 1994). See id. at 894 ("By 'traditional' surrogacy we mean an
arrangement where a woman is impregnated with the sperm of a married man with the prior understanding that
the resulting child is to be legally the child of the married man and his infertile wife."). Id. at 894. The trial of
this case was actually before Johnson v. Calvert.
263. Id. at 894-95.
264. Id. at 895. In return, Robert and Cynthia agreed to pay Jordan $10,000 in "recognition" of Robert's
"obligations to support [the] child and his right to provide [Jordan] with living expenses." Id.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 894-95 (footnote omitted).
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[was] no 'tie' to break."26' Robert was the father because he was the genetic
father and Elvira the mother because she was both the genetic and birth mother.
Once the contract and intent were ruled out as criteria for parenthood, Cynthia
had no valid claim to the child. 6"
Finally, In re Marriage of Buzzanca also deal with the subject of surrogacy,
but it does not add much to the overall process of surrogacy.27 In this case, the
marriage of the contractual parents, Luanne and John, both of whom had signed
the surrogacy agreement, ended. John attempted to disavow the surrogacy
agreement and to avoid the parental and financial responsibility for the child. The
case received great notoriety because the trial court, applying the statutory
scheme, stated (figuratively throwing up its hands) that this child had no parents
at all."' While the California court of appeal firmly rejected this position, the trial
court was technically correct under the California statutory scheme. John did not
have a genetic tie to the child and did not fit any of the statutory presumptions.
Luanne did not give birth and did not have a genetic connection. There was no
statutory recognition of surrogacy contracts.
While the decision of the court of appeal is complicated, the court applied the
intent test of Johnson v. Calvert. The court stated that John was the father based
upon the well-established doctrines of consent and estoppel. Like a husband who
has consented to his wife's artificial insemination, he consented to becoming the
12child's father and, as the consensual father, he should be estopped from
267. Id. at 896.
268. See id. at 900 stating:
Moreover, the framework employed by Johnson v. Calvert of first determining parentage
under the Act is dispositive of the case before us. In Johnson v. Calvert our Supreme Court
first ascertained parentage under the Act; only when the operation of the Act yielded an
ambiguous result did the court resolve the matter by intent as expressed in the agreement. In
the present case, by contrast, parentage is easily resolved in Elvira Jordan under the terms of
the Act. Here, apropos the language in Johnson v. Calvert ... the two usual means of showing
matemity-genetics and birth-coincide in one woman.
Id.
269. See id. It should be noted that at the appellate level, Robert actually asserted the position that the
contract should be enforced and Cynthia should be declared the child's mother.
270. In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Ct. App. 1998).
271. See id. at 282 (stating:
The trial court then reached an extraordinary conclusion: Jaycee [the child] had no lawful
parents. First, the woman who gave birth to Jaycee was not the mother; the court had--
astonishingly-already accepted a stipulation that neither she nor her husband were the
"biological" parents. Second, Luanne was not the mother. According to the trial court, she
could not be the mother because she had neither contributed the egg nor given birth. And
John could not be the father, because, not having contributed the sperm, he had no biological
relationship with the child).
Id.
272. See id. at 286 (stating:
If a husband who consents to artificial insemination under Family Code section 7613 is
"treated in law" as the father of the child by virtue of his consent, there is no reason the result
should be any different in the case of a married couple who consent to in vitro fertilization by
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denying his own paternity and parental duty."' The court also specifically
referred to the fact that John caused the birth of Jaycee, and, of course, when the
court in Johnson spoke of the intended parent, it was referring to the person who
through intent caused the birth of the child. 4 With Luanne, the court was more
explicit. She was the mother because she was the intended mother: "Not only was
Luanne the clearly intended mother, no bona fide attempt has been made to
establish the surrogate as the lawful mother." '275 Regarding both parents, the court
concluded, "[e]ven though neither Luanne nor John are biologically related to
Jaycee, they are still her lawful parents given their initiating roles as the intended
parents in her conception and birth." '276
In summary, California has no statutory provisions to deal with surrogacy.
No California appellate case has enforced a surrogacy contract based upon
contract theory, although the California Supreme Court in Johnson concluded
that such contracts do not violate public policy, the most common legal
impediment to the enforcement of surrogacy contracts in other states. All four
cases that have dealt with issues of parentage arising out of surrogacy contracts
have applied the law dealing with parentage, not the law of contracts. In three of
the cases, the genetic parent, both mother and/or father, has prevailed. In
Johnson, where the genetic test conflicted with the "giving birth test," the
California Supreme Court resorted to the intent test to break the tie, although the
unknown donors and subsequent implantation into a woman who is, as a surrogate, willing to
carry the embryo to term for them. The statute is, after all, the clearest expression of past
legislative intent when the Legislature did contemplate a situation where a person who caused
a child to come into being had no biological relationship to the child.).
Id.
273. Id. at 287 (stating:
It must also be noted that in applying the artificial insemination statute to a case where a party
has caused a child to be brought into the world, the statutory policy is really echoing a more
fundamental idea-a sort of grundnorm to borrow Hans Kelsen's famous jurisprudential
word-already established in the case law. That idea is often summed up in the legal term
"estoppel." Estoppel is an ungainly word from the Middle French (from the word meaning
"bung" or "stopper") expressing the law's distaste for inconsistent actions and positions-like
consenting to an act which brings a child into existence and then turning around and
disclaiming any responsibility.).
Id.
274. See id. at 291 (stating:
In context, then, the high court's considered dicta is directly applicable to the case at hand.
The context was not limited to just Johnson-style contests between women who gave birth
and women who contributed ova, but to any situation where a child would not have been born
"'but for the efforts of the intended parents."' ([Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal.
1993) (quoting Hill, supra note 165, at 415)]).
Id.
275. Id. at 288. The court treated this statement as two reasons why Luanne was the child's mother.
However, the second part of the statement, that neither the genetic mother nor the birth mother had come
forward to parent the child, actually supports the view that the court was really relying on the intent test.
Without these other potential mothers involved, it is clear that the court was not using the intent test as a tie-
breaker.
276. Id. at 293.
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result was that the genetic parent was the one who was declared to be the child's
parent. Only in In re Marriage of Buzzanca did the court resort exclusively to
another test, the intent test, to establish the parental relationship, and in that case
the genetic parent was a mere donor and did not seek a parental relationship.
Finally, in none of the cases has a court applied rules which were based upon the
preservation of the unitary family.
4. New Technology
While discussions of new assisted-reproduction technology sometimes take
on a science-fiction quality, there is one form of new technology, cloning,7 s
which has reached such a level of sophistication and likelihood that it deserves
discussion in the context of parenting. On the other hand, while there is no
evidence at this time that the cloning of a human has been achieved, the
possibility appears to be so likely that serious thought is being given to the moral,
ethical, biological, economic and legal effects,279  and two Presidential
277. Another form of new technology which may in the future merit discussion is the artificial womb,
which has clearly not been perfected, although some scientists have claimed some breakthroughs in this area.
Even with these possible breakthroughs, serious thought is not yet being given to the implications for the law of
parentage, although existence of such a womb would at least in some cases undermine the need for the giving
birth test and emphasize either the genetic test or the intent test for parentage. See supra note 19.
278. Clarke D. Forysythe has described two kinds of cloning. Of these two types, only the latter is the
subject of discussion in the text:
The cloning of entire organisms, especially mammals, may be performed using two
different techniques with different implications. One technique is called blastomere separation
or "cloning by embryo splitting." This involves splitting the cells of a human embryo at its
earliest stages of development, a method of artificially creating a twin. Each cell at this early
stage is undifferentiated and totipotent-individually able to grow into a mature embryo, and
then a fetus, leading to birth. The cloning of human embryos that was reported in October
1993 was achieved by blastomere separation. This method avoids the specter of replicating a
dead or living adult human being.
In contrast, the second cloning technique that reportedly resulted in the Scottish sheep is
called "nuclear transfer" (or transplantation), a term which effectively describes the basic
procedure. This may be attempted using embryonic or adult cells. This technique has also
been called (in the bills introduced in Congress) somatic cell nuclear transfer, which refers to
the use of genetic material from non-germ (non-sex) cells. The female's genetic material is
contained in the nucleus of the ovum (the egg cell). The nucleus from an egg is removed
(enucleated egg) and replaced with the nucleus from a cell of the human being to be cloned.
The unfertilized egg is artificially fertilized by replacing its nucleus.... This technique of
human cloning, like IVF, is conducted extracorporeally-outside the human body, in a
laboratory. As with IVF, only after the human egg is denucleated, the nucleus replaced, and
the resulting embryo is allowed to divide would it be implanted in a woman's uterus. Only
then would a normal pregnancy exist. Cloning by somatic cell nuclear transfer (in contrast to
other techniques) was the exclusive focus of the 1997 National Bioethics Advisory
Commission (NBAC) hearings and report.
Clarke D. Forsythe, Human Cloning and the Constitution, 32 VAL. U. L. REV. 469, 481-82 (1998) (footnotes
omitted).
279. See Elster, supra note 191, at 533; Forsythe, supra note 278, at 469; Leon R. Kass, The Wisdom of
Repugnance: Why We Should Ban the Cloning of Humans, 32 VAL. U. L. REV. 679 (1998); Bruce Wilder,
From Bastardy to Cloning: Adaptations of Legal Thought for Unorthodox Reproduction, 26 HUM. RTS. Q. 23
(1999).
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Commissions have recommended that the cloning of a human being, at least for
reproductive purposes, be prohibited.28° California and other states have taken this
step and prohibited human cloning. 21' However, this prohibition does not mean
that a child will not be produced in this manner. Moreover, in light of the fact
that no reproductive technology has been successfully resisted in the long run,
there is a distinct possibility that cloning may become a part of our reproductive
arsenal in the future, even if it is "off shore" or "underground." The full
implications of cloning are far beyond the scope of this article even on the
subject of parentage, yet I think they must be addressed because any restructuring
of our parentage law should take them into account.
As to cloning, the issue for parentage law is, of course, who will be the
parent of the cloned child; more specifically, the issue is which portion of the
present law would govern the parentage of a cloned child? If present law proves
to be inadequate, how should a new law be drafted? These issues are made
especially difficult by the reality that, for every cloned child, there is a relatively
large number of potential parents to choose from. One commentator has
described this array of potential parents as follows:
The process of cloning will result in a child having genetic material from
as many as four individuals: the person from whom the cell nucleus was
derived, that individual's biological parents, and the woman contributing
the enucleated egg cell, which contains a small fraction of mitochondrial
deoxyribonucleic acid ("DNA"). In addition, if the egg with the
transferred nucleic material is implanted in a surrogate gestational
mother, the child will have two other potential parents-the gestator, and
if she is married, her husband.... There may also be intended rearing
parents unrelated to the individual who is cloned, such as when the
cloned individual is deceased or a celebrity.
2
Every one of these parental candidates can receive some support in the California
statutory scheme for determining parentage.
280. See Remarks Announcing the Prohibition on Federal Funding for Cloning on Human Beings and
an Exchange with Reporters, WEEKLY COMP. DOC., Mar. 4, 1997, at 278.
281. California Health and Safety Code section 24185(a) states, "No person shall clone a human being
or engage in human reproductive cloning." CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24185(a) (West Supp. 2003).
Subsection (c) provides a definition of cloning:
"Clone" means the practice of creating or attempting to create a human being by transferring
the nucleus from a human cell from whatever source into a human or nonhuman egg cell from
which the nucleus has been removed for the purpose of, or to implant, the resulting product to
initiate a pregnancy that could result in the birth of a human being.
Id. § 24185(c)(1) (West 2002).
282. Elster, supra note 191, at 536. Additionally, it is not impossible to consider the physician or
scientist who was responsible for the physical cloning of the child. Although this person should not be viewed
as a potential parent to rear the child, he or she is a potential candidate to play the parental role of supporting the
child.
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The use of blood testing or genetic testing to determine parentage is possible,
but it presents technological problems which must be addressed. In theory, the
DNA test could be used to support the claim of the donor parent; the problem is
that, using the most sophisticated forms of DNA testing, the conclusion would be
that the donor's DNA was almost 100 percent similar to the cloned child, a
situation which normally would indicate twin siblings."' Under present day
standards, the DNA test would most likely conclude that the donor's parents
were the parents of the cloned child. Additionally, as mentioned in the quotation
above, the woman who donated the enucleated egg cell also contributes a small
amount of DNA to the cloned child which might register on a DNA test.284
Both the conclusive presumption... and the various rebuttable presumptions28
would support the candidacy of the husband of the gestational mother. The
husband of the gestational mother might also be the genetic donor. If cloning
were to be legalized, this scenario might be common: a couple desires to have a
child that is not encumbered by the wife's genetic disease and so "[t]o avoid this
possibility of passing on the disease, the couple decides to transfer nucleic
material from one of the husband's cells to the wife's enucleated egg cell and
then transfer the resulting embryo to the wife's uterus.,,287 However, there are
situations in which the husband of the gestational mother would almost be a
stranger to the child. If the husband were married to a true gestational surrogate,
he would have no connection to the child other than being married to the birth
mother; nevertheless, there would be no way to challenge his paternity unless the
genetic father had also attained the status of presumed father. The same would be
true under the rebuttable presumptions of Family Code section 761 1.288
The "giving birth standard" would, of course, support the gestational mother.
While the gestational mother might also be the donor mother and the intended
mother, the more difficult scenario is that in which the gestational mother is a
surrogate whose only connection with the child is giving birth, and her status as
parent might be challenged by a donor parent supported by DNA testing, an
intended parent, or even by a potential parent who is both a donor and an
intended parent. In this situation would the court use the tie-breaking approach of
Johnson v. Calvert?.9 In Johnson, the gestational mother was opposed by the
290genetic mother who was also the intended mother. One could say that the
283. See id. at 548.
284. Id. at 536. Nevertheless, these problems are minor and can be resolved by merely tinkering with the
legal standards used to establish parenthood. It seems absurd to think that if we select the person who
contributed "a small fraction" of a child's DNA as the parent, we would refuse to accept the person who
contributed almost 100 percent. Id.
285. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7540 (West 1994 & Supp. 2003).
286. See id. §§ 7600-7730.
287. Elster, supra note 191, at 549.
288. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611 (West 1994 & Supp. 2003).
289. 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
290. Id. at 778.
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weight of the genetic test and the intent test combined to outweigh the giving
birth test. Likewise, it would be possible with a cloned child for the donor and
the intended parent to be the same person. However, with a cloned child it is
entirely possible for the donor parent to be different from the intended parent.
Johnson v. Calvert did not resolve this scenario. Although the appellate court
case of In re Marriage of Buzzanca upheld the parentage of purely intended
parents, 29' there was no claim to the status of parent by the donor or gestational
parents.
Finally, the standard of the intended parent leads to the greatest level of
controversy. The problem arises because in California cloning is illegal. The full
scope of Health and Safety Code section 24185(a), 2 which prohibits cloning a
human being, is not known at this time. But those who participate knowingly in a
wrongful cloning at least have violated the public policy of California. Each of
the potential parents of a clone under California law must be examined in light of
this policy shift, which most dramatically affects the status of the intended
parents who, instead of being sympathetic individuals seeking to bring a child
into the world and to rear that child, are now the prime movers of a statutory
violation and perhaps of a moral wrong. If "intended parents" were allowed to
keep a cloned child, they would benefit from their own wrongdoing and
encourage other people to engage in the practice of cloning. Most importantly,
the use of the intent test as the tie-breaker may be lost.
III. SUGGESTED MODEL FOR CALIFORNIA
As stated in the introduction, the approach proposed by this article is simply
this: first, to make the genetic test the baseline standard for establishing the
existence of the parent-child relationship; second, to require a judicially pre-
validated contract when modem means of assisted conception are used to
conceive and give birth to a child; and third, to use the best interest of the child
standard where the parties (donors, surrogate parents, and intended parents) have
failed to have a pre-validated contract, where a true tie-breaking test is required,
or where the facts of the case are unique, as in In re marriage of Buzzanca.'9'
This system can be implemented easily in California. The genetic baseline can be
established in California by simply abolishing the conclusive presumptions and
by making the rebuttable presumptions fully rebuttable. Legislation establishing
the bright-line pre-validated contract could be modeled after the approach of the
Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act24 (USCACA) or the
291. 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 282 (Ct. App. 1998).
292. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24185(a) (West Supp. 2003).
293. In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280. The history of the law and reproductive
technology is testimony to the fact that novel situations can arise.
294. See UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT (USCACA) § 5, 9C U.L.A. 373,
383 (2001). This citation is only of historical interest. The latest addition of volume 9B of the Uniform Laws
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Uniform Parentage Act (2000)29 (UPA (2000)). Implementation of the best
interest standard would deviate from the model of either the USCACA or the
UPA (2000) and would require new legislation.
A. The Baseline.: The Genetic-Biological Relationship
With minor changes to the Family Code, California can establish the genetic
test as the baseline method for determining parentage. The first step would be to
abolish the conclusive presumptions of paternity, which could be accomplished
by simply repealing Family Code sections 7540 and 7541. The second step
would be to make the rebuttable presumptions of Family Code section 7611
completely rebuttable. 96 It is not necessary to repeal these presumptions because
they fill an important role in the paternity scheme in that they allow issues of
paternity to be resolved without litigation. The presumptions allow courts to
determine paternity in cases in which the biological father has not come forward
and in which paternity is important but not really the subject of the litigation.
The easiest way to make the presumptions of Family Code section 7611 fully
rebuttable is by enlarging the list of those who can rebut those presumptions. At
present under Family Code section 7630, only "[a] child, the child's natural
mother, or a man presumed to be the child's father" ' can bring an action to
declare the existence or nonexistence of a father and child relationship under the
rebuttable presumptions; a genetic-biological father who is not a presumed father
cannot bring an action to establish his paternity. The list of those who may rebut
the presumptions in section 7630(a) could be expanded to include "any interested
party '," or "a man alleged or alleging himself to be the father. ,299 Both of
Annotated no longer contains the Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act because this act has
been superceded by the Uniform Parentage Act (2000). UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000), 9B U.L.A. 295 (2001).
295. See UNIF. PARENTAGEACr (2000) §§ 801-803, 9B U.L.A. 362-364 (2001).
296. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611 (West 1994 & Supp. 2003).
297. Id. § 7630(a). A presumed father who attains that status by receiving the child into his home and
holding it out as his natural child is excluded from this group. See id.
298. See id. § 7630(a)(2)(b). While there are many permutations, the new statutory provision might take,
the new version of section 7630 might read like this:
Any interested party may bring an action as follows:
(1) At any time for the purpose of declaring the existence of the father and child relationship.
(2) For the purpose of declaring the nonexistence of the father and child relationship presumed
under Section 7611 only if the action is brought within a reasonable time after obtaining
knowledge of relevant facts. After the presumption has been rebutted, paternity of the child
by another man may be determined in the same action, if he has been made a party.
299. The addition of this phrase to section 7630 (a) would create a less expansive provision than the one
mentioned in footnote 298:
(a) A child, the child's natural mother, a man presumed to be the child's father under Section
7611, or a man alleged or alleging himself to be the father may bring an action as follows:
(1) At any time for the purpose of declaring the existence of the father and child
relationship.
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these phrases already appear in section 7630. 300 Another way to accomplish this
change would be to allow a father who is a presumed father under Family Code
section 7555, which creates a rebuttable presumption of paternity where the
genetic test yields a paternity index of at least 100,301 to rebut the presumptions of
Family Code section 7611 .0
As to the subject of maternity, it is not necessary to alter the statutory scheme
to establish the genetic baseline simply because, without the use of assisted
conception, the birth mother and the genetic mother are always the same. In
effect, the genetic baseline has already been established for mothers. It is the
position of this paper that, if assisted conception is used so that the birth mother
and the genetic mother are different women, the provisions which are suggested
below for dealing with assisted conceptions should apply. Even if in the future an
artificial womb is developed and commonly used,3 °3 it would still not be
necessary to change the provisions of the statute simply because Johnson v.
Calvert has already established that the provisions of Family Code section 7550
(2) For the purpose of declaring the nonexistence of the father and child relationship
presumed under Section 7611 only if the action is brought within a reasonable
time after obtaining knowledge of relevant facts. After the presumption has been
rebutted, paternity of the child by another man may be determined in the same
action, if he has been made a party.
300. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7630 (West 1994 & Supp. 2002). The phrase "any interested party" comes
from Family Code section 7630(b) which allows rebuttal of section 761 l(d) (the receiving and holding out
presumption) and "a man alleged or alleging himself to be the father" is used in section 7630(c) which allows
an action where there is no presumed father. See id. The language of UPA (2000) might also serve as a model
for a new provision of the California Family Code:
§ 602. Standing to Maintain Proceeding.
Subject to [Article] 3 and Sections 607 and 609, a proceeding to adjudicate parentage may be
maintained by:
(I) the child;
(2) the mother of the child;
(3) a man whose paternity of the child is to be adjudicated;
(4) the support-enforcement agency [or other governmental agency authorized by other
law];
(5) an authorized adoption agency or licensed child-placing agency; [or]
(6) a representative authorized by law to act for an individual who would otherwise be entitled
to maintain a proceeding but who is deceased, incapacitated, or a minor [; or
(7) an intended parent under [Article] 8].
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACrI(2000) § 602, 913 U.L.A. 338 (2001).
301. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7555(a) (West 1994).
302. Specifically, this could be accomplished by modifying Family Code section 7630(a) to say, "A
child, the child's natural mother, or a man presumed to be the child's father under subdivision (a), (b), or (c) of
Section 7611 or under Section 7555 may bring an action" to prove the existence or nonexistence of the father
and child relationship. The phrase in italics has been added by the author to the statutory language. See id.
§ 7630.
303. The phrase "commonly used" is important here. An artificial womb would certainly be assisted
conception and the provision suggested herein for assisted conception could apply. However, if artificial wombs
were routinely used for normal child birth, it would be impossible to use the contract approach of assisted
conception. The judicial system would simply fail from overload.
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through section 7558, regarding the use of the genetic testing, apply to maternity
as well as to paternity.i
1. California and the Majority of States
By making the genetic test the baseline for establishing parentage, California
would not be doing anything novel or revolutionary. Indeed, California has
always been somewhat backwards in this area. California appears to be the only
state to maintain the conclusive presumption of paternityY and, according to the
UPA (2000), "[t]hirty-three States allow a man alleging himself to be the father
of a child with a presumed father to rebut the marital presumption."' ° The UPA
(2000) uses the genetic test as the baseline for parentage determinations. Section
631 of the UPA (2000) states that a "presumed, acknowledged, or adjudicated
father may be disproved only by admissible results of genetic testing excluding
that man as the father of the child or identifying another man as the father of the
child." ' But, even more importantly, this section requires that "a man identified
as the father of a child under Section 505 [which states the standard that genetic
testing must meet to establish paternity] must be adjudicated the father of the
child" ' and that "a man excluded as the father of a child by genetic testing must
be adjudicated not to be the father of the child." 3 Even more to the point, the
framers of the UPA (2000) made the following statement in the Comment to
section 631:
This section establishes the controlling supremacy of admissible genetic
test results in the adjudication of paternity. Other matters such as statute
of limitations, equitable estoppel and res judicata may preclude the
matter from reaching trial or the court denying genetic testing. However,
if test results are admissible, those results control unless other test results
create a conflict rebutting the admitted results."1
304. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 781 (Cal. 1993).
305. See Angela R. Arkin, Evidentiary and Related Issues in Paternity Proceedings, in I DISPUTED
PATERNITY PROCEEDINGS 3-15 (Lexis Publishing 5th ed. 2003). "At least one state, California, has a
presumption of legitimacy that is 'conclusive' if the child is bom to a married woman living with her husband at
the time of conception and which may be rebutted only in limited circumstances." Id. Also, there was no
conclusive presumption of paternity in the Uniform Parentage Act when it was adopted in California.
306. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 607 cmt, 9B U.L.A. 341 (2001).
307. Id. § 631(l), 9B U.L.A. 348 (2001).
308. Id. § 631(2) (2001).
309. Id. § 631(4), 9B U.L.A. 349 (2001).
310. Id. § 631 cmt., 9B U.L.A. 349 (2001). There are other sections in the UPA (2000) that acknowledge
the supremacy of the genetic test in determining parentage. In section 204, concerning the presumptions of
paternity, the framers of the UPA (2000) removed the former presumption, which is still found in Family Code
section 761 l(d). The Comment to section 204 says that originally section 204 had stated that a man was a
presumed father if he "receive[d] the child into his home and openly h[eld] out the child as his natural child,"
but this portion was taken out "because genetic testing is a far better means of determining paternity." See id.
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2. California's Own Tradition
The modification to the genetic baseline for parentage would not be a radical
departure from traditional California law. Despite Justice Scalia's insistence in
Michael H. that the purpose of the conclusive presumption was the protection of
the family, it is obvious from the historical development of the conclusive
presumption and, indeed, from the face of the statute itself at every stage of its
development, that California law has always been concerned with determining
the biological relationship between father and child. Why else has there always
been criteria included in the statute to exclude certain married men from being
the father of their wife's child? "' Even Justice Scalia admitted that, at common
law, the "presumption could be rebutted... by proof that a husband was
incapable of procreation or had no access to his wife during the relevant
period." '312 When the presumption was codified in California, it contained the
provisions for excluding both impotent and absentee husbands as fathers.313 Later,
there was also a judicial exception which allowed racial traits to be used to rebut
the presumption;31 4 in 1954, husbands who were sterile were judicially excluded
as possible fathers."5
§ 204 cmt., 9B U.L.A. 311 (2001). Additionally, the provision of the UPA (1973) section 4(b) which
corresponds to Family Code section 7612, dealing with the requirement of clear and convincing evidence and
instances where two presumptions conflict, has been substantially removed from the UPA (2000) because "[t]he
existence of modern genetic testing obviates this old approach to the problem of conflicting presumptions when
a court is to determine paternity." See id. The only additional protection that the UPA (2000) provides for the
presumed father who is not the genetic father is found in the two-year statute of limitations placed on the right
of the alleged father found in section 607:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), a proceeding brought by a presumed
father, the mother, or another individual to adjudicate the parentage of a child having a
presumed father must be commenced not later than two years after the birth of the child.
(b) A proceeding seeking to disprove the father-child relationship between a child and the
child's presumed father may be maintained at any time if the court determines that:
(1) the presumed father and the mother of the child neither cohabited nor engaged in
sexual intercourse with each other during the probable time of conception; and
(2) the presumed father never openly treated the child as his own.
Id. § 607, 9B U.L.A. 341 (2001).
311. Technically, the exclusions were really facts which, if they existed, prevented the presumption from
arising.
312. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124 (1989).
313. CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 1962(5) (1872) (repealed 1965) "(T]he issue of a wife cohabiting with her
husband, who is not impotent, is indisputably presumed to be legitimate." (emphasis added).
314. See In re McNamara's Estate, 183 P. 552 (Cal. 1919).
There is one class of cases where it is recognized in this country at least, that the husband is
not to be taken as the father of the child, even though he had intercourse with his wife during
the normal period of conception. That instance is where the husband and wife are of the same
race, as for instance, white, and it appears that the wife has had intercourse with a man of
another race, as, for instance, a negro, and the child is of mixed blood. The reason why the
conclusive presumption is not applied in such instances is that the element of
indeterminability which is the reason for the presumption in the ordinary case is absent. It is
clear that the husband is not the father. The actual fact, in other words, is capable of definite
determination, and for this reason the conclusive presumption which is a substitute for such
determination is not properly applicable.
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Although the Legislature in 1955,36 and the California Supreme Court in
1960, 3'7 bolstered the conclusive presumption against attack by evidence derived
from blood tests, there is some evidence that the reason for this rejection was the
unreliability of the tests and even fear that a man who was not married to the
mother might be falsely accused of fathering her child."8
However, starting in 1975, the Legislature began to make truly significant
inroads into the application of the conclusive presumption, inroads which
ultimately demonstrated faith in blood tests. In that year the judicial exception for
sterility was codified," 9 and the word "legitimate" was replaced with the phrase
"child of the marriage" in keeping with the reform of the law to remove the
stigma of illegitimacy.320 This change also manifested the modern statutory
concern for the determination of parentage. In 1980, the Legislature created a
two-year window of time in which the presumption was rebuttable by the
presumed husband and the mother through the use of blood tests.3 ' And,
Id. at 557-58; see also In re Walker's Estate, 181 P. 792, 794 (Cal. 1919). This exception has now been rejected
in California. See San Diego County v. Brown, 145 Cal. Rptr. 483, 484-86 (Ct. App. 1978); Hess v. Whitsitt, 65
Cal. Rptr. 45, 47 (Ct. App. 1967).
315. Hughes v. Hughes, 271 P.2d 172 (Cal. Ct. App. 1954). The Court of Appeal stated:
[s]terility is a condition which, if established, renders it impossible to procreate and it is clear
that a husband who is sterile during the period of conception cannot become a father. The
same reasoning applies in such a case as is found in the McNamara decision. Where sterility
is capable of definite determination, the conclusive presumption of legitimacy which is a
substitute for such determination is not properly applicable.
id. at 175; accord Groner v. Groner, 99 Cal. Rptr. 765, 765-66 (Ct. App. 1972).
316. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1962(5) (1963), amended by 1955 Cal. Stat. 948 (1955) (repealed
1965) (stating, "[nlotwithstanding any other provision of law, the issue of a wife cohabiting with her husband,
who is not impotent, is indisputably presumed to be legitimate.") (emphasis added).
317. Kusior v. Silver, 354 P.2d 657, 668 (Cal. 1960) (holding that blood test results were not admissible
to rebut the conclusive presumption).
318. See Hill v. Johnson, 226 P.2d 655 (Cal. Ct. App. 1951). The rationale for not allowing blood test
evidence seems somewhat unusual in this case:
It was error to admit the evidence since it is contrary to the conclusive presumption of
legitimacy. This is as it should be, since in the absence of a presumption that is conclusive,
uncontestable and uncontradictable, an innocent man, whose only defense might be his
uncorroborated denial of improper relations with the mother of a child, could easily be made
the victim of blackmail by the collusive, false testimony of a husband and wife who are living
together and having normal sexual relations.
Id. at 656; see also Arais v. Kalensnikoff, 74 P.2d 1043 (Cal. 1937); Berry v. Chaplin, 169 P.2d 442 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1946). In 1953, California adopted the Uniform Act on Blood Tests to Determine Paternity, which
established procedures for the use of blood test evidence in paternity actions. However, California did not adopt
section 5 of that act, which allowed blood test evidence to rebut presumptions of paternity.
319. 1975 Cal. Stat. 1244 § 13. "Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the issue of a wife
cohabiting with her husband, who is not impotent or sterile, is conclusively presumed to be a child of the
marriage." Id. (emphasis added).
320. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7602 (West 1994) ("The parent and child relationship extends equally to
every child and to every parent, regardless of the marital status of the parents.").
321. CAL. EVID. CODE § 621 (a)-(d) (1986) (repealed 1992):
(a) Except as provided in subdivision (b), the issue of a wife cohabiting with her husband,
who is not impotent or sterile, is conclusively presumed to be a child of the marriage.
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following the United States Supreme Court decision in Michael H. v. Gerald
D.,322 the California Legislature allowed a man who was not the presumed father
under the conclusive presumptions to bring an action to rebut the conclusive
presumptions if he was a presumed father under the California version of the
UPA.
323
The most important conclusion to be drawn from this historical analysis is
that the conclusive presumption always has been concerned with whether the
mother's husband was the biological father of the child. Both under the common
law and under the presumption as it developed in California, when there was a
means to prove that the mother's husband was not the child's father, the husband
was excluded from consideration. In modern times, the Legislature and the courts
have gradually expanded the methods for determining that a woman's husband is
not the father of her child. This expansion is a strong, although incomplete,
endorsement of the view that the child's father is actually the genetic-biological
father, to the point where, during the two-year window of time to challenge the
presumption, the genetic test is the preeminent criteria for fatherhood. Today, at
least in litigated cases of paternity and child support other than those cases
following dissolution, the genetic test is the one most commonly used to
determine parentage in California. First, it is used almost exclusively in those
cases in which a woman and child seek to enforce a support order against an
alleged father.32 During the first two years of a child's life, the conclusive and
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivision (a), if the court finds that the conclusions
of all the experts, as disclosed by the evidence based upon blood tests ... are that the
husband is not the father of the child, the question of paternity of the husband shall be
resolved accordingly.
(c) The notice of motion for blood tests under subdivision (b) may be raised by the husband
not later than two years from the child's date of birth.
(d) The notice of motion for blood tests under subdivision (b) may be raised by the mother
of the child not later than two years from the child's date of birth if the child's
biological father has filed an affidavit with the court acknowledging paternity of the
child.
Id.
322. 491 U.S. 110(1989).
323. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7541(b) (West 1994 & Supp. 2003). The proximity of this modification of the
statute to the Supreme Court's decision in Michael H. easily leads to the conclusion that the change was in
response to Michael H. See Halpern, supra note 38, at 277 (citing Marcia Coyle, After the Gavel Comes Down:
It's Never Quite Over When It's Over, Parties Before the Supreme Court Find Out, 2/25/91 NAT'L L.J. I
(1991), stating:
[I]n August 1990 the California legislature amended California's conclusive presumption to
enable a putative father or child, in addition to the husband or wife, to attempt to rebut the
presumption under certain conditions. The amendment seems to have been inspired in large
part by the United States Supreme Court's affirmance in 1989 of the California Court of
Appeal decision in Michael H. v. Gerald D., and the subsequent lobbying of the California
legislature by Michael H., the non-victorious party in that case.
324. See In re Marriage of B., 177 Cal. Rptr. 429 (Ct. App. 1981); Murphy v. Myers, 560 N.W.2d 752
(Minn. Ct. App. 1997); In re Paternity of M.J.B., 425 N.W.2d 404 (Wis. 1988); Jessica G. v. Hector M., 653
A.2d 922 (Md. 1995).
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rebuttable presumptions are ineffective as the basis for support if the child is not
the genetic-biological child of the woman's husband. Second, the genetic-
biological test for parentage serves as the baseline for determining parentage
when anyone with standing seeks to prove that a presumed father is not the
child's parent or when a presumed father seeks to establish his own paternity
when there is another presumed father.25
3. Contemporary California Appellate Decisions
In keeping with this tradition of concern for the genetic-biological relationship,
several contemporary California appellate courts have narrowed and limited the
effect of the conclusive presumption, and, indeed, marital presumptions in general,
in a manner which supports the genetic-biological parental relationship. The
California Practice Guide: Family Law, which may give some insight into how
trial courts treat the conclusive presumption, tells us that, in applying the conclusive
presumption, the courts have attempted to avoid "absurd results" and therefore
adopted "a case-by-case approach that involves a weighing of the competing
state and private interests in applying [versus] not applying the presumption; and
[would] not apply the presumption under facts that would yield 'absurd
results."'326 In making this decision, the courts consider both whether the child
has a relationship with the presumed father or the genetic-biological father and
the child's best interest in terms of receiving support.327 Moreover, the courts
have routinely applied the doctrine of estoppel to lessen the blunt application of
the conclusive presumption. Estoppel has been used both to prevent a presumed
father from asserting the presumption of paternity... and to prohibit the denial of
a genetic-biological father's paternity.
The apparent source of this rebellion against the conclusive presumption is a
1975 case which did not even apply the conclusive presumption. In In re Lisa
R.,330 an alleged father sought to establish his paternity at a juvenile court annual
dependency review of Lisa, a child in foster care.33' He had never been married to
Lisa's mother, who at the time of the child's birth was actually married to
.. 332
another man deceased at the time of the proceedings. The record on appeal
established that Lisa had been thriving in foster care and that the alleged father
325. CAL. FAM. CODE§ 7541(a) (West 1994 & Supp. 2003).
326. HOGOBOOM & KING, supra note 203, § 6.4 (citing In re Lisa R., 532 P.2d 123, 131-33 (Cal.
1975)).
327. Id. (citing In re Kiana A., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 669 (Ct. App. 2001); Brian C. v. Ginger K., 92 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 294 (Ct. App. 2000)).
328. In re Guardianship of Ethen S., 271 Cal. Rptr. 121 (Ct. App. 1990).
329. In re Lisa R., 532 P.2d 123.
330. Id.
331. Id. at 124-27.
332. Id. at 125.
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had only had sporadic visitation with her.333 When the alleged father appeared at
the annual review, the court ruled that he had no standing to establish his
paternity and was excluded from the hearing. 33 The statutory impediment to the
alleged father's ability to establish his paternity was not the conclusive
presumption, which at that time was Evidence Code section 621, but rather
former Evidence Code section 661, a forerunner of the present day Family Code
section 7611.
Former Evidence Code section 661 provided:
A child of a woman who is or has been married, born during the
marriage or within 300 days after the dissolution thereof, is presumed to
be a legitimate child of that marriage. This presumption may be disputed
only by the people of the State of California in a criminal action brought
under Section 270 of the Penal Code or by the husband or wife, or the
descendant of one or both of them. In a civil action, this presumption
may be rebutted only by clear and convincing proof.
35
Because of the limitation on who could rebut the presumption, the
presumption was conclusive as to the alleged father. However, the California
Supreme Court declined to preclude the alleged father from establishing his
paternity, basing its decision on Stanley v. Illinois336 and a now familiar line of
United States Supreme Court cases supporting parental rights.337
The court held that the decision to apply the presumption must be based upon
a balancing of interests: "[t]he question whether appellant, as one claiming to be
Lisa's natural father, can rebut the presumption that Lisa is the issue of her
mother's marriage must thus be resolved by weighing the competing private and
state interests."33 In the end, the court found in favor of the alleged father's interest
in establishing his paternity. While the court's balancing regarding former
333. Id. at 126. The record indicated that the lack of visitation may have been due to the fact that social
workers who knew of his paternal relationship with Lisa had discouraged his visits.
334. Id.
335. id. at 130 n.12.
336. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
337. The exact quote from the case is as follows:
The rights to conceive and to raise one's children have been deemed "essential," Meyer v.
Nebraska,..."basic civil rights of man," Skinner v. Oklahoma, .... and "(r)ights far more
precious ... than property rights," May v. Anderson ..... It is cardinal with us that the
custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and
freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder." Prince v.
Massachusetts ..... The integrity of the family unit has found protection in the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,... the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, Skinner v. Oklahoma .... and the Ninth Amendment, Griswold v. Connecticut,
Id. at 651 (citations omitted).
338. In re Lisa R., 532 P.2d at 131.
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Evidence Code section 661 is historically interesting,339 the most important point is
that this balancing approach has now been applied by the appellate courts to the
present day conclusive presumption of Family Code section 7540 in a manner
which has supported the genetic-biological relationship.
This support for the genetic-biological relationship has manifested itself both
in cases in which the courts have refused to allow a genetic-biological father to
avoid the responsibilities of paternity even though there was a conclusively
presumed father, and in a case in which the genetic-biological father was allowed
to assert his paternity despite the existence of a conclusively presumed father.
Following In re Lisa R., the Court of Appeal for the Fourth District, in County of
Orange v. Leslie B.,3" refused to apply the conclusive presumption where the
genetic-biological father had sought to use the conclusive presumption to bar the
establishment of his own paternity. The court found that the presumed father had
not known of the child's conception or birth, at least not until the hearing when
the child was twelve, and had never lived with the mother and child. The Court
of Appeal quoted the trial court in concluding, "[a]pplying the [presumption]
leads to an absurd result that defies reason and common sense. To apply the
[presumption] is to rely upon a fiction to establish a legal fact which we know to
be untrue, in order to protect policies which in this case do not exist."' '
The same result was reached in Alicia R. v. Timothy M., 42 where the facts
were similar to those in Leslie B.
[B]lood tests have established that M. is the child's father and that S. is
not. There has been a judgment of nullity of the "marriage" between R.
[the mother] and S.... R. no longer resides with S. and there is no
longer a parent/child relationship between S. and the child.43
M. sought to impose the conclusive presumption to prevent S. from
establishing his paternity. The Court of Appeal for the Second District following
Leslie B. concluded: "[w]hile the state has a legitimate interest in promoting
marriage and not impugning a family unit, that interest cannot be served here
where there is no marital union or family unit to disrupt."
344
Perhaps the most interesting of these cases is one in which the court declined
to apply the conclusive presumption to prevent the genetic-biological father from
establishing his paternity. The facts are amazingly similar to those of Michael H.
v. Gerald D.345 In Brian C. v. Ginger K.,w the trial court found that the child,
339. Id. at 132-33.
340. 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 797 (Ct. App. 1993).
341. Id. at 801.
342. 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 868 (Ct. App. 1994).
343. Id. at 871.
344. Id.
345. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
346. 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 294 (Ct. App. 2000).
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Kennedy, was conceived while the mother, Ginger, was living with her husband,
William, who was not impotent or sterile, and that Brian lived with Ginger and
Kennedy during the first year of the child's life and held the child out to be his
own.347 At some point around the time that Kennedy was one year old, Ginger left
Brian and returned to William. 348 Brian brought an action to establish his
paternity, and Ginger and William filed a motion for summary judgment more
than two years after Kennedy's birth based upon the conclusive presumption
claiming that William was the child's father.349 The trial court granted summary
judgment.3 4 No genetic tests were done to determine the paternity of either
William or Brian.35" ' The Court of Appeal for the Fourth District steadfastly
refused to apply either of the presumptions which would make William the
natural father, either the conclusive presumption to the present situation or the
rebuttable presumption of Family Code section 7611(a) that the man who is
married to the mother is the natural father. The court held that Family Code
section 7630(b) gave Brian standing to establish his own paternity under section
7611(d), despite express language of the statute to the contrary, 2 and standing to
rebut the presumption of 7611(a) because, using the reasoning of Stanley v.
Illinois and In re Lisa R., "a conclusion that the statutory conclusive presumption
(Fam. Code, § 7540) automatically cuts off a man in Brian's position from
asserting paternity is unconstitutional." '353 Because Brian had standing to assert
his own paternity and to rebut the marriage-related presumptions, the court
concluded that ultimately DNA tests would determine paternity.3 4
While the result in Brian C. v. Ginger K. is admirable, this case and the
others mentioned above demonstrate how the appellate courts in California have
led a small rebellion against the marital presumptions. Brian C. itself is strong
support for the genetic-test approach to determine paternity. While there are, of
course, appellate cases which have applied the statutory presumption more
literally, the cases discussed here indicate a willingness to avoid the present
California statutory scheme. Although the courts have had to use a constitutional
rationale to revise, in effect, the present statutory scheme, the real problem is that
the present scheme is outmoded in a day when genetic evidence of paternity is
readily available.
347. Id. at 297.
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. Id. at 297-98.
351. Id. at 298.
352. id. at 301.
353. Id. at 312.
354. Id.
355. See, e.g., Susan H. v. Jack S., 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 120 (Ct. App. 1994); Rodney F. v. Karen M., 71 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 399 (Ct. App. 1998); Miller v. Miller, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 797 (Ct. App. 1998).
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4. Acceptance of Genetic-Biological Testing
The willingness of contemporary courts to put their faith in genetic testing is
fully justified by the reliability of modem testing procedures. If at one time the
rebuttable presumptions were not made fully rebuttable because of a fear of false
356
results from blood tests, this concern should no longer play a role in the policy
decision not to make them rebuttable. Contemporary DNA testing can exclude a
man as the father of a child,357 and, when statistical techniques are applied to the
DNA tests, they become "very powerful" and economically feasible tools to
determine that a particular man is a child's father.358 Even older testing methods
"such as blood grouping, red cell enzyme analysis, and serum protein and antigen
analysis, and HLA analysis" can still play a valuable role in determining
parentage, and they may be even more cost-effective.359 Although California has
not allowed a nonpresumed genetic father to use these tests to rebut the
presumptions, it has strongly endorsed the admissibility and reliability of these
tests by adopting Family Code sections 7550-7558. 360 These provisions set
standards for testing procedures and for the admission of the results of genetic
161testing. Section 7555 resolves one issue that has often caused problems in the
presentation of the results of a genetic test to the trier of fact by adopting the
Paternity Index as the statistical tool to be used for evidentiary purposes. 362 More
importantly, this section establishes the evidentiary threshold for establishing
paternity by creating a presumption of paternity when the paternity index is
greater than 100. 3 ' In California, the statutory foundation clearly has been laid for
the use of genetic testing as the baseline for paternity and maternity determinations.
This faith in genetic testing has been exhibited nationally. The federal
government has mandated that "states provide for genetic testing of all parties in
contested paternity actions,"364 and that "genetic test results must be admissible as
356. See supra note 318 and accompanying text.
357. Arkin, supra note 305, at 3-07. "If the DNA does not match, the alleged father or suspected
perpetrator cannot be the individual sought." Id.
358. Kamrin T. MacKnight, Scientific Aspects of DNA Testing, in I DISPUTED PATERNITY PROCEEDINGS
13-08 (Lexis Publishing 5th ed. 2003). "The cost of DNA testing is significant, currently ranging from
approximately $500-600 per trio of mother, child, and alleged father. The cost increases in direct proportion to the
complexity of the case." id. at 13-08 n. 1.
359. Id. at 13-08.
360. See CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 7550-7558 (West 1994 & Supp. 2003).
361. Id. §§ 7552, 7552.5, 7553.
362. See Arkin, supra note 305, at 3-10: "A standard inclusionary genetic test result in a paternity case
will lead to two figures related to the likelihood that the alleged father is the true biological father: the paternity
index and the probability of paternity. Although there has been very little controversy concerning the
admissibility of the paternity index, the probability of paternity calculation is regularly challenged." See also
Plemel v. Walter, 735 P.2d 1209 (Or. 1987); In re Paternity of M.J.B., 425 N.W.2d 404 (Wis. 1988); In re M. v.
Marvin S., 656 N.Y.S.2d 802 (Fam. Ct. 1997).
363. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7555(a) (West 1994).
364. PETER N. SWISHER, ANTHONY MILLER & JANA B. SINGER, FAMILY LAW: CASES, MATERIALS,
AND PROBLEMS 357 (Matthew Bender 2d ed. 1998) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(B) (1998)).
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evidence as long as they are of a type generally acknowledged as reliable and are
performed by an accredited laboratory." 365 As a result, virtually every state allows
the admission of genetic and other forms of blood testing evidence to prove
paternity. 366 The UPA, in two provisions which California did not adopt, allows a
court to order blood tests' 67 and authorizes the use of blood test results in
paternity decisions. 368 Likewise, the UPA (2000) has extensive provisions for the
use of genetic evidence,3'9 and section 631 specifically provides that genetic
testing rebuts the presumptions of paternity and requires that an adjudication of
paternity be based upon genetic testing. 37° Regarding UPA (2000) section 63 1, the
commissioners of the Uniform Act state:
[t]his section establishes the controlling supremacy of admissible genetic
test results in the adjudication of paternity. Other matters such as statute
of limitations, equitable estoppel and res judicata may preclude the
matter from reaching trial or the court denying genetic testing. However,
if test results are admissible, those results control unless other test results
create a conflict rebutting the admitted results.37'
5. Universality of the Genetic-Biological Relationship
As a matter of policy, the law of California should be structured in a manner
that allows every natural parent of a child the opportunity to develop a personal
relationship with his or her child. The California statutory law should embody the
principle set forth in the California Supreme Court case of Adoption of Kelsey
S.3 7 2 This case is a logical extension of a line of four United States Supreme Court
cases, Stanley v. Illinois,373 Quilloin v. Walcott, 74 Caban v. Mohammed,3 75 and
Lehr v. Robertson,376 which collectively stand for the proposition that a natural
father who has participated in his child's life has a constitutional right to have a
relationship with his child.377 While these cases do not directly support the
365. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(F)(i) (1998)).
366. See D.H. Kaye & Ronald Kanwischer, Admissibility of Genetic Testing in Paternity Litigation: A
Survey of State Statutes, 22 FAM. L. Q. 109 (1988); SWISHER, MILLER & SINGER, supra note 364, at 347.
367. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (1973) § 1, 9B U.L.A. 445 (2001).
368. Id.
369. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT(2000) §§ 501-511, 9B U.L.A. 329-337 (2001).
370. Id. § 631, 9B U.L.A. 348 (2001).
371. Id. § 631 cmt., 9B U.L.A. 349 (2001).
372. 823 P.2d 1216 (Cal. 1992).
373. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
374. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
375. 441 U.S. 380(1979).
376. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
377. In Stanley, the Supreme Court held that an unwed natural father who had lived with and supported
his three children when their mother died had a right to a hearing on fitness before the children could be
removed from his custody, despite an Illinois statute which provided that, "the children of unwed fathers
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proposition that the law should protect the genetic-biological relationship, the
dissent in Lehr asked the following question: does a natural father who has been
prevented from developing a relationship with his child have a constitutional
right to have the opportunity to develop that relationship? Adoption of Kelsey S.
answered this question:
If an unwed father promptly comes forward and demonstrates a full
commitment to his parental responsibilities-emotional, financial, and
otherwise-his federal constitutional right to due process prohibits the
termination of his parental relationship absent a showing of his unfitness
as a parent. Absent such a showing, the child's well-being is presumptively
best served by continuation of the father's parental relationship. Similarly,
when the father has come forward to grasp his parental responsibilities,
his parental rights are entitled to equal protection as those of the
mother.379
In addition, the court stated that "[t]he biological connection between father and
child is unique and worthy of constitutional protection if the father grasps the
opportunity to develop that biological connection into a full and enduring
become wards of the State upon the death of the mother." Stanley, 405 U.S. at 646, 649. In Quilloin, the Court
held that there is no constitutionally protected interest for an unwed natural father who had never legitimated
the child, never had custody, nor ever "shouldered any significant responsibility with respect to the daily
supervision, education, protection, or care of the child." 434 U.S. at 256. The Court in Caban further refined the
position of Stanley and Quilloin as to the appropriate standard to be applied to determine when an unwed father
is entitled to constitutional protection. The biological relationship was still not enough: "In those cases where
the father never has come forward to participate in the rearing of his child, nothing in the Equal Protection
Clause precludes the State from withholding from him the privilege of vetoing the adoption of that child."
Caban, 441 U.S. at 392. The Court found that constitutional protection adhered to a biological father who "has
established a substantial relationship with the child and has admitted his paternity ... " and viewed Quilloin as
emphasizing "the importance in cases of this kind of the relationship that in fact exists between the parent and
child." Id. at 393 & n.14. Although Lehr v. Robertson concluded that the natural father's rights had not been
violated, it also supported the view that the natural father's relationship with his child is what counts
constitutionally. 463 U.S. 248. The biological connection plus a participation in the rearing of his child creates a
more profound right, one that is constitutionally protected, to have a relationship with the child:
The difference between the developed parent-child relationship that was implicated in Stanley and
Caban, and the potential relationship involved in Quilloin and this case, is both clear and significant.
When an unwed father demonstrates a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood by
"com[ing] forward to participate in the rearing of his child," his interest in personal contact with his
child acquires substantial protection under the Due Process Clause.
Id. at 261 (quoting Caban, 441 U.S. at 392 (citation omitted).).
378. Id. at 268-76. This issue arose in Lehr because, according to the dissent, the natural father had been
unable to develop this relationship due to the mother's concealment of herself and the child. The majority never
reached this issue because it concluded that due process was satisfied by the existence of a putative father
registry of which Lehr had not availed himself, although he had filed a paternity action. See generally Elizabeth
Buchanan, The Constitutional Rights of Unwed Fathers Before and After Lehr v. Robertson, 45 OHIO ST. L. J.
313 (1984) (discussing Lehr v. Robertson and focusing on termination of parental interests in adoption
proceedings where the termination is undertaken to free the child for adoption).
379. Adoption of Kelsey S., 823 P.2d 1216, 1236 (Cal. 1992).
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relationship. ' 3" ° Of course, the same is true regarding the mother and child
relationship.
For too long, either because of the inability to determine the genetic parent or
the misplaced belief that the marital relationship must be protected, California
has failed to realize that the genetic-biological relationship is fundamental to the
parent-child relationship. Adoption of Kelsey S. impliedly recognized that the
genetic-biological relationship is a real world connection between parent and
child. A recent statement by the California Legislature summarizes the
fundamental nature of the genetic-biological relationship:
(a) There is a compelling state interest in establishing paternity for all
children. Establishing paternity is the first step toward a child support
award, which, in turn, provides children with equal rights and access to
benefits, including, but not limited to, social security, health insurance,
survivors' benefits, military benefits, and inheritance rights. Knowledge
of family medical history is often necessary for correct medical diagnosis
and treatment. Additionally, knowing one's father is important to a
child's development.... 381
Although this statement is made in support of voluntary declarations of paternity,
it is clear from the reference to medical history that when the Legislature said
"paternity," it meant genetic-biological paternity, and there is no reason that it
should not apply to maternity as well.
Now, when technology is possibly on the brink of developing radical new
methods of creating children, the genetic-biological relationship must be
recognized by law as the starting place for the determination of parentage. This
relationship is a connection which exists in nature. It is a physically tangible
connection that every person has with only two other people. Not only is it
possible to scientifically establish this connection, but most people, to varying
degrees, feel the connection of biological kinship. They feel it not only with
parents, but with more distant relations, such as brothers and sisters, aunts and
uncles, grandparents, and cousins who have more distant genetic-biological
relationships. People who do not have the genetic-biological relationship with
parents often long for it. Adopted children often search for their birth mothers;
children often long, and even search for, an absent father, even one they have
never known. The very terms "parent," "mother," and "father" mean the genetic-
biological-or "blood"-relationship. While there are other definitions of these
terms, some of which may be more meaningful or important to some people,
everyone accepts the genetic-biological meaning of the terms "parent," "mother,"
and "father." Even when people are angry with their genetic-biological parents,
reject their parents, never want to see them again, have adoptive parents, have
380. Id. at 1228.
381. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7570 (West 1994).
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psychological parents, have new and better parents by whatever method, they
still accept that the term "parent" means, at least by one definition, the person
with whom they have a genetic-biological connection. As a society, we recognize
that biological parents have an obligation to support and rear their children,
hence, the almost universal acceptance of the principle that the man who begets a
child should pay for that child's support and upkeep. Indeed, the world would be
a better place if all parents took care of their biological offspring. The naturalness
of this real-world connection and the emotions attached to it without doubt mean
that, no matter how much we favor nurture over nature in the development of the
human psyche, we cannot ignore the genetic-biological relationship. The parent
and child relationship based upon the genetic-biological connection can be lost
through neglect or abuse, but it is not something which must be perfected. It
exists and the law should recognize it.
6. The Psychological Relationship
In recent years, there has been significant concern with the psychological
parent-child relationship. Even the presumptions of paternity have been defended
on the grounds that they preserve the psychological relationship. Nevertheless,
the use of the genetic-biological baseline for determining parentage is not a threat
to the preservation of psychological relationships. One way to protect
psychological parent-child relationships would be to place a limit on the amount
of time that a genetic-biological parent has to assert his or her rights. Presently,
there is a two-year limitation under the statutes which allow for rebuttal of theconcusiv a drebutabl .. 382
conclusive and rebuttable presumptions. An even shorter period might be
appropriate. It simply is not asking too much to require a genetic-biological
parent to act promptly to establish parental rights. However, an allowance, by
tolling the time limit or availability of estoppel, should be made for biological
parents who are unaware of their child or who, through no fault of their own, are
unable to comply. Another means of protecting the psychological parent-child
relationship would be by drawing a distinction between the parental relationship
and the custodial relationship. If a child has formed a relationship with another
person, such as a spouse or partner of a natural parent, the child can still remain
in the custody of the natural parent and non-parent while the biological parent
has the opportunity to visit and have a relationship with the child. Finally, there
are situations, discussed below, when parentage must be determined by use of the
best interest standard. In those situations, it is very likely that this standard will
dictate that the person with the strongest psychological relationship with the child
should be declared the parent.
382. See, e.g., id. § 7541(b)-(c).
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B. The Bright-Line for Assisted Conception: The Judicially Pre-Validated
Contract
As mentioned above, other than for artificial insemination, California has no
statutory law dealing with the parentage of children conceived through assisted
conception.383 The few cases which have dealt with the more advanced forms of
surrogacy have not created a bright-line standard for the determination of parentage
after assisted conceptions.39 Adoption law... provides just this sort of bright-line
certainty; however, potential parents contemplating assisted reproduction want more
certainty about their future parentage than the mere possibility of adopting the child
after it is born. Nevertheless, adoption may serve as a model situation in which a
child will have parents other than its genetic-biological parents. The process of
adoption recognizes that this change in parentage is a significant event, one
which requires the operation of law, and which provides not only certainty, but
also protection, for the child. There are other models for the operation of law in
the area of assisted conception. Both the Uniform Status of Children of Assisted
Conception Act... (USCACA) and the UPA (2000)387 have proposed that, for
assisted conception, there be a judicially pre-validated contract between the
surrogate and the intended parents which establishes the parent-child
relationship. The test or criteria for parentage is whomever the pre-validated
contract designates as parent. While this approach has already been proposed for
surrogacy contracts, it would also work for future technology even where
children are conceived through cloning and gestated in an artificial womb. This
article proposes that California adopt a pre-validated contract requirement for
assisted conception modeled after the UPA (2000); however, it also suggests an
important modification of the UPA (2000). Donors should be made a party to the
pre-validated contract for assisted conception, and, in situations in which there is
no pre-validated contract or the contract fails to provide a parent-for example,
where the contractual parents die-the donor should be one of the possible
parents considered by a court in applying the best interest of the child standard.
1. Surrogacy
At the outset of this discussion of surrogacy, it is important to mention that
there are situations in which it is not necessary to have a special rule to determine
parentage of a child born to a surrogate mother. In other words, the establishment
of the genetic-biological test as the baseline criteria for determining parentage
resolves issues of parentage. The best example of this result is the form of
383. See supra Part II.C.
384. See supra Part n.C.3.
385. See CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 8500-9340 (West 1994 & Supp. 2003).
386. See UNIF. STATUS OFCHILDREN OFASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT § 5, 9C U.L.A. 373, 383 (2001).
387. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) §§ 801-803, 9B U.L.A. 362-64 (2001).
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gestational surrogacy found in Johnson v. Calvert,388 where there was ovum
donation and sperm donation from parties to the surrogacy contract.3 89 The
Calverts were the genetic-biological parents of the child. 39, The problems arose
simply because the court was unwilling to place the genetic-biological test
foremost. I also believe that the genetic-biological test resolves issues of maternity
in traditional surrogacy which is accomplished by artificial insemination of the
surrogate mother. The genetic-biological test would establish the surrogate as the
mother. I believe this would be the proper result in traditional surrogacy, and
adoption is the appropriate method for establishing a new mother of the child,
someone other than the genetic-birth surrogate mother.39'
There are, of course, surrogacy situations in which the parties to the
surrogacy contract seek to have someone other than the genetic-biological parent
ultimately serve as the child's parent. Indeed, in situations where the parentage of
an IVF donor has been cut off because the donor has donated the genetic material
to a licensed physician, there may be no genetic-biological parents under the law.
For these situations, the bright-line pre-validated contract for determining
parentage is readily available. As mentioned above, this approach has been
proposed, at least for surrogacy contracts, by both the USCACA 392 and by the
UPA (2000).39' While the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws appears to consider the UPA (2000) to be the successor of the
USCACA, either statute could serve as a model for the California Legislature.
394
The USCACA Alternative A section 5395 allows surrogate contracts, requires
388. 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
389. Id. at 778.
390. Id.
391. See In re Marriage of Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893 (Ct. App. 1994).
392. UNIF. STATUS OFCHILDREN OFASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT § 5, 9C U.L.A. 373, 383 (2001).
393. UNIF. PARENTAGEACT(2000) §§ 801-809, 9B U.L.A. 360-370 (2001).
394. Id. Prefatory Note, 9B U.L.A. 297 (2001) states:
In addition, in 1988, the Conference also adopted the Uniform Status of Children of Assisted
Conception Act. Assisted reproduction and gestational agreements became commonplace in
the 1990s, long after the promulgation of UPA (1973). The USCACA resembled a Model Act
more than a Uniform Act because it provided two opposing options regarding "gestational
agreements." To date, only two States have enacted USCACA, each choosing a different
option. With the promulgation of the Uniform Parentage Act (2000), all of the earlier
Uniform Acts dealing with parentage have been withdrawn by the Conference, leaving the
Uniform Parentage Act (2000) as the single product of the Conference dealing with the
subject.
Id.
395. UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION Acr § 5, 9C U.L.A. 373. The Uniform
Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act also provides Alternative B which declares that all surrogacy
contracts are void:
An agreement in which a woman agrees to become a surrogate or to relinquish her rights and
duties as parent of a child thereafter conceived through assisted conception is void. However,
she is the mother of a resulting child, and her husband, if a party to the agreement, is the
father of the child. If her husband is not a party to the agreement or the surrogate is
unmarried, paternity of the child is governed by [the Uniform Parentage Act].
Id. § 5, 9C U.L.A. 383 (2001).
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judicial pre-approval, and provides that if there is no judicial pre-approval, the
surrogate is the mother of the child and her husband is the father.396
Article 8 of the UPA (2000) presents a much more comprehensive surrogacy
provision, although it replaces the term "surrogate mother" with "gestational
mother." '397 This Article does not include an alternative provision which would
make all gestational agreements void; rather, it accepts the pragmatic need for
such agreements.' 98 However, it does make the welfare of the child paramount
and, indeed, views the surrogacy process as analogous to adoption. 399 In a sense,
the UPA (2000) has opted for regulation rather than prohibition. 4 0 Gestational
agreements are allowed, but, to be enforced, they must be validated by the court.
The parties to the contract vary depending upon the nature of the physical
arrangements which have been made. The gestational mother and, if she is
married, her husband, must be parties. If there are sperm or egg donors, they
must also sign the agreement and, of course, the intended parents must also
sign. 4°' The agreement may provide that the gestational mother, her husband, and
any donors relinquish any parental rights and that "the intended parents become
396. Id. § 5, 9C U.L.A. 373 (2001). The entire text of section 5 of Alternative A reads as follows:
(a) A surrogate, her husband, if she is married, and intended parents may enter into a written
agreement whereby the surrogate relinquishes all her rights and duties as a parent of a
child to be conceived through assisted conception, and the intended parents may become
the parents of the child pursuant to Section 8.
(b) If the agreement is not approved by the court under Section 6 before conception, the
agreement is void and the surrogate is the mother of a resulting child and the surrogate's
husband, if a party to the agreement, is the father of the child. If the surrogate's husband
is not a party to the agreement or the surrogate is unmarried, paternity of the child is
governed by [the Uniform Parentage Act].
Id.
397. "'Gestational mother' means a woman who gives birth to a child under a gestational agreement."
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 102(11), 9B U.L.A. 304 (2001).
398. See id. § 801, 9B U.L.A. 362 (2001). The Comment to Article 8 states:
The previous Uniform Act on this subject, USCACA, proposed two alternatives, one of
which was to declare that gestational agreements were to be void. Subsection (a) rejects that
approach. The scientific state of the art and the medical facilities providing the technological
capacity to utilize a woman other than the wife as the gestational mother, guarantee that such
agreements will continue to be written.
Id. § 801 cmt., 9B U.L.A. 362 (2001).
399. The Comment to U.P.A. (2000) section 803 states:
This pre-conception authorization process for a gestational agreement is roughly analogous to
adoption procedures in place in most jurisdictions as of December, 2000. Just as adoption
contemplates the transfer of parentage of a child from the natural to the adoptive parents, a
gestational agreement involves the transfer from the gestational mother to the intended
parents. UPA (2000) is designed to protect the interests of the child to be born under the
gestational agreement as well as the interests of [the] gestational mother and the intended
parents.
Id. § 803 cmt., 9B U.LA. 364-65 (2001).
400. See id. art. 8, prefatory cmt., 913 U.LA. 360 (2001).
401. See id.; see also id. § 801(a), 9B U.LA. 362.
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the parents of the child."' ' The agreement may include valuable consideration for
the gestational mother. However, the agreement is unenforceable unless it has
been validated by the court, and the statute requires the court to make seven
specific findings in support of validation. Each of these findings covers an
important area of concern in the surrogacy process: does the court have
jurisdiction; is the intended mother unable to bear a child; 40 has a home study
demonstrated that the intended parents meet the standard of fitness of adoptive
parents; have the parties voluntarily entered into the contract with an
understanding as to its consequences; is there a physical or mental health risk to
the gestational mother; are there adequate provisions for health care expenses;
and is the consideration for the gestational mother adequate?4 If the court
determines that each of these concerns is properly resolved, the "court may issue
an order validating the gestational agreement and declaring that the intended
parents will be the parents of a child born during the term of
the .. agreement." '  Finally, Article 8 provides that, if the agreement is not
enforceable, the parentage of the child must be determined by Article 2 of the
Act;4°6 however, there is an additional provision which states that parties to a non-
validated, and hence unenforceable, agreement may still be liable for the support
of the child. 4°7
402. Id. § 103(d), 9B U.L.A. 306 (2001).
403. See id. § 803(b)(2), 9B U.L.A. 364 (2001). The inclusion of this item emphasizes a desire on the
part of the authors of the UPA (2000) to limit the use of surrogacy. The authors also require that couples who
obtain a child through surrogacy should be married. See id. § 801(b), 9B U.L.A. 362. The California Legislature
could, of course, reconsider these limitations.
404. UPA. section 803(b) requires that seven findings must be made by the court in order to validate the
agreement:
(1) the residence requirements of Section 802 have been satisfied and the parties have
submitted to the jurisdiction of the court under the jurisdictional standards of this [Act];
(2) medical evidence shows that the intended mother is unable to bear a child or is unable to
do so without unreasonable risk to her physical or mental health or to the unborn child;
(3) unless waived by the court, the [relevant child-welfare agency] has made a home study of
the intended parents and the intended parents meet the standards of fitness applicable to
adoptive parents;
(4) all parties have voluntarily entered into the agreement and understand its terms;
(5) the prospective gestational mother has had at least one pregnancy and delivery and her
bearing another child will not pose an unreasonable health risk to the unborn child or to
the physical or mental health of the prospective gestational mother;
(6) adequate provision has been made for all reasonable health-care expense associated with
the gestational agreement until the birth of the child, including responsibility for those
expenses if the agreement is terminated; and
(7) the consideration, if any, paid to the prospective gestational mother is reasonable.
Id. § 803(b), 9B U.L.A. 364 (2001).
405. Id. § 803(a), 9B U.L.A. 364 (2001).
406. Id. § 809(b), 9B U.L.A. 369 (2001).
407. See id. § 809(c), 9B U.L.A. 369 (2001). "Individuals who are parties to a nonvalidated gestational
agreement as intended parents may be held liable for support of the resulting child, even if the agreement is
otherwise unenforceable. The liability under this subsection includes assessing all expenses and fees as
provided in Section 636." Id.
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The pre-validated contract provides a much greater degree of certainty than
the intent test of Johnson v. Calvert.' It also provides an assurance that the
child's welfare has been protected. The authors of the UPA (2000) were right
when they took "the position that entering into a gestational agreement is a
significant legal act that should be reviewed by a court, just as an adoption is
judicially reviewed." By contrast, under present California law4 as Justice
Kennard pointed out in her dissent in Johnson v. Calvert, there is great
uncertainty regarding even the definition of intent in this context.4 ' Under the
approach of the UPA (2000) Article 8, the written contract is a tangible
manifestation of the intent of the parties. The statute sets forth guidelines for the
contract, requirements for the petition to be validated, a requirement that there be
a hearing, a list of specific findings which must be made, and the requirement of
a court order. 4" The bright-line is established and it is clear to everyone. Not only
is there a possibility of easy enforcement, but enforcement is less likely to be
necessary. The judge will have had the opportunity to measure the resolve of the
parties' obligations, to question them about their consent, to root out fraud,414 and
to ascertain whether they consented voluntarily with full understanding of the
consequences.4 5 Whatever natural respect the parties have for the contract is
reinforced by the validation process and even more by the order of the court.
More importantly, the approach of the UPA (2000) Article 8 allows the judge to
make a reasoned and compassionate decision as to how to best insure that the
408. 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
409. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, art. 8, prefatory cmt., 9B U.L.A. 361 (2001).
410. "In deciding the issue of maternity under the Act we have felt free to take into account the parties'
intentions, as expressed in the surrogacy contract, because in our view the agreement is not, on its face,
inconsistent with public policy." Johnson, 851 P.2d at 783.
411. Id. at 795-800 (Kennard, J., dissenting). Whatever certainty exists in the use of the intent test is
actually provided by the underlying contract. Indeed, the intent test merely serves as a conceptual substitute for
the surrogacy contract, unless the court in Johnson actually believed that there will be situations in which the
intended parent is someone other than the contractual parent. If the court takes this possibility seriously, then
there is no certainty at all in the intent test and a hearing must be held.
412. UNIF. PARENTAGEAC(2000) §§ 801-803, 9B U.L.A. 362-64 (2000).
413. Under U.P.A. section 807, enforcement merely requires the filing of a notice with the court that the
child has been born:
(a) Upon birth of a child to a gestational mother, the intended parents shall file notice with
the court that a child has been born to the gestational mother within 300 days after
assisted reproduction. Thereupon, the court shall issue an order:
(I) confirming that the intended parents are the parents of the child;
(2) if necessary, ordering that the child be surrendered to the intended parents; and
(3) directing the [agency maintaining birth records] to issue a birth certificate naming
the intended parents as parents of the child.
(b) If the parentage of a child born to a gestational mother is alleged not to be the result of
assisted reproduction, the court shall order genetic testing to determine the parentage of
the child.
Id. § 807, 9B U.L.A. 368 (2001).
414. See id. § 803 cmt., 9B U.L.A. 365 (2001).
415. Id. § 803(b)(4), 9B U.L.A. 364 (2001).
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child will be raised in a wholesome and fit environment. If California used the
approach of the UPA (2000), a study of the intended parents' home would be
required and the intended parents would have to meet the standards of adopting
416parents. In contrast, the intent test, at least as it stands now, makes no attempt
to provide for the welfare of the child and follows the erroneous assumption that
awarding a child to the intended parent insures the child's welfare.4 7
2. Cloning and Future Technology
As mentioned above, cloning is illegal in California, and Presidential
Commissions under the administrations of both President Clinton and President
George W. Bush have recommended at least a temporary ban on cloning for
418reproductive purposes. However, if the history of reproductive technology is
any indication, this process will not be resisted forever. While there are good
reasons for the cloning of humans to remain illegal, the approach to determining
the parentage of a child who was born as a result of cloning, if cloning were
legal, is not difficult. If cloning remains illegal, however, the process of
determining the parentage of a child born as a result of cloning will be more
complicated and, indeed, additional laws may be required.
If cloning is ever legalized, the approach suggested in this article for
surrogacy will work perfectly. For anyone other than the genetic parent to be the
parent of the child, the specific legal requirement of a judicially pre-validated
contract would have to be met, and the standards established under the rules of
the UPA (2000) or similar rules for validating or approving such contracts would
apply. There would, of course, be cases in which the contract was not needed.
The primary genetic donor,4 9 the birth mother, and the intended parent could be
the same woman. She would, of course, be the mother of the child under both the
genetic test and the giving birth test; her husband would be the father under the
"married-to-the-mother" presumption. Additionally, the genetic donor could be
the husband of the gestational mother; he would be the child's father under the
genetic test and she would be the mother under the giving-birth presumption.
However, if there were an intended parent other than the primary genetic donor
and the gestational mother, a judicially pre-validated contract should be required.
416. Id. § 803(b)(3), 9B U.L.A. 364 (2001).
417. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 783 (Cal. 1993). Johnson states:
Moreover, as Professor Shultz recognizes, the interests of children, particularly at the outset
of their lives, are "[un]likely to run contrary to those of adults who choose to bring them into
being." Thus, "[hionoring the plans and expectations of adults who will be responsible for a
child's welfare is likely to correlate significantly with positive outcomes for parents and
children alike."
Id. (quoting Shultz, supra note 165, at 309).
418. See supra note 280 and accompanying text.
419. While there is a small hitch in that the donor's parents would also pass the genetic test, this would
not present a significant problem.
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If there were no contract or if the contract had not been judicially pre-validated,
and, therefore, was unenforceable, then the best interest of the child standard
would apply.4' In both cases, the genetic parent, the surrogate mother, and the
contractual parent would vie for the right to establish the parent-child
relationship; the intended parent, however, would face the financial responsibility
of raising the child under a provision similar to section 809 (c) of the UPA
(2000).4"
If cloning remains illegal, the scenario becomes more complicated and very
difficult to resolve at this time, since the exact culpability of each party to the
cloning arrangement has not been established. In other words, are the donor, the
gestational mother, and the intended parents all at the same level of culpability?
One possible answer to this question is that the intended parent in a cloning
situation is the party of greatest culpability, since he/she is in essence the prime
mover of the child's creation; it is easily possible to imagine scenarios including
a futuristic black market, in which the creation of a child is the result of an
agreement between the intended parents and a physician or an organization that
performs the cloning procedure, in which the donor and the gestational mother
might not even know of the child's origin.
So what can be said about determining the parentage of a child who comes
into this world as a result of illegal cloning? It is not impossible to develop a
working model for such a determination. Of course, in any model based on
illegal cloning, the requirement of a judicially pre-validated contract for assisted
conception becomes meaningless. Also, in any model, as a matter of both
deterrence and of insuring the financial well-being of the child, the intended
parents and the person (and/or organization) who performs the cloning should
remain financially responsible for the child, as would all intended parents under
the UPA (2000). As to the gestational mother and the donor, they should both
have the opportunity to establish the parental relationship. Both of these potential
parents have a significant real-world connection with the child, and it should not
make any difference if they have developed their desire to raise the child late in
the process.4" The UPA (2000) states a definite preference for the gestational
mother over the donor. 4 Under the UPA (2000), where there is an unenforceable
contract of surrogacy, the gestational mother is considered to be the child's
mother,4 4 and in all cases donor parents have no opportunity to establish a
parental relationship. There is, however, no reason for this automatic assignment
420. See discussion infra Part II.C.
421. "Individuals who are parties to a nonvalidated gestational agreement as intended parents may be
held liable for support of the resulting child, even if the agreement is otherwise unenforceable." UNIF.
PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 809(c), 9B U.L.A. 369 (2001).
422. As mentioned several times in this article, California recognizes the right of a genetic birth mother
who has agreed to the adoption of her child to rescind her consent after the child's birth. See CAL. FAM. CODE
§§ 8500-9340 (West 1994 & Supp. 2003).
423. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 201, 9B U.L.A. 309 (2001).
424. Id.
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of parentage; it assumes that the gestational parent is fit and the donor is not.
Why not, in this extraordinary situation, make an actual determination of the
child's best interest?
The greatest difficulty in formulating a model is deciding whether the
intended parents should be considered in determining the parentage of the child.
As a matter of deterrence, the intended parents should be barred from being
declared the child's parents so that they do not receive the benefit of their illegal
act. But, at the same time, it is not impossible to imagine a scenario where the
best interests might dictate that the intended parents should be declared the
child's parents. Indeed, it is possible that the intended parents are the only ones
who want to raise the child. There is a compromise between these two views: the
intended parent would be considered as a possible parent only if there was no
other potential parent, donor, or gestational mother available. The overall model,
one based upon the principles enunciated in this article, for the determination of
parentage of an illegally cloned child would contain a provision stating that any
contract regarding this form of assisted reproduction would not be valid. Where
the donor and intended parent coincide, there would be no need for a special
provision; the donor is the genetic-biological parent of the child. Where the
intended parent is someone other than the donor, the best interest standard would
prevail, but the contest is only between the gestational mother and the donor.42
The intended parent would be considered only if there was no other potential
parent available.
3. Status of Donors
In considering the requirement of a judicially pre-validated contract for
assisted conception, a question arises regarding the status of donors: should
donors be automatically excluded as parents of a child created through assisted
conception? California already excludes one category of donors: "[t]he donor of
semen provided to a licensed physician and surgeon for use in artificial
insemination of a woman other than the donor's wife is treated in law as if he
were not the natural father of a child thereby conceived., 426 However, California
law is entirely silent regarding the status of both egg donors and sperm donors
where artificial insemination is not used as the means of assisted conception.
Section 702 of the UPA (2000) severs all ties between donor and child: "[a]
donor is not a parent of a child conceived by means of assisted reproduction. 4 7
The view of the framers of the UPA (2000) was that this approach is more in
425. In the cloning scenario, the donor may either be a man or a woman.
426. CAL FAMv. CODE § 7613(b) (West 1994). For situations involving homologous artificial insemination,
that is, where the donor is the husband or partner of the impregnated woman, there is no need for a special criteria
to determine parentage of the donor; the genetic test is sufficient. For heterologous artificial insemination, the
present rule operates to sever the parental relationship of donor and child.
427. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 702, 9B U.LA. 355 (2001).
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keeping with modern assisted reproduction practices and "provides certainty of
nonparentage for prospective donors." 42g There are several important reasons for
not adopting this provision. It encourages at-home artificial insemination and all
of the ills which may be associated with private artificial insemination.4 At-
home artificial insemination does not allow for even the most rudimentary
screening for health-related problems. At best, a medical history is taken
informally, and no medical tests are taken.40 Moreover, there are situations in
which the donor may want to establish a parental relationship with the child. The
most likely situation would be where there has been improper use of the donor's
genetic material through fraud, theft or even negligence.4 ' Also, there is the
problem of the involuntary donor. While the involuntary donor might not be a
problem with sperm and egg donation, it may be a significant problem with
cloning, where almost any cell can provide the genetic material needed for
cloning. The involuntary donor should be included in the group of potential
parents who have standing to assert parentage rights.
California should reject the position of the UPA (2000) and it should not
432broaden the approach of Family Code section 7613, allowing automatic
severance of the parent-child relationship for sperm donors only in cases of
artificial insemination. The effect of this limitation is that donors433 must be
428. Id. § 702 cmt., 9B U.L.A. 355 (2001).
429. See Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 224 Cal. Rptr. 530, 535 (Ct. App. 1986).
430. Additionally, the automatic severance of the parental rights can lead to absurd results when at-
home artificial insemination is involved. If a couple decides to engage in sexual intercourse and the woman gets
pregnant, her partner is the father. If they use artificial insemination, the man has no relationship to the child. If
they have adequately protected sex and then use artificial insemination, then the donor has no relationship with
the child. Evidentiary problems could arise. The partner seeking to establish paternity would say that they had
sexual intercourse; the party seeking to deny paternity would say that they used artificial insemination.
431. The California Legislature has recognized this problem and made it a crime to improperly use
sperm, ova, or embryos. See also CAL. PENAL CODE § 367g (West 1999 & Supp. 2003). See Historical and
Statutory Notes to Penal Code section 367g, supra note 226. Also, two very recent cases have tackled the
problem of parentage following the improper use of genetic material. In the first, Prato-Morrison v. Doe, 126
Cal. Rptr. 2d 509 (Ct. App. 2002), the trial court refused to allow the putative genetic parents to present
evidence that they were related to the child. In the second case, Robert B. v. Susan B., 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 785
(Ct. App. 2003), the trial court's decision to declare the genetic father to be the child's father was upheld by the
court of appeal.
432. There is little harm in California keeping its present section 7613 of the Family Code. The present
approach does involve the operation of law, albeit on a rather low level. Also, the present approach is very well
established. Sperm banks have been active for many years and many children have been conceived in this
manner and not many legal issues have arisen out of the process. Contra Jenna H. Bauman, Note, Discovering
Donors: Legal Rights to Access Information About Anonymous Sperm Donors Given to Children of Artificial
Insemination in Johnson v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 31 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 193 (2001).
Finally, in the process of artificial insemination, the genetic-biological mother, who is also the birth mother, is
still involved. In effect, if section 7613 remained in the code it would be an exception to the rule requiring a
donor in assisted conception to be a party to the judicially pre-validated contract.
433. In some situations the genetic test, if adopted as the baseline for determining parentage, would
serve adequately to determine parentage. Examples include where the genetic mother may actually carry the
child conceived with her own and her husband's genetic material and where the genetic mother and father
would also be the intended parents as in Johnson v. Calvert. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 34
parties to the judicially pre-validated assisted-conception contracts and they must
expressly consent to the severance of their parental rights.
C. The Best Interest Test
While either the USCACA or the UPA (2000) could serve as an adequate
model for California legislation enforcing surrogacy contracts, there is a common
problem with both acts, at least as they apply to gestational surrogacy. Under the
USCACA section 5 Alternative A, if there is no judicial pre-approval, the
surrogate mother and her husband, if he is a party to the surrogacy agreement, are
the child's parents by default.4 4 The UPA (2000) reaches this same result by the
• • 435
application of Article 2 and other provisions. Although neither act states a
rationale for adopting this position, there are two likely rationales: the first is to
follow traditional presumptions of parentage (the mother is the birth mother and
the father is the man married to her); the second is to provide a deterrent to those
who seek to have a child by surrogacy without judicial validation. If intended
parents do not follow the rules, they lose the child they sought. Nevertheless, this
approach may place onerous economic and psychological burdens on the
gestational mother and her husband, the parties to the surrogacy contract who are
the most likely to have been exploited by it, the least likely parties to be
represented by counsel, and the least likely to intuitively realize that they must
have the contract pre-validated by a court. The UPA (2000) mitigates the
economic burden on the gestational mother and her husband by requiring that
"[i]ndividuals who are parties to a non-validated gestational agreement as
intended parents may be held liable for support of the resulting child, even if the
agreement is otherwise unenforceable.,4" But the problem of collecting support
and the psychological burden both remain, and, while the gestational mother may
want to raise her child, the UPA approach makes no provision for situations
where she has no interest in raising the child. A better approach would be simply
to use the best interest standard to determine the parentage of a child born as a
result of an un-validated surrogacy contract. Indeed, in all cases of assisted
conception where there is no judicially pre-validated contract, or where, because
434. UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT § 5, 9C U.L.A. 373 (2001).
435. In Article 2, section 201 provides for the determination of maternity by giving birth, adjudication,
or adoption, and for paternity by presumption, adjudication, or adoption. The gestational mother would be the
child's mother by virtue of having given birth. Section 201 also provides that paternity may be determined by
unrebutted presumption, acknowledgment, adjudication, adoption or consent to assisted reproduction. UNIF.
PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 201, 98 U.L.A. 309 (2001). While section 631 requires that a man be identified as
the father by genetic test under section 505 and that this evidence rebuts a presumption or acknowledgment of
paternity, the genetic test could not be used to establish the paternity of the donor because section 702 states
that, "A donor is not a parent of a child conceived by means of assisted reproduction." Id. § 702, 9B U.L.A. 355
(2001). Ultimately, the mother's husband would then be the child's father because of the presumption of
paternity created by the fact that he is married to the birth mother under section 704(a). See id. § 7 04(a), 9B
U.L.A. 356 (2001).
436. Id. § 809(c), 9B U.L.A. 369 (2001).
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of subsequent events such as the death of the contractual parents,43 the contract is
unenforceable, the test for determining parentage should be the traditional best
interest of the child standard.
While the best interest standard is not normally the standard for determining
parenthood, there are good reasons for using this standard. The application of the
best interest standard would make the welfare of the child paramount. A court
using the best interest standard could determine which of the potential parents,
donors, surrogate mother and her husband, or intended parents actually want to
rear the child. Unlike the approach of the USCACA and the UPA (2000), under
this standard, the court could also factor in the surrogate mother's psychological
relationship with the child developed during gestation and the days spent with the
child following birth. This standard would take into account the fitness of the
potential parents, their economic and psychological resources, their parenting
skills, and the suitability of their home. This concern for the welfare of the child
would be similar to that expressed in adoption law and in the requirement for a
pre-validated contract itself.438
While it may be novel to use the best interest standard to determine parentage,
California already has a well-developed body of law to determine the actual best
interest of the child. In fact, the court would be utilizing a very familiar standard
439indeed-one which has been judicially applied and perfected over many years.
A statutory framework for custody decisions already exists. California Family
Code section 3011 states specific factors to be considered in determining the best
interest of the child, including "[t]he health, safety, and welfare of the child,'" 44 a
parent's history of child abuse, 44' "[tjhe nature and amount of contact with both
parents," 442 and "the habitual or continual illegal use of controlled substances or
habitual or continual abuse of alcohol .... ,44 Other provisions allow consideration
of factors which may not be appropriate for determining parentage of a newborn,
but which demonstrate that there is a well-thought-out legislative approach to the
best interest standard. 4 Most importantly, the statutory framework has extensive
provisions for investigating and evaluating potential parents and their homes.445 In
437. The best interest standard could also be used where the contractual parents change their minds
about wanting to rear the child. While the contractual parent should still be financially responsible for the child,
the best interest of the child might dictate that the gestational mother or the donor parents should rear the child.
438. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 803, 913 U.L.A. 364 (2001).
439. For early applications of the best interest standard, see De La Montanya v. De La Montanya, 44 P.
354 (Cal. 1896); Sargent v. Sargent, 39 P. 931 (Cal. 1895); Luck v. Luck, 28 P. 787 (Cal. 1892). Perhaps the
oldest case applying the best interest standard to custody is State ex rel. Paine v. Paine, 23 Tenn. 523 (1843).
440. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3011(a) (West 1994 & Supp. 2003).
441. Id. § 3011(b).
442. id. § 3011(c).
443. Id. § 3011 (d).
444. See id. § 3040(a)(1) (allowing consideration of a parent's willingness to "allow the child frequent
and continuing contact with the noncustodial parent"); id. § 3042(a) (allowing consideration of the child's
preference).
445. ld. §§ 3110-3118.
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addition to these statutory provisions, there is extensive case law on the best
interest standard. California has significant case law on the effect of a parent's
disability,4" unconventional lifestyle, 447 sexuality of a parent,"48 religious beliefs,' 9
450
and disparate income .
The deterrent effect will not be lost if the best interest standard is adopted.
The use of this test will still discourage the parties, especially the intended
parents, from ignoring the requirement of judicial pre-validation. The intended
parents will not want to run the risk of a hearing and the possible loss of the
child. The cost of not following the statutory guidelines will be great in terms of
both money and emotional capital. Without this deterrent effect, the requirement
of a hearing for pre-validated contracts would become meaningless if an intended
parent could become the parent of the child after the child's birth without a
hearing.
Moreover, if a hearing is held, the court really would have no choice but to
determine what is in the best interest of the child. Once the child is born, it
becomes unimaginable for the court to do anything other than that which is in the
child's best interest. While courts sometimes have to make difficult or even fine-
line distinctions when applying the best interest standard, they would not be
expected to consciously place children in situations which are bad for them.
Finally, if the best interest standard is used to determine parentage, the court
will be able to consider all potential parents of the child including the donor or
donors, the gestational mother and her husband if she is married, and the
intended parents. One might expect, because of the strong support for the genetic
relationship expressed herein, that this article would advocate that donors should
be given priority. Just as the USCACA and the UPA (2000) designate the
surrogate and her husband as the default parents when there is an unenforceable
contract,45' it would be possible to make a similar rule in favor of the genetic-
biological parents. However, such a blanket rule in favor of genetic donors would
be unfair in this situation simply because the genetic donors may not have
contemplated raising a child at the time that they agreed to become donors. These
expectations, or lack of expectations, should be honored. However, if the donor
446. See In re Marriage of Carney, 598 P.2d 36, 42 & n.8 (Cal. 1979) (holding that a custody determination
may not be based solely on the existence of a parent's disability).
447. See id. at 44-45 (holding that an unconventional lifestyle of one parent is an insufficient basis for a
decision granting custody to the other parent).
448. See Nadler v. Superior Court, 63 Cal. Rptr. 352, 354 (Ct. App. 1967) (holding that, while a court
may consider homosexuality of a parent, it may not serve as the exclusive basis for a custody decision).
449. See In re Marriage of Urband, 137 Cal. Rptr. 433, 433-34 (Ct. App. 1977) (holding that the
religious beliefs of a parent may not serve as a basis of a custody decision unless there is a showing of actual
detriment to the child).
450. See Burchard v. Garay, 724 P.2d 486, 491-92 (Cal. 1986) (holding that disparate income may not
serve as a factor in custody decisions). This case would be especially relevant to the issue of parentage if the
legislature chose to keep the provision of the UPA (2000) which mandates financial responsibility for the
intended parents.
451. See discussion supra Part II1.B.
2003 /Baseline, Bright-line, Best Interests
has at some point formulated a desire to raise the child-for example, where the
genetic material of the donor has been used by fraud or mistake-the donor
should have the opportunity to make his or her case that he or she should be the
child's parent. The same is true regarding a surrogate mother and her husband.
While they should not be precluded from asserting a parentage claim, it is unfair
to require, as does the UPA (2000), that the gestational mother assume the role of
mother. California public policy, embodied in statute, favors a birth mother's
change of heart regarding her decision to raise her child during gestation over
giving the child up for adoption. So a decision during gestation that she would
like to raise the child should at least afford the birth mother the opportunity to
prove that it would be in the child's best interest for her to raise the child.
The intended parents should have the same opportunity... to establish
parentage; however, they should receive no special benefit from having been the
intended parents. It should make no difference that they formed their desire to
raise the child first, or that they were the prime movers of the child's creation.
Under the pre-validated contract system, they had their opportunity to perfect
their parental relationship through a procedure that took into account the welfare
of the child. If it is not in the best interest of the child to be raised by the intended
parents, then they should not be considered the parents. While the courts favored
intended parents in both Johnson v. Calvert453 and In re Marriage of Buzzanca,44
they did so because they assumed that the best interests of the child were co-
extensive with the desire to have a child. They used an imputed best interest
standard, but such a standard is both foolish and unnecessary if there is a hearing
at which the actual best interests can be determined. The use of the best interest
test does not mean that in determining parentage the court will not consider the
facts that the intended parents have diligently sought to have a child, possibly for
a long time, that they have taken the trouble to arrange for assisted conception,
that they have made other preparations to welcome the child into their home, and
that they have a great capacity to love and care for the child. All of these factors
weigh heavily in their favor, but the mere fact that these people are the intended
parents should not decide the case in their favor. At the same time, the position
of the USCACA and the UPA (2000) is too harsh. While the intended parents, as
the prime movers, have had the opportunity to assert their parental rights by
simply having their contract for assisted conception validated by the court, their
failure to follow statutory procedures should not automatically preclude them
from serving as the child's parents.
452. In a sense, the use of the best interest test is a benefit for the intended parents. Otherwise, the
intended parent would be out of the picture entirely, The gestational mother would be the child's mother under
the birth mother presumption, which could be rebutted by a donor mother using the genetic test, and the child's
father would be the donor.
453. 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
454. 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Ct. App. 1998).
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In a sense, the best interest requirement serves as a sufficiently strong
deterrent against ignoring the judicial validation requirement. If the intended
parents do not follow the judicial validation requirement, they run the risk of
losing the child. As an additional deterrent, California should adopt the UPA
(2000) approach regarding support-that the intended parents will be exposed to
the possibility of ongoing support for the child whether or not they are declared
the parents of the child. 55
IV. CONCLUSION
The goal of this article has been to present a practical model for establishing
the parent and child relationship in California-a model that attempts to provide
for the welfare of children and at the same time provide certainty and consistency
in the California law dealing with children born both with and without assisted
conception. This article recognizes that there is a very strong interest on the part
of couples, married and unmarried, heterosexual and homosexual, and single
people, as well, to use the various means of assisted conception to aid them in
having children. At the same time, this article assumes that the ethic of the
marketplace should not be the sole factor in determining a child's parentage, that
this decision is suitable for state regulation and court intervention. Three basic
proposals have been made herein. First, the genetic-biological relationship should
be considered the baseline for the determination of a child-parent relationship. In
all situations, the genetic-biological relationship should serve as the basis of the
parent and child relationship unless another person is designated as the parent by
operation of law. This proposal does not mean that presumptions no longer play a
role in determining the parent-child relationship, but that California should
abolish the conclusive presumption and make all other presumptions regarding
paternity and maternity fully rebuttable. Second, for situations involving assisted
conception other than artificial insemination, there should be a bright-line rule
analogous to that in adoption law to determine when someone other than the
genetic-biological parent should be designated as the natural parent. California
should enact legislation requiring that there be a written contract among donors,
surrogate mothers, and intended parents; for this contract to be enforceable, it
must be judicially validated prior to the conception of the child. This legislation
should include specific requirements, which should be designed to insure the
welfare of the child, and which must be met in order for courts to approve or
validate such contracts. Finally, for all situations of assisted conception where
there is no enforceable pre-validated contract, the court must determine the
parentage of the child according to the best interest of the child standard.
455. See UNIF. PARENrAGE ACT (2000) § 809(c), 9B U.L.A. 369 (2001).

